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Abstract
The size of the financial risk, the social repercussions and the legal ramifications
resulting from data leakage are of great concern. Some experts believe that poor system
designs are to blame. The goal of this thesis is to use applied formal methods to verify
that data leakage related confidentiality properties of system designs are satisfied.
This thesis presents a practically applicable approach for using Banks’s confidentiality
framework, instantiated using the Circus notation.
The thesis proposes a tool-chain for mechanizing the application of the framework
and includes a custom tool and the Isabelle theorem prover that coordinate to verify a
given system model. The practical applicability of the mechanization was evaluated by
analysing a number of hand-crafted systems having literature related confidentiality
requirements.
Without any reliable tool for using BCF or any Circus tool that can be extended for the
same purpose, it was necessary to build a custom tool. Further, a lack of literature
related descriptive case studies on confidentiality in systems compelled us to use
hand-written system specifications with literature related confidentiality requirements.
The results of this study shows that the tool-chain proposed in this thesis is practically
applicable in terms of time required. Further, the efficiency of the proposed tool-chain
has been shown by comparing the time taken for analysing a system both using the
mechanised approach as well as the manual approach.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is one of the three classic goals of the data security triad where the other
two are integrity and availability (Article 29 Working Party, 2013, p. 27). Confidentiality
of a system is an assurance that information will not be leaked to an unauthorised
audience by that system. Confidential information may include Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) (Antón and Earp, 2001) and business secrets amongst other things.
Disclosure of confidential information has the potential to compromise privacy, results
in huge financial losses and also have social repercussions. The massive data leakage of
Personally Identifiable Information of 33 million users at Ashley Madison in 2015 (BBC
News, 2015) is a perfect example of such damage. However, this has been dwarfed by
the recent announcement of the 2014 data breach at Yahoo Inc. (The New York Times
Company, 2016).
“Security experts say the breach could bring about class-action lawsuits, in addition
to other costs. An annual report by the Ponemon Institute in July found that the
costs to re-mediate a data breach is $221 per stolen record. Added up, that would
top Yahoo‘s $4.8 billion sale price”
(The New York Times Company, 2016).
The financial aspects of such data leakages in organisations has been published in
the media (see Table 1.2). However, the author was not able to find details on the
approaches which the perpetrators used for stealing confidential information from these
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organisations1. Therefore, there is no way to conclude whether these data leakages were
due to poor system design. Studies conducted by security experts such as Cast Software
.Inc (2014), Verizon Enterprise Solutions (2014) and Depaula (2016) have identified
poor system design as one of the reasons for data leakage. One such aspect of a poor
system design can be the inconsistency between the functional requirements of a system
and its confidentiality requirements. If a functional requirement and a confidentiality
requirement of a system are inconsistent, confidential data maybe revealed through an
implementation that only satisfies such a functional requirement.
To address the thesis scope and challenges, one must consider system development
approaches that ensure that the confidentiality requirements are engineered into the
design of an information system. Further, one must ensure that the chosen approach
supports a mathematically accurate transformation from a system model to an imple-
mentation.
1.2 Confidentiality engineering
Confidentiality engineering can be defined as the integration of tools and techniques
within the system development process whereby practitioners can verify the conform-
ance of a system design against a given set of confidentiality requirements. Given that
confidentiality is a non-functional property2, how can engineers verify whether the
design of a system respects both the functional as well as the non-functional require-
ments of a system? Model driven verification (Holzmann and Joshi, 2004) and formal
1 The author did find such information for the Target data leakage. The approach is reported as follows. “According
to Krebs, sources close to the investigation said the attackers first gained access to Target’s network on Nov. 15,
2013 with a username and password stolen from Fazio Mechanical Services, a Sharpsburg, Pa.-based company that
specializes in providing refrigeration and HVAC systems for companies like Target.
Fazio apparently had access rights to Target’s network for carrying out tasks like remotely monitoring energy
consumption and temperatures at various stores.
The attackers leveraged the access provided by the Fazio credentials to move about undetected on Target’s
network and upload malware programs on the company’s Point of Sale (POS) systems”
(IDG Communications, 2013).
2 In the field of software engineering, functional requirements describe what the system is supposed to do whereas
non-functional requirements describe the qualities of the system functions (Onabajo, 2009, p. 21).
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The focus of the research presented in this thesis is on analysing models of inform-
ation systems for data leakage, by detecting inconsistencies between functional
requirements and confidentiality requirements. The motivation for this research is
discussed in Section 1.4
The hypothesis presents two main challenges.
1. Find an approach for system engineers to verify whether their system designs
respect the data leakage related confidentiality requirements of a system.
2. Find an approach for system engineers to ensure that their system designs
are transformed into implementations that are correct by construction.
These challenges demand the need for system development approaches where the
engineers can verify that:
• The system designs are confidentiality assuring.
• The step by step transformation from system designs to implementation can
be verified as preserving the embedded confidentiality assurances.
Thesis scope and challenges
verification (Blanchet, 2008; Hadj-alouane et al., 2005) are different approaches whereby
system designs can be verified for conformance to a given set of requirements.
Banks’s Confidentiality Framework (BCF) (Banks, 2012), discussed in this thesis, is
based on aspects of the information flow theories by Jacob (1988) and Morgan (1998).
Using BCF, the information flow in a system can be analysed. Login and logout
functions that are usually implemented to secure a system are part of an access control
mechanism that does not protect against information flow related security issues.
“Information flow (IF) analysis is a suitable verification technique that focuses on
the information propagation throughout the system (end-to-end) rather than mere
data access (point-to-point). IF analysis can identify leaks, so-called interferences,
that circumvent access control mechanisms”
(Accorsi and Wonnemann, 2010, p. 194).
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The case for formal methods. Formal methods are techniques based on mathematics to
describe system properties.
“A method is formal if it has a sound mathematical basis, typically given
by a formal specification language. This basis provides the means of pre-
cisely defining notions like consistency and completeness and, more relevantly,
specification, implementation, and correctness” (Wing, 1990, p. 8).
Correctness of a system can be described as an assurance that a software does
exactly what it is supposed to do. This assurance is often seen as a reflection
of the success percentage of applying a collection of test scenarios on the sys-
tem. However some of the correctness demanding systems such as mission
critical systems, military systems and life-saving systems needed a much more
correctness-guaranteed approach for their design, development and verification
(Cofer, 2010; Hall and Chapman, 2002). This is due to the criticality of the target
application environment as well as the financing involved in such huge pro-
jects. The approach for testing systems using test cases does not provide such
correctness guarantees as the set of test cases define a finite set of scenarios.
“Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show
their absence!” (Dijkstra, 1972).
Potter, Sinclair and Till (Potter et al., 1996b) believe that formal methods was
born out of this push towards assuring the ‘accuracy and correctness’ of software.
This belief was further supported by many academics in the software engineering
discipline where they commonly agreed that errors introduced early in the
development process are much harder and time-consuming to fix if detected later
and also consequently cost a lot more (Woodcock and Davies, 1996, p. 1; Bowen,
1996, p. 31; Peine et al., 2008, p. 9; Defence Science and Technology Organisation,
2008, p. 4; Cant et al., 2002, p. 2; Sommerville, 2010, p. 243) .
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Confidentiality vs. Privacy. Many researchers including Jamal et al. (2014), Hayashi
(2013), Moore and McSherry (2013), McClelland (2002), Mayer (2002), Anderlik
and Rothstein (2001) and Mlinek and Pierce (1997) argue that people often use
the terms confidentiality and privacy interchangeably. For example, Hansen (1971),
Mayer (2002) and Tschantz and Wing (2008) used the word privacy interchangeably
with confidentiality, when discussing techniques that are used to analyse scenarios
with a confidentiality requirement.
Both these words are used in relation to information secrecy. The topic of this
thesis is focused on proposing an approach to make a certain confidentiality
framework practical. Therefore, it is important to clarify the difference between
these two terms and explain how one is related to the other.
A knowledge map of the field of information security research is presented in Fig-
ure 1.1. The objective of presenting Figure 1.1 is to show the association between
confidentiality, privacy and security which are sometimes used interchangeably.
Further, the knowledge map also highlights the area of the information security
research discussed in this thesis.
privacy refers to “the right of individuals or cooperative users to main-
tain confidentiality and control over their information when it’s
disclosed to another party” (Porambage et al., 2016, p. 37).
confidentiality refers to “the assurance on non-disclosure of sensitive resources
to unauthorised subjects” (Margheri et al., 2015, p. 34).
In summary, privacy is an individual’s desire for information secrecy whereas
confidentiality is an assurance for information secrecy. Privacy demands form
a subset of information secrecy requirements, where other requirements might
include secrecy of company information or government information, to name but
two.
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As shown in Figure 1.1, there are many aspects of confidentiality such as legal (Al-
Fedaghi, 2012, p. 6), financial (Rubinstein, 2011, p. 1456), ethical (Orb et al., 2001) and
data leakage related (Gordon, 2007) to name a few. In this thesis, we consider the data
leakage related aspect of confidentiality. An introduction to data leakage is given in
Section 1.3.
1.3 Data leakage through communication channels
Shabtai et al. (2012, p. 5) state that data leakage is the intentional or unintentional
distribution of private or sensitive data to an unauthorised entity. Private and sensitive
data are considered confidential and may include personal, corporate, military or
government data. Some intentional and unintentional activities that may result in a
data leakage are shown in Figure 1.2.
Different technological approaches are being used to provide data leakage detection
and prevention such as designated Data Leak Prevention (DLP) systems3, access control
and encryption mechanisms, advanced/intelligent4 security measures and standard
security measures such as firewalls, antivirus systems and intrusion detection systems.
Apart from direct theft, data leakage may occur as a result of poor information infra-
structure design (Cast Software .Inc, 2014; Depaula, 2016; Verizon Enterprise Solutions,
2014) as well as poor data management practices amongst others. Among the mechan-
isms that may help in detecting and mitigating data leakages, is the implementation of
information security policies. The information infrastructure of an organisation must be
governed by such policies to ensure that the security of the data is always maintained
whether in transit or at rest. This includes integrating such policies within the top-level
3 “Designated DLP solutions are intended to detect and prevent attempts to copy or send sensitive data, intentionally or
unintentionally, without authorization, mainly by personnel who are authorized to access the sensitive information”
(Shabtai et al., 2012, p. 9).
4 “Advanced or intelligent security measures include machine learning and temporal reasoning algorithms for detecting abnormal
access to data” (Shabtai et al., 2012, p. 9).
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design of information systems. The focus of the research in this thesis is to provide
a practically applicable approach for using a formal framework that supports such
integrations.
Channels are used to communicate information between agents5 in an information
system. Within the context of an information system, an individual with a low security
clearance may use various channels to gather data that maybe classified at a higher
classification. Such channels may include side channels, covert channels, inference channels
and overt channels.
side channel A side channel is a physical observable side-effect of a computation,
that an adversary can measure (Lawson, 2009, p. 65).
covert channel A covert channel is described as “any communication channel that
can be exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner
that violates the systems security policy” (Latham, 1986, p. 80).
inference channel An inference problem exists when a user with a lower security clear-
ance uses information which he is authorized, to draw conclusions
about information at a higher security clearance (Garvey et al., 1991,
p. 119). Such a link that may allow the flow of information from a
higher security class to a lower security class is an inference channel.
overt channel An overt channel is described as “a communication path within a
computer system or network designed for the authorized transfer of
data” (Lucena et al., 2006, p. 147).
BCF codifies the information a user may not gain by observing overt channels in an
information system. The aim of this thesis is to extend the value of BCF. This has been
achieved by mechanising BCF and evaluating the mechanisation to understand how
effective it is for analysing system models for data leakages.
5 “Agents are active components forming the system. They can be humans, devices, legacy software, etc”
(De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde, 2005, p. 41).
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1.4 Motivation
The regulatory demand for secure by design practices during system development and
the size of the financial risk due to data leakage incidences motivate work on techniques
to integrate confidentiality engineering during the system development process. System
development practices that guarantee confidentiality, contribute towards assuring
privacy as well as trustworthy computing. In this regard the work presented in this
thesis is highly encouraging.
The untrusted access to confidential information leads to privacy violations. Such
digital-era related privacy concerns have been raised as early as in the 1990s. One of the
recommendations of the study conducted by The New York Public Service Commission
during 1989 and 1990 on privacy in telecommunication services recommended that
privacy promoting technologies should be encouraged in future service offerings
(Rotenberg, 1993).
Technology and policy experts in security, privacy and networking who participated in
the 2003 conference on the Grand Challenges in Trustworthy Computing organised by
the Computing Research Association (2003) declared that:
• ensuring trustworthiness of important societal applications such as electronic
voting systems and healthcare record databases is one of the great challenges in
trustworthy computing.
• a possible progress on ensuring trustworthiness of important societal applications
will be to assure users that systems are designed with strong mathematical
guarantees that eventually can achieve confidentiality of records amongst other
security requirements.
Even though software designers have started to include non-functional properties such
as performance and reliability in the system development process, “security still remain
an afterthought” (Giorgini et al., 2004, p. 2). The same issue has been highlighted by a
number of author’s (CAUSE, 1997, p. 3; Mouratidis et al., 2003, p. 63 ; Mouratidis et al.,
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2005, p. 610; Schumacher et al., 2005, p. xi; Weiss and Mouratidis, 2008, p. 169; Williams,
2009, p. 67; Churchill, 2009, p. 131; David and Prosch, 2010, p. 3 ; Le M’etayer, 2010,
p. 323; Rubinstein, 2011, p. 1411; Le Métayer, 2011, p. 10 ; European Digital Rights, 2012,
p. 8; Burgemeestre et al., 2013, p. 153 ; Cavoukian and Dixon, 2013, p. 212 ; El-Hadary
and El-Kassas, 2014, p. 463) .
In this regard, this thesis explores ways in which the value of a validation framework
for systems with a confidentiality requirement can be extended. The eventual goal
is to have a well tested and mature confidentiality validation framework so that the
framework can be integrated into professional software development tool kits. The
work presented in this thesis contributes towards realising this goal.
1.4.1 Mandatory regulation demanding secure-by-design practices
Privacy legislations and regulations in many countries (General Services Administra-
tion, 2005; Office for National Statistics, 2002; Office of Parliamentary Counsel, 1988;
U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014) mandate that personally
identifiable information must never be released to unauthorised individuals. However,
decisions about the implementation mechanisms to achieve legislative compliance is
solely left to the parties who handle personal data of individuals. Dr. Ann Cavoukian
(2009) first introduced the phrase Privacy by Design (see Figure 1.1) to refer to such
mechanisms, back in the 90s.
“Privacy by Design refers to the philosophy and approach of embedding privacy
into the design specifications of various technologies” (Cavoukian, 2009).
Both the preliminary and the final report of the U.S. Federal Trade commission (FTC)
on “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change” in 2010 and 2012
consecutively recommends companies to adopt Privacy by Design practices by building
privacy at every stage of their product development (Federal Trade Commision (FTC),
2012; Federal Trade Commission, 2010). However, the FTC stopped short of using the
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phrase Privacy by Design in its call to the U.S. Congress, but rather requested them to
consider enacting baseline privacy legislation and reiterated its call for data security
legislation.
The General Data Protection Regulation of The European Parliament and The European
Council (2016) states that organisations must implement “data protection by design and
by default” whereby organisations must ensure that personal data will be “processed in
a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection
against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction
or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and
confidentiality’)”. The European Digital Rights (2012) and European Parliament (2014)
elaborate these measures by specifying that technical aspects should include the design
of software and hardware and that organisational aspects should include internal
and external policies and current best practices, a call advocated earlier by Dr. Ann
Cavoukian (2009) and later repeated by the U.S. FTC (Federal Trade Commision (FTC),
2012; Federal Trade Commission, 2010).
This shows a shift from general compliance recommendations and directives towards
legislation and regulation that mandates the adoption of secure-by-design practices
during software design and development. It is also important to note here that this
European Parliament regulation also applies to organisations outside the European
Union (EU) that collect personal data from EU citizens. Hence, the regulation throws a
broader net than the Euro-zone and practically covers all multinational companies in
the world.
1.4.2 Cost of data leakages
Data leakages cost millions of dollars to companies around the world. For example, as
per the Article 83 of the General Data Protection Regulation (The European Parliament
and The European Council, 2016, p. 82), companies with severe data breaches will be
fined either 2% of the company’s worldwide annual turnover or e10, 000, 000 which
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ever is greater. In addition, a data leakage has many other associated losses including
loss of customer confidence and legal fees and settlements related to multiple lawsuits.
Table 1.2 presents a list of major data leakages between 2011 to 2015 where each single
breach compromised more than 1 million unique customer records. Table 1.1 presents
the ratio of the cost of the data leakage to the net asset value of that company, just to
give an idea of the size of the risk to an organisation from data leakage. This shows
that data security translates into a financial risk for an organisation.
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Anthem Insurancea personal
information
80 2015 24, 251 8, 000 32.99%
The Home Depot b personal and
financial
information
56 2014 12, 520 8, 120 64.85%
Table 1.1: Financial risk ratio against net asset value of two companies
where more than 1 million records were compromised
a Company value has been taken from the 2014 Annual Report of Anthem, Inc. (Anthem, 2014) submitted to the U.S.
Securities Exchange. When calculating the total cost of the data breach at Anthem, Inc., the stated lower bound of
$100 (Lockton Inc., 2015) as the per record cost of the breach was considered.
b Company value has been taken to be the different between the total assets and liabilities in the Home Depot financial
report in (MarketWatch, 2014). When calculating the total cost of the data breach at The Home Depot, the average
cost of $145 paid for each stolen record in 2014 has been considered (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2014).
The cost of a data leakage cannot be realized for sometime. In the case of The Home
Depot data breach, the 2014 annual report of The Home Depot (2014) has revealed
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that the gross expense for their 2014 data breach stood at $63m . However, the report
also stated that “We expect to incur significant legal and other professional services expenses
associated with the Data Breach in future periods”. The 2015 annual report of The Home
Depot (2015) has revealed that the gross expense related to its 2014 data breach had
increased to $232m.
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Organisation Information
lost
Records
compromised
(in millions)
Year Source
Ashley Madison personal info 33 2015 (BBC News, 2015)
TalkTalk personal and
financial info
4 2015 (Gemalto, 2015)
U.S. office of
personnel
management
personal info 21 2015 (Gemalto, 2015)
Experian personal info 15 2015 (Guardian News, 2014)
Anthem Insurance personal info 80 2015 (Lockton Inc., 2015)
Adult FriendFinder personal info 3.8 2015 (Gemalto, 2015)
Community Health
System
personal info 4.5 2014 (Verizon, 2015)
Experian personal info 200 2014 (Guardian News, 2014)
The Home Depot personal and
financial info
56 2014 (The Home Depot, 2014)
JP Morgan personal info 76 2014 (The New York Times
Company, 2014)
eBay personal info 145 2014 (Verizon, 2015)
Adobe personal info 38 2013 (BBC News, 2013)
Target personal and
financial info
70 2013 (The Association of Data
Protection Officers, 2015)
Evernote personal info 50 2013 (The Association of Data
Protection Officers, 2015)
Epsilon personal info 60 2011 (The Association of Data
Protection Officers, 2015)
Sony personal info 78 2011 (The Association of Data
Protection Officers, 2015)
Table 1.2: Data leakages between 2011-2015 where more than 1 million
records were compromised
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1.5 Hypothesis
Banks (2012) proposed a formal framework that can be used for the formal analysis of
data leakage related confidentiality requirements in systems. Banks’s Confidentiality
Framework (BCF) can be used to demonstrate that the formal model of a system does
not leak data through legitimate communication channels of the system in violation
of any confidentiality requirements of the system. The manual application of BCF
is practically infeasible (Section 4.2). Further, there are no tools that can be used to
analyze system models using BCF. However, there are different tools and frameworks
that can be used to derive and analyse formal predicates from system models, similar
to BCF (Section 2.2).
The hypothesis of this thesis is that a practically applicable approach exists that
supports the process of analysing system models using Banks’s Confidentiality
Framework (BCF) (Banks, 2012) to verify if those models respect the integrated con-
fidentiality requirements pertaining to data leakage through legitimate channels.
The hypothesis
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1.5.1 The challenges
In order to justify the hypothesis, the following issues were addressed.
• Identify the step-by-step process for applying BCF.
• Identify what is required for applying BCF such as:
– how formal models of systems should be presented.
– how confidentiality requirements should be encoded in system
models.
• Identify how the process of applying BCF can be automated.
• Identify how the predicates generated through BCF can be translated to a
format that can be simplified by a tool.
• Identify a tool that can simplify complex predicates.
• Identify a formal language that can be used to specify systems and con-
fidentiality requirements in a way that the combined specification can be
type checked with an existing tool.
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1.5.2 Testing the hypothesis
In order to test the hypothesis, the following tasks were required.
1. Constructing a tool-chain for analysing systems using BCF.
2. Using the tool-chain to analyse purpose written specifications based on
typical system scenarios in which data leakage is a known issue.
3. Carrying out the following types of tests.
a) Multiple tests that show that analysing a system using BCF confirms
that the confidentiality requirements are respected in a given specific-
ation, if there were no contradictions in the system specification.
b) A test that shows that BCF correctly flags an issue that is not apparent
with a seemingly correct specification.
c) A test that shows that BCF correctly flags an issue with a specification
that has an artificially inserted inconsistency within its functionality
and confidentiality requirements.
4. Comparing the time taken to analyse systems using the tool-chain and
comparing it with manual application to show the value of the mechanisa-
tion.
5. Demonstrating the practical applicability of the mechanisation by showing
that confidentiality requirements related to data leakage through legitimate
channels can be generalised into patterns that supports tool based analysis.
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1.6 Contributions
Major contributions of this thesis are:
1. Proposing a practical approach for using Banks’s Confidentiality Framework
(BCF), to reason about the conformance of a system to a given set of data leakage
related confidentiality requirements, by developing a mechanisation for BCF
(contribution from Chapter 4).
2. Identifying and extracting generalized patterns of confidentiality requirements
from literature, where these requirements are related to data leakage in systems
through overt channels (contribution from Chapter 5).
3. Demonstrating the value of the proposed mechanisation by using it to analyse
systems with data leakage related confidentiality requirements. This includes:
a) Carrying out a comparison of execution times during the manual vs. mech-
anised application of BCF (contribution from Chapter 4).
b) Reviewing the time consumed for the mechanised application of BCF on
hand-crafted systems with varying degrees of complexity, with a confid-
entiality requirement that reflects a generalized pattern (contribution from
Chapter 6).
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1.7 Thesis structure
The structure of the thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2 presents a discussion of the preliminary knowledge that is required to
follow this thesis.
Chapter 3 presents the mechanisation of BCF. The chapter discusses ways in which
a practically applicable approach can be developed for BCF.
Chapter 4 presents a discussion on the approach which has been followed in this
research to evaluate the mechanisation of BCF.
Chapter 5 presents a systematic literature search for confidentiality related discus-
sions in order to identify common recurring patterns of confidentiality
requirements. Further, an approach for deriving generalized patterns of
confidentiality requirements is also presented.
Chapter 6 presents a case study analysis where systems with confidentiality re-
quirements, that represent instances of patterns of confidentiality require-
ments, has been analysed. A formal model has been developed for each
system and the results of the mechanised analysis has been presented
and compared.
Chapter 7 presents an evaluation of the research in this thesis. Further, this chapter
discusses the future directions in which the work pursued in this thesis
may be extended. The chapter further summarises the overall contribu-
tions, findings and limitations of the work presented in this thesis.
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2.1 Introduction
The research presented in this thesis establishes a practically applicable approach for the
analysis of data leakage in systems with a confidentiality requirement. The approach is
based on the mechanisation of BCF (Banks, 2012). BCF is based on Unifying Theories
of Programming (UTP) by Hoare and He (1998) and has been instantiated using the
Circus notation (Oliveira et al., 2009). The denotational semantics of the Circus notation
is based on UTP. This chapter provides an account of the preliminary knowledge which
the user must be equipped with in order to understand the technical content in this
thesis.
First, a discussion about the rationale behind selecting BCF for analysing data leakage
related confidentiality requirements in systems is presented. This includes a comparison
of BCF with research carried out by other researchers in the realm of formal analysis
of confidentiality. Next, the chapter introduces the reader to UTP, discusses how the
concept of BCF is captured in UTP, introduces the Circus notation and explains how
UTP forms the basis for the notation, describes how systems are modelled using the
Circus notation, describes how BCF is instantiated for Circus and discusses how BCF
in Circus can be used to analyse data leakage related confidentiality requirements in
systems.
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2.2 Analysing systems with a confidentiality requirement
This section reviews some existing formal approaches for analysing systems with a
confidentiality requirement. The Figure 2.1 shows the stage of the system development
where each approach is utilised. These approaches will be discussed later in this section.
The approaches discussed include PROMELA and the SPIN model checker (Holzmann,
1997), SecureUML (Basin et al., 2003), Secure Tropos (Bresciani et al., 2004), CoNaN
tool (Cerny and Alur, 2009a), InDico (Accorsi and Wonnemann, 2010), CONCHITA
using KAOS (De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde, 2005), TEES framework (Howitt,
2008) and Confidentiality properties and the B Method (Onunkun, 2012).
In addition, the Figure 2.1 includes the techniques abuse case and UML-RT to Circus
transformation. Even though these techniques are not used for analysing confidentiality
in systems, abuse case is included in Figure 2.1 to show that there is a possible alternative
to the existing KAOS technique used in CONCHITA, whereas UML-RT to Circus,
which is discussed later in Section 2.5.2, is included to show the stage of the system
development process where UML-RT to Circus is utilised.
This section presents a critical analysis of BCF by discussing the comparative advantages
and limitations of BCF with respect to other proposed approaches shown in Figure 2.1.
Abuse case. McDermott and Fox (1999) define abuse case as a complete interaction
between an actor and the system that is harmful to the system, one of the actors
or to one of the stakeholders of the system. McDermott and Fox (1999) introduced
the notion of abuse case to enable engineers to model possible harmful scenarios
of system interactions in such a way that the artefact could be understood by both
the user as well as the customer.
Abuse case and KAOS shown in Figure 2.1 are both goal-oriented requirement
engineering approaches that can be used for deriving security requirements from
security goals. However, they differ in how they derive and model security
requirements.
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45
2 Background
• Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification (KAOS) specification
language contains formal definitions in temporal first-order logic for com-
ponents of the system meta-model (Black, 2009, p. 22). These components
include system goal, agents, actions, entities and the relationships between
them. KAOS addresses security requirements by way of anti-goals (Lam-
sweerde, 2004).
• Abuse case uses the UML (Rumbaugh et al., 2004) approach for modelling
possible harmful scenarios of system interactions.
“In the requirement phase, the abuse case helps in gaining better under-
standing of system security between stakeholders, especially users and
customers. Any security design trade-offs can be made easily”
(Srivatanakul, 2005, p. 76).
PROMELA and the SPIN model checker. The Protocol/Process Meta Language (PRO-
MELA) (Holzmann, 1997) is a language for modelling finite state machines. It
allows a user to model concurrent processes. PROMELA supports embedded C
code. Communication between the processes are established through channels
defined for message passing. The Simple Promela INterpreter (SPIN) (Holzmann,
1997) analyses the logical consistency of concurrent systems. SPIN supports the
PROMELA modelling language. A PROMELA model consists of a number of
processes templates with at least one instantiation (Holzmann, 1997). The SPIN
model checker translates each template into a finite automaton. The global system
behaviour or state space of the system is represented by computing asynchronous
interleaving of all the finite automaton. Security properties are modelled as claims
in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). SPIN converts the encoded security properties to
a Büchi automaton1 (Büchi, 1960) and computes the synchronous product of this
1 The Büchi automata extends the theory of finite automata on finite words to languages over infinite words. “While
finite runs of finite automata are accepting if an accepting state is visited at the end of the run, an infinite run of a
Büchi automaton is accepting if a final state is visited (or a final transition is taken) infinitely many times during
the course of the run. The Büchi acceptance condition thus specifies a set of states (or transitions) that have to be
visited (respectively, taken) infinitely often” (Varghese, 2014, p. 1).
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automaton and the automaton representing the global state space. The model
checker visits every reachable state and also remembers all the states it has visited
(Wang et al., 2000, p. 50). The memory requirement to store this information and
resources required to traverse the state space depends on the size of the state
and the number of reachable states and can be resource intensive depending on
the given system specification. Edelkamp et al. (2001) combined SPIN with HSF
(Edelkamp, 1999) heuristic search workbench to develop the LISP SPIN tool that
can traverse large state spaces more efficiently than SPIN.
The model checker either validates the given security property or else a counter
example is produced that shows how the violation can take place. Some other
researchers have used SPIN to model and analyse confidentiality properties of
systems as described below.
Dabaghchian and Abdollahi Azgomi (2015) used embedded C code in PRO-
MELA to model a variant of the observational determinism confidentiality
property. Observation determinism ensures confidentiality in concurrent
programs by assuring that public variables and private variables are kept
independent during the execution of a program.
Ahmed and Tripathi (2003) used SPIN to model and verify confidentiality
properties of a Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) system.
They re-modelled the course activity case study by Foley and Jacob (1995).
In this thesis, the same system has been modelled and analysed using BCF
(Banks, 2012).
Having to remember every visited state is the biggest limitation of SPIN. Fur-
ther, the specifications that can be written using PROMELA are restricted to
the available PROMELA templates. However, BCF is defined using the UTP
framework and can be instantiated for a range of UTP theories as shown by Banks
(2012). Therefore a broad set of features can be supported by instantiating BCF
on relevant UTP theories than in SPIN+PROMELA.
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SecureUML - Integrating UML based process modelling and RBAC. Basin et al. (2003) pro-
posed an approach to integrate RBAC based security policies into formal system
models by using OCL constraints in UML. The resulting UML based language is
called SecureUML. The RBAC policies imposed by OCL constructs are used to
derive the precondition for every action in a UML class. Further, they integrate
SecureUML with a process modelling language by defining a dialect that identi-
fies process elements as protected resources. The semantics of this dialect uses a
form of weakest pre-condition computation to decide whether a user is allowed
to execute a particular process element. The process models are translated to
implementations of controller objects for multi-tier applications. They evaluate
their approach by generating prototypes using an extended version of a tool
called ArcStyler2 (Basin et al., 2003, p. 8).
SecureUML integrates security into formal models of systems. However they do
not provide an approach for verifying those models. The fundamental objective
of BCF is to provide an approach for verifying confidentiality integrated formal
models of systems.
Secure Tropos - Secure requirements engineering with reasoning. Tropos (Bresciani et al.,
2004) is an agent based software engineering methodology. Tropos lacks the ability
to capture the functionality and security features of an organisation at the same
time. Giorgini et al. (2004) extended Tropos by defining predicates that represent
properties of actors and trust properties between actors. These predicates are
combined to form security properties in the form of axioms. These axioms are
formalized as a datalog3 logic program and analysed using the DLV system
(Leone et al., 2006). Consistency checks guarantee that the security specification
is not self contradictory (Giorgini et al., 2004).
2 ArcStyler “provides a transformation function for converting UML classes and state machines into controller classes
for web applications, executed in a Java Servlet environment” (Basin et al., 2003, p. 8).
3 Abiteboul et al. (1995, p. 273) give an introduction to the datalog language.
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Secure Tropos utilizes a graphic model of a system whereas BCF utilizes a formal
specification based model of a system. It is not clear how a formal specification
of a Secure Tropos based model can be derived so that the specification can be
refined to an eventual implementation. However, with certain instantiations of
BCF, this is possible.
ConAn tool - Automated confidentiality analysis. Automated program checking for con-
fidentiality by Cerny and Alur (2009a) presents a notion of confidentiality based
on possibilistic reasoning. The tool supports a subset of Java that includes boolean
variables, integer variables, data variables and variables that range over an infinite
domain. However, only equality tests on data variables are supported.
A program execution produces an observation with respect to a condition cond.
If two executions exist where, in one execution a confidentiality predicate secret
holds and in another execution the same confidentiality predicate secret does not
hold, then the two executions will be indistinguishable to the observer, hence
achieving confidentiality.
The proposed ConAn tool takes in a program in Java bytecode, a condition cond, a
confidentiality predicate secret and some other required parameters. The tool auto-
matically inserts annotations to the Java program that record user observations
based on program execution. The tool generates formal scripts compatible with
the Yices SMT solver (Dutertre, 2014). The Yices SMT solver decides satisfiability
of the resulting formulae.
Automated program checking for confidentiality related to data leakage is specific
to a subset of Java constructs whereas BCF is defined at a higher level since BCF
is based on a formal notation and not specific to any programming language.
The approach for verification does not start from a formal specification but
rather reverse engineers a program to derive a set of formal scripts which then
get evaluated. Data leakage in Circus models can be verified using BCF and
subsequently those models can be refined to be implemented in any supported
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programming language. The ConAn tool based approach is limited to restricted
Java based implementations of systems, whereas since BCF supports verification
of system models at the formal specification level, this limitation does not exist.
InDico - Automated analysis of business processes for confidentiality. Accorsi and Won-
nemann (2010) proposed an approach for information flow analysis in business
processes. First, a formal model of a business process is developed. For example,
the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) (White, 2004) can be used
for this. The model is mapped to a coloured Petri Net (Jensen, 1987). Next, the
activities of the resulting IFnet’s4 are labelled with security labels. Analysis of the
IFnet relies on a manual verification process. The first step is to inspect the IFnet
for structured patterns that might leak information. The second step is to check
whether the identified patterns are reachable within a run of the system. This
is a state space explosion problem when processes have non-trivial number of
states. Therefore, the approach is not practical for non-trivial processes and also
has scalability issues due to a manual analysis approach. Further, this approach
supports only non-interference properties.
In comparison to InDico, BCF is not limited by state explosion and scalability
because BCF validates a system based on predicates which can be machine
evaluated.
CONCHITA framework. The CONfidentiality CHecker for Incremental Threat Analysis
(CONCHITA) by De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde (2005) is a reasoning
framework based on bounded model checking and constraint solving techniques.
Formal system models are defined using the goal oriented software requirements
engineering methodology called KAOS (Van Lamsweerde et al., 1991). The know-
ledge of agents at specific states in the system are captured using epistemic
constructs. These epistemic constructs are combined with LTL (Linear Tem-
poral Logic) (Pnueli, 1977) to define axioms that capture the interaction between
4 An IFnet is a specialization of coloured petri nets for work-flow modelling and information flow analysis (Accorsi
and Wonnemann, 2010, p. 195).
50
2.2 Analysing systems with a confidentiality requirement
knowledge and time. A set of templates that represent specification patterns
for confidentiality requirements are given. Specifiers must utilize one of these
templates to define their confidentiality claims. CONCHITA propositionalizes
the input specification and confidentiality claims. The resulting propositions are
converted into non-temporal logic versions by defining the length of the trace
as a given bound. The confidentiality verification problem is translated to a
constraint satisfaction problem by quantifying confidentiality patterns over the
user agent’s finite bound of knowledge of the system. The resulting constraint
is analysed using the Oz constraint solver (Henz et al., 1993) which presents a
counter example if the knowledge of a user agent contradicts with the quantified
confidentiality claim.
CONCHITA depends on a limited set of templates that can be used to define
confidentiality requirements whereas BCF does not have this limitation. Further,
BCF uses the Circus notation that represents system entities and state variables
more closely than epistemic logic used in CONCHITA.
TEES confidentiality model. The TEES confidentiality model (Howitt, 2008) is an au-
thorisation model that utilizes both Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo
and Kuhn, 1992) and Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) that includes override.
The model is based on a state machine approach and is formalized using the B
notation and verified using the Rodin B-toolkit (Butler and Hallerstede, 2007).
TEES concentrates on the antecedent of a conditional confidentiality requirement5
where TEES defines the condition under which the confidentiality of a state
variable must be maintained. However, BCF is more flexible in that BCF can
additionally define the degree of confidentiality of a state variable. For example,
consider a set S that represents the set of bids in an auction. BCF can be used to
define a confidentiality property where either all values of S can be kept secret or
a defined subset of values of S can be kept secret.
5 A conditional confidentiality requirement is equivalent to a conditional information flow, a flow of information that
only occurs when some condition is met at runtime (Tschantz and Wing, 2008, p. 108).
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Confidentiality Properties and the B Method. Onunkun (2012) proposes a framework to
reason about information flow security in B machines. The framework is restricted
to Multi Level Security properties. In this framework, state variables are mapped
to security classes in a security flow lattice. The framework extends the flow
logic analysis approach proposed by Clark et al. (2002). Reasoning about the
information flow is based on predicates computed based on this extension. Even
though the B machines were checked with Atelier-B (2017) for consistency, it is not
clear from Onunkun (2012) as to how the described information flow violations
were detected using the custom tool which Onunkun (2012) had developed.
BCF detects information flow violations through inconsistencies in a computed
predicate similar to that in Onunkun’s method. However, BCF is not restricted to
Multi Level Security properties only.
As can be seen from Figure 2.1 , the approaches based on Secure Tropos and SecureUML
are utilized in the requirement analysis phase. However, there is little research on how
the requirements phase is reconciled with the formal specification phase (Nakagawa
et al., 2007, p. 531). The work by Nakagawa et al. (2007) is an attempt towards bridging
this gap by proposing an approach to generate formal specifications based on VDM++
(Durr and van Katwijk, 1992) from KAOS models.
None of the above approaches support the analysis of a concrete formal specification of
a system where confidentiality requirements can be modelled using constraints on the
channels through which a system communicates with its environment. However, the
instantiation of BCF (Section 2.6) discussed in thesis supports supports such constraints.
The features in Table 2.1 are considered as critical criteria based on which BCF has been
selected for analysing systems with a confidentiality requirement.
Table 2.1 identifies at least one limitation of each approach in comparision to the BCF
approach for analysing data leakage related confidentiality requirements in systems.
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Not restricted by templates 3 5 5 5
Supports formal analysis of confidentiality
properties in system models
3 5 5
Not limited by state explosion problem 3 5
Not restricted by Multi-Level Security
properties
3 5
Table 2.1: Features supported by the various approaches for analysing
confidentiality requirements
A tick (3) denotes that the particular feature is avail-
able in the related formal approach. A cross (5) denotes that
the particular feature is not available in the related formal
approach. A blank denotes that the author has not verified
the availability of the particular feature in the related formal
approach. It is not necessary to identify all the features
supported by each approach as the intention of this table is
to show that none of the approaches except BCF support all
the features listed in the table.
2.3 Banks’s confidentiality framework (BCF)
Banks (2012) introduced BCF for the formal analysis of confidentiality requirements in
systems related to data leakage. BCF uses the general Unifying Theory of Programming
(UTP), and BCF has been instantiated (but not automated) for the Circus notation
(Oliveira et al., 2009). Hereafter, the phrase “BCF in Circus” will be used when referring
to this instantiation. BCF combines functionality and confidentiality requirements
within a formal framework to allow the specification of systems that are secure-by-
design (Banks and Jacob, 2011).
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As per Kerckhoffs’ Principle, ‘security through obscurity‘ is considered bad practice
in the design of a system (Kerckhoffs, 1883). In line with Kerckhoffs’ Principle, BCF
assumes that the adversary who wants to learn confidential information from the
system may have knowledge about the complete source code of the system.
Section 2.4 introduces UTP, describes the concept of BCF in UTP and discusses some of
the challenges that arise in automating a framework based on UTP. Section 2.5 gives
a brief introduction to the Circus notation, discusses how BCF has been instantiated
for the Circus notation and outlines some of the advantages of using Circus models in
detecting data leakage in systems.
2.3.1 The conceptual basis for BCF
The development of information flow security theories has been a gradual process.
Denning (1976) proposed a lattice model of secure information flow and provided a
formal semantics for the formal verification of information flow in program specific-
ations. Other notable information flow properties discussed in the literature include
Goguen and Meseguer’s Non-Interference (Goguen and Meseguer, 1982), Sutherland’s
Non-Deducibility (Sutherland, 1986), Jacob’s Inference function (Jacob, 1988), McCul-
lough’s Generalized Non-Interference (Mccullough, 1988), O’Halloran’s Non-inference
(O’Halloran, 1990), McLean’s Generalized Non-inference (McLean, 1994) and Zakinthi-
nos’s Perfect Security Property (Zakinthinos and Lee, 1997).
BCF is loosely based on the user inference function proposed by Jacob (1988). Further,
BCF adapts the idea of Morgan’s shadow semantics (Morgan, 2009). Both Jacob’s
inference function and Morgan’s shadow semantics are described below.
Jacob’s User Inference. Sometimes a system might only require hiding the occurrences
of certain properties of high6 events, rather than all high events and the knowledge
about the occurrence of other high events are considered acceptable. To cater for
6 Events executed by a user in a higher security level than an ordinary user of the system.
54
2.3 Banks’s confidentiality framework (BCF)
such scenarios, there was a need for a formal approach to calculate how much a
group of users can infer about the events executed by another group of users in a
system.
Jacob (1988) proposed the inference function to carry out such calculations. The
inference function calculates how much a user U can infer about the interactions
of other users in a system S, by carrying out an interaction allowed for the user U.
This is an observation based approach where the set of all possible observations
which the user U can make by interacting with S is syntactically written as S@U
and is called the projection of U onto S (Jacob, 1988, p. 15). The set of all traces in
the system S is denoted by τS. For any trace t, where t ∈ τS, U can only observe
parts of t that is visible to U through its window which is defined as t  U. The
projection of U onto S is defined as follows.
S@U =̂ {t  U | t ∈ τS}
After observing the output X of an interaction l with the system S, the user U can
calculate all possible traces which could have generated the observation X. This is
a general approach suitable for calculating the amount of knowledge a user can
obtain by interacting with the system.
Morgan’s shadow semantics. Classical refinement does not preserve ignorance7 re-
lated properties. This phenomenon commonly known as the refinement paradox
was first identified by Jacob (1988). Morgan’s approach (Morgan, 2009) consists
both in resolving the refinement paradox as well as maintaining the uncertainty
during the refinement of sequential programs.
A system state might have a visible as well as a hidden state space based on
the security policy requirements of the system. A variable h whose observations
are to be kept secret is part of the hidden state space. In addition, Morgan
7 An observer’s ignorance of data is his/her uncertainty about the parts of the program state which he/she cannot
see (Morgan, 2009, p. 2).
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introduces a third (set valued) variable to the hidden state space called the shadow,
which consists of all potential values of the variable h in the hidden state space,
including the current value of h. Consider the scenario where an adversary has
the complete knowledge of the source code, can view the visible part of system
state (based on his authorisation) as well as have the knowledge of the program
flow. However because of the uncertainty about the hidden state space due to
atomic non-determinism (introduced by the shadow), the adversary cannot deduce
for sure, the exact value of the variable h in the hidden state space.
Banks (2012) borrowed the concept of shadow variables from Morgan (2009). In BCF,
the concept of shadow variables is established by introducing the concept of a shadow
system, where the variables in the shadow system reflects the same from the original
system, under certain user observations. BCF in Circus also borrows the concept of
the inference function from Jacob (1988). BCF in Circus provides an inference function
that can be used to calculate the possible observations a user can make about the state
space of a system by his/her interactions. BCF in Circus assumes that the calculated
observation of the state space of a system is always a reflection of the state space of the
associated shadow system.
2.3.2 Advantages and limitations of BCF
The following are some of the advantages of BCF.
BCF being based on UTP. Since BCF is based on UTP, the underlying concept
can be specialised for other UTP theories. Banks described how BCF can be
specialised for the theory of designs (Banks, 2012, p. 35) and the theory of reactive
processes (Banks, 2012, p. 40). Banks has also instantiated BCF using the Circus
notation as stated before in page 53. In this thesis, this instantiation has been
used in analysing data leakage in systems with a confidentiality requirement.
BCF based analysis involves a comprehensive search of the state space. BCF uses
logical expressions to capture the knowledge about the entire state space of a
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program at any given state.
The following are some of the limitations of BCF.
Weak notion of confidentiality. BCF reasons about the existence of at least one
alternative explanation when hiding the value of a state variable. This is a weak
notion of confidentiality when compared to Caroll Morgan’s shadow semantics
(Morgan, 2009). In the shadow semantics, a set of other possible alternative
explanations exist for each hidden value.
Tedious, time consuming and error-prone calculations required in BCF. The calcu-
lations required to analyse a system using BCF is tedious, time consuming and
error-prone since the probability of human errors exists in any activity related to
manually manipulating large blocks of formulae text (Verma, 2011, p. 11).
Requirements must be written specific to a given system. When using BCF, con-
fidentiality requirements must be written specific to a given system and cannot
be expressed in a more abstract or generalized manner.
2.4 Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP)
BCF is a generic formal approach defined in Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP).
UTP is a unified framework for formal program semantics, which can be used to
formally specify systems (Hoare and He, 1998). UTP is a mathematical treatment of
computer programming using the simple non-deterministic programming language
introduced by Dijkstra (1975).
In the UTP semantics, all the possible observations of executing a program are captured
in a predicate (Hoare and He, 1998). Each variable in the predicate models an attribute
of the system. The following example describes a universal observation of a system
where an attribute x of the system is defined to be greater than 0 and another attribute
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y is defined to be greater than x.
x > 0∧ y > x (2.1)
Valid observations of the system may include (x = 5 & y = 6) or (x = 12 & y = 13).
However, as per the predicate in Equation (2.1), observations such as (x = 0 & y = 1)
or (x = 3 & y = 2 ) are not valid. Such observations cannot exist in practice.
2.4.1 UTP theories
A unified theory in UTP is comprised of alphabets, signatures and healthiness conditions8.
In addition to the observational variables in a system, a UTP theory may contain other
variables which are also called auxiliary variables (Foster and Payne, 2013; Oliveira
et al., 2009; Verma, 2011) that record certain properties about the execution of a program.
The alphabet of a program conforming to such a UTP theory includes these auxiliary
variables. A signature of a UTP theory for a programming language consists of a set
of operators and atomic components that represent the constructs of a programming
language (Hoare and He, 1998, p. 12). A set of basic signatures common to a range
of programming language theories are listed in Table 2.2. Healthiness conditions are
idempotent functions9 that define the subset of predicates that satisfy a given UTP
theory. The theory of relations (Hoare and He, 1998), the theory of designs (Hoare and He,
1998), the theory of reactive processes (Wei, 2013, p. 3) and the theory of reactive designs
(Cavalcanti and Woodcock, 2006) are UTP theories that form the foundation of the
Circus theory (Oliveira et al., 2009), the semantic basis for the Circus notation. The
build up to the theory of Circus from the theory of relations is shown in Figure 2.2. The
following is a brief introduction to each of those theories.
8 Healthiness conditions of a UTP theory are higher order predicates, that select only some predicates as meaningful
in that particular UTP theory. Healthiness conditions are often written as fixed point equations such as P=H(P),
where P represents a predicate and H is a predicate transformer.
9 “An idempotent function is a function f , where f (f (x)) = f (x) for all x” (Gormish et al., 1997, p. 8).
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Operation Syntax Semantics Description
Assignment a := e a′ = e ∧ x′ = x state variable a is assigned
the value of e and all other
variables (denoted by x) re-
main unchanged
Sequential
composition
P ; Q ∃ x0 • P[x0/x′] ∧ Q[x0/x] sequential composition
between the programs P
and Q is the relational
composition of their
intermediate state
Conditional P / b .Q (b ∧ P) ∨ (¬ b ∧ Q) a program that behaves like
P if b is true, or like Q if b
is false. b is a truth function
without dashed variables.
Skip ∏ x′ = x does not change the pro-
gram state in any way and
all state variables (denoted
by x) remain unchanged
Non-determinism PuQ P ∨ Q the greatest lower bound
between the programs P
and Q
Table 2.2: A set of basic signatures common to a range of programming language
theories
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Theory of relations. In the UTP theory of relations (Hoare and He, 1998), every program-
ming construct is formalised as a relation between an initial observation and an
intermediate or a final observation of a system. Any variable in a program predic-
ate can also be decorated with a prime (′) to denote the value of the same variable
immediately after the execution of the program. The undecorated counterpart
represents the value of the observation before the execution of the program. The
observations made before and after the execution of the program can be combined
to form a UTP relation which describes the relationship between the initial and
intermediate or final observation of the system.
For example, assume that the initial observation of the system in Equation (2.1) is
such that x = 3 and y = 16. Now, run the program statement:
x := x ∗ 5 (2.2)
The following UTP relation represents the initial and final observation resulting
from executing the program statement in Equation (2.2).
x = 3∧ x′ = 15∧ y = 16∧ y′ = 16
The theory of relations does not distinguish between terminating and non-terminating
programs (Cavalcanti et al., 2006, p. 210).
Theory of designs. A program statement written with preconditions and postcondi-
tions and which respects certain healthiness conditions is called a design. The theory
of designs introduces two observation variables where:
• ok indicates that the program has started.
• ok′ indicates that the program has terminated.
The subset of relations that conform to the theory of designs (Hoare and He, 1998)
must respect the healthiness conditions H1 and H2 (Hoare and He, 1998, p. 281).
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H1(P) =̂ ok⇒ P
H2(P) =̂ P ; ((ok⇒ ok′) ∧ v′ = v)
where P is a relation with the alphabet {ok, ok′, v, v′} and v represents all state
variables of the system except ok and ok′. If P is H1 healthy then any observation
on P can only be made after the program has started. If P is H2 healthy then the
program must always terminate.
Theory of reactive processes. A reactive process is a program which may engage with
its environment and whose behaviour might depend on these interactions (Wei,
2013, p. 3). In addition to ok and ok′, the theory of reactive processes introduces
the variables wait, tr and ref and their primed counterparts where:
• if wait′ is True then P is in an intermediate state.
• if wait′ is False then P has successfully terminated.
• if ok′ is True then the state of P depends on wait′.
• if ok′ is False then P has diverged.
• tr - sequence of events that have occurred up to the start of P.
• tr′ - sequence of events that have occurred after the start of P, to the point
when the subsequent observation is made.
• ref - events that P may have refused to participate in, up to the start of P.
• ref ′ - events that P may have refused to participate in after the start of P, to
the point when the subsequent observation is made.
where P is a process. The undashed variables ok and wait represents the similar
states of the predecessor of P.
A reactive process P must satisfy the healthiness conditions R1, R2 and R3 where
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The theory of Circus
as UTP relations
Morgan’s specification 
statements
semanticssyntax
Djkstra’s guarded 
commands
CSP notation
Z notation
UTP theories
UTP relation X
is a design
UTP relation X
is a reactive process
UTP relation X
H1,H2
R1,R2,R3
(R)
CSP1
CSP2
UTP relation X
is a CSP process
R1,R2,R3
(R)
Healthiness conditions of UTP theories
Figure 2.2: UTP theories, healthiness conditions and the theory of Circus
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R1 states that P must never change history, R2 states that tr has no influence on
the behaviour of P and R3 states that P has no effect on the observation before
it starts execution (Wei, 2013, p. 4). A reactive process is a fixed point on the
function composition R where:
R(P) =̂ R1 ◦ R2 ◦ R3(P)
Theory of reactive designs. The theory of reactive designs (Oliveira et al., 2009) combines
the valuable qualities of both the theory of designs (Hoare and He, 1998) and the
theory of reactive processes (Cavalcanti and Woodcock, 2006, p. 240) where:
the ability to model programs in terms of preconditions and postcondi-
tions in the theory of designs
is combined with,
the ability to capture the intermediate behaviour of programs in the
theory of reactive processes.
“The space of reactive designs is a sub-space of the reactive processes, which is derived
by applying R to the space of designs” (Banks, 2012, p. 14).
Theory of CSP. Hoare and He (1998) and Cavalcanti and Woodcock (2006) extend the
theory of reactive designs to give a UTP semantics to CSP processes (Banks, 2012,
p. 15). The space of CSP processes is a sub-space of the space of reactive designs
that also satisfies the healthiness conditions CSP1 and CSP2. CSP1 states that if
a given process P diverges, then the only guarantee is the extension of the trace.
CSP2 states that a given process P cannot require non-termination.
Even though each of the above theories has a different syntax, the semantics of all those
theories are based on UTP. An important advantage of a formalised program semantics
such as UTP is being able to formally reason about a program. How can one ensure
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that the developed program is consistent against its specification? This can be answered
using program correctness.
2.4.2 Program correctness
A program is correct if every observation made of every possible run of the program
results in values that satisfy the original specification (Hoare, 1997, p. 7). For example,
consider the specification S and a possible observation Q made from running a program
P1 that correctly implements S.
S =̂ (l′ < m′ ∧ l > 0∧m′ < 100)
Q =̂ (l = 5∧ l′ = l× 5∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)
To formalise the notation that the observation Q satisfies the specification S, we state
that the specification is implied by the observation.
(l = 5∧ l′ = l× 5∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)⇒ (l′ < m′ ∧ l > 0∧m′ < 100)
Further, program correctness states that this implication is true for all possible values
of the observable variables, if P1 correctly implements S.
∀ l, m, l′, m′ • ((l = 5∧ l′ = l× 5∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)
⇒ (l′ < m′ ∧ l > 0∧m′ < 100))
This universal quantification can also be written as [Q ⇒ S], using the conventional
square brackets by Dijkstra and Scholten (1990). The square brackets is an abbreviation
for the universal closure of the implication over all the variables in the alphabet.
[(l = 5∧ l′ = l× 5∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)⇒ (l′ < m′ ∧ l > 0∧m′ < 100)]
The universal quantification of Q⇒ S must be true if P1 is a correct implementation of
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S. In this case:
∀ l, m, l′, m′ • ((l = 5∧ l′ = l× 5∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)
⇒ (l′ < m′ ∧ l > 0∧m′ < 100))
≡ (Leibniz)
∀ l, m, l′, m′ • ((l = 5∧ l′ = l× 5∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)
⇒ (25 < 90∧ 5 > 0∧ 90 < 100))
≡ (simplify)
true
The above calculation shows that P1 is a correct implementation of S. Now, consider an
observation R that is made from running another program P2.
R =̂ (l = 5∧ l′ = l× 20∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)
In this case:
∀ l, m, l′, m′ • ((l = 5∧ l′ = l× 20∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)
⇒ (l′ < m′ ∧ l > 0∧m′ < 100))
≡ (Leibniz)
∀ l, m, l′, m′ • ((l = 5∧ l′ = l× 20∧m′ = 90∧m = 90)
⇒ (125 < 90∧ 5 > 0∧ 90 < 100))
≡ (simplify)
false
The above calculation shows that P2 is not a correct implementation of S.
Different theories have been proposed to facilitate reasoning about the correctness of
programs. Next, a discussion of such theories are presented.
65
2 Background
2.4.2.a Theories of program correctness
Formal program verification is proving properties of a program using logic and math-
ematics. Hoare logic (Hoare, 1969) and Dijkstra’s weakest precondition (Dijkstra, 1975)
are two well-known calculi for the formal verification of programs. BCF utilises a form
of weakest precondition computation to reason about confidentiality in systems.
Hoare logic. Hoare logic (Hoare, 1969) is a calculus that gives a set of inference rules
and axioms to reason about program correctness. A precondition is a boolean
expression that must be satisfied before the execution of the program. A postcon-
dition is a boolean expression that must be satisfied immediately after a program
has completed its execution. A precondition and postcondition assert a subset
of acceptable states on the initial and final states of a program. Hoare uses such
assertions to reason about certain programming constructs in UTP. If a program
Q starts in a state that satisfies P and completes its execution then the program
will reach a state that satisfies R.
P{Q}R (2.3)
This structure is called the Hoare triple (Hoare, 1969, p. 577).
Weakest pre-condition. Dijkstra (1975) used Hoare style assertions (Hoare, 1969) to
define a different construct for program development called the weakest precondi-
tion.
The weakest precondition function wp is a predicate transformer that maps a post
condition Q of a program statement S to a precondition P. Dijkstra (1975) states
that if the program S is executed with its initial state satisfying P, the program is
guaranteed to reach a state satisfying the post condition Q.
P = wp(S, Q)
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Figure 2.3 shows the post condition and the resulting weakest precondition of an
ePurse payment operation where ePurseBalance is the existing balance in the
ePurse and cost is the amount to be deducted from the ePurse for the sale of items.
In this case wp(S, Q) ≡ (ePurseBalance− cost) > 0, or ePurseBalance > cost.
Post-condition (Q)
ePurseBalance   0
Weakest pre-condition (P)
(ePurseBalance – cost)   0
Payment operation (S)
ePurseBalance = ePurseBalance -cost
(condition: the ePurse must have sufficient funds)
start stop
Figure 2.3: Weakest pre-condition and post condition of an ePurse payment operation
2.4.3 Refinement
Refinement is the verifiable transformation of an abstract specification of a system
to a more concrete one. If an abstract specification R is refined by a more concrete
specification S, the statement is formally written as R v S. Both of these specifications
as well as the relation between the two must be formally defined in order to prove that
the concrete specification is a “correct realisation” of the abstract specification (Potter
et al., 1996a). Program refinement is the process of applying such a set of correctness-
preserving transformations on an abstract specification eventually to produce executable
code (Back and Wright, 1998, p. 20).
Refinement Calculus. A Refinement Calculus is a framework for reasoning about the
correct derivation of programs using refinement. One approach for deriving
such correct programs is through stepwise refinement (Wirth, 1971). Back (1980)
used Dijkstra’s weakest precondition calculus (see Section 2.4.2.a) as a basis when
formalizing stepwise refinement in a refinement calculus. The refinement calculus
proposed by Morgan (1998) is an alternative approach where specifications and
executable code are regarded equally as programs. A third approach has been
proposed by Morris (1987). The approach by Morris (1987) is directly based on
that of Back (Cavalcanti et al., 1998, p. 1).
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2.4.4 BCF in UTP
BCF allows a user to validate the consistency of the requirements in a system by
comparing the state space of the original system P and an isomorphic state space of a
possible copy of the system P˜. From now on, this possible copy of the system, having
the possible copy of the state space, will be called the twin system and its state space
the twin state space. Banks called the twin state space the fog space (Banks and Jacob,
2014, p. 4). However, the word twin brings clarity to the concept of the fog space by
emphasizing that BCF assumes that there is exactly one alternative copy of the state
space and that the composition of the fog space is similar to that of the original system
state space. This composition implies that:
if a user is uncertain about the value of a state variable in the original system
state space based on his/her knowledge about the program counter
then the user will also be uncertain about the value of its twin counterpart in the
twin state space
The user’s knowledge about the program counter depends on what functions the user
is allowed to perform using the system. This in turn is defined by the functional
requirement of the system. Retrospectively, a confidentiality requirement defines what
a user must not learn from his/her interactions with a system. To achieve this, it
must be made sure that the user is uncertain about the value of the particular state
variable which the confidentiality requirement demands to be hidden or concealed.
This uncertainty can be achieved by restricting the user’s knowledge about the program
counter at the state where the value of that particular variable needs to be secured. To
achieve this restriction, a separation between the two state spaces must be enforced and
this can be specified by defining a predicate that uses variables from both the original
as well as the twin system.
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2.4.5 Possible twin state space
Identifying the state space of a system and subsequently introducing a possible twin
copy of the state space of the system, reflecting a possible copy of the system are
pre-requisites for using BCF. Banks uniquely identified the variables of the twin system
using the tilde decoration. In his thesis (Banks, 2012, p. 56), the twin variable for every
variable x is written as x˜.
The twin system always exists in tandem with the original system. The predicate that
represents the combined state space of the the original system and the twin system
is derived using the predicate transformer U (Banks, 2012, p. 56). The predicate
transformer U is defined as:
U(S) =̂ S∧ S˜
where S represents a relational predicate that defines a system, S˜ denotes S[x˜,x˜′/x,x′],
that is, S with each variable x and x′ systematically renamed to x˜ and x˜′. Every state
variable in the original system S has a twin variable in the twin system S˜. The combined
state space represented by the relation S ∧ S˜ is called a lifted relation (Banks, 2012, p. 56).
For example, consider the relational predicate S that represents a system.
S ≡ x > 3 ∧ y ≤ 100
The combined predicate that represents the system S in the lifted state space is:
U(S)
≡ (definition of U)
S∧ S˜
≡ (definition of S and S˜)
x > 3 ∧ y ≤ 100∧ x˜ > 3 ∧ y˜ ≤ 100
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where x˜ and y˜ are twin state space variables introduced by renaming the alphabetised
relational state variables x and y in the relational predicate S. The variable x˜ is a copy
of x with the same value domain10. Likewise, y˜ is a copy of y having the same value
domains.
10 “A value domain is defined as the permissible values for a data element” (American National Standard Institute
(ANSI), 1999, P. 27). Here, the term ‘value domain’ is used to refer to the set of values a variable might assume
through out all the stable states of a system.
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2.5 Circus: a formal specification language
Banks (2012, p. 85) illustrates BCF by instantiating BCF using the Circus notation (Freitas,
2005; Oliveira et al., 2009; Woodcock and Cavalcanti, 2002). Circus is a formalism that
combines a state based formalism called the Z notation (Spivey, 1989) and a process-
oriented formalism called CSP (Roscoe, 1995; Schneider, 1999) using the underlying
UTP semantics of the languages. In addition, Circus uses Dijkstra’s guarded command
notation (Dijkstra, 1997) and Morgan’s refinement calculus (Morgan, 1998). Since Circus
combines both Z and CSP (Woodcock and Cavalcanti, 2002), Circus utilizes the syntactic
structures from both the Z and the CSP notations.
2.5.1 Advantages of Circus
The state of a Circus process is hidden except for communications through channels
through which values of specified state variables may be observed (Cavalcanti and
Gaudel, 2014, p. 416) . Data security policies may be captured in a Circus specification
by introducing constraints on the data that can be communicated through defined
channels. Further, Circus supports complex data structures (Mahony and Dong, 1998).
The Circus notation has a strong formal semantics that is based on UTP, a framework
that unifies programming theories across many different computational paradigms
(Oliveira et al., 2005, p. 1). The refinement strategy for Circus by Sampaio et al. (2003)
allow the stepwise refinement of Circus specifications to code in a calculational way. The
underlying relational model of the Circus notation has proved convenient for reasoning
(Ramos et al., 2005, p. 100).
“We can benefit from the use of the Circus refinement calculus to model a system at
different abstraction levels, and, by using its refinement laws, verify the consistency
of the different refinement levels with the help of formal proofs.”
(Gomes, 2012, p. 5)
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2.5.2 Uses of Circus
The Circus notation by Woodcock and Cavalcanti (2001a) has benefited from active
development from the academic community since its introduction in 2001. Work has
been done to both illustrate the suitability of the Circus notation as a modelling language
as well as to extend the formalism to support a richer set of system characteristics.
The work by Sherif and Jifeng (2002), Wei et al. (2010) and Wei et al. (2011) proposed
different timed models for Circus for studying the properties of timed programs in
the untimed model, OhCircus by Cavalcanti et al. (2003) extended Circus with object-
oriented features (classes, inheritance and dynamic binding), SCJ-Circus by Miyazawa
and Cavalcanti (2015) supported the specification and verification of Safety-Critical
Java11 (SCJ) models (Henties et al., 2009).
Oliveira et al. (2004) presented a refinement strategy for industrial scale systems in
Circus. They illustrated this strategy by refining a Circus specification for an industrial
fire control system. They further stated that the illustration is an empirical evidence
that the strategy is applicable to large systems.
Freitas and Cavalcanti (2006) described a tool that uses a translation strategy for
converting a Circus specification to a Java program. Later, Cavalcanti et al. (2011)
extended her work (Cavalcanti et al., 2005) by proposing a semantics for automatically
deriving Circus specifications from a subset of Ada programs12 and proving that such
an Ada implementation of a control law diagram is correct.
Cavalcanti et al. (2005) proposed a semantics for control law diagrams13 using Circus.
11 “The Safety-Critical Java (SCJ) specification is designed to enable the creation of safety-critical applications using a
safety-critical Java infrastructure and using safety-critical libraries that are amenable to certification under DO-178B,
Level A and other safety-critical standards” (Henties et al., 2009, p. 3).
12 Wegner (1980) gives a brief history including characteristics of the Ada programming language.
13 “In a control law diagram, systems are modelled by directed graphs of blocks connected by wires. Roughly
speaking, wires carry signals, and blocks represent functions that determine how outputs are calculated from the
inputs. In a continuous-time model, signals vary continuously; in a discrete model, signals are sampled at fixed
time intervals, so that input and output take place in cycles.” (Cavalcanti et al., 2011, p. 467)
72
2.5 Circus: a formal specification language
They use extended versions of existing tools to translate a control law diagram to both
Z and CSP specifications respectively, capturing the state and reactive models of a
system as required. Finally, they proposed a translation strategy to derive a Circus
specification from the generated Z and CSP specifications.
Ramos et al. (2005) proposed a semantics for UML Realtime (UML-RT)14 via mapping
the realtime objects of the UML-RT into Circus. They proposed and proved a decompos-
ition law for those realtime objects to illustrate that the proposed model transformation
from UML-RT to Circus is sound (Ramos et al., 2005, p. 109).
Gomes (2012) presented a Circus specification for the Integrated Modular Avionics
(IMA) architecture15 for aircraft systems. In compliance with the ARINC 653 standard
(Prisaznuk, 2006), the formalisation focuses on modelling the temporal partitioning
of the application layer16 of the IMA architecture, that prevents the direct commu-
nication between applications running on that layer. The Circus specification is val-
idated by deriving a CSP specification from the Circus specification and using the
Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) tool (Goldsmith et al., 2005) on the resulting
CSP specification.
2.5.3 Challenges of using the Circus notation
The absence of a single common BNF for the Circus notation is one of the challenges
of using the notation for the formal specification of systems. Further, the absence of a
dedicated tool for specifying and type checking the resulting Circus specification is an-
other barrier that hinders researchers from using the Circus notation for developmental
14 “The UML Real-Time Profile (UML-RT) addresses modeling concepts that have proven suitable for modelling the
run-time architectures of complex real-time systems in application domains such as telecommunications, aerospace,
and industrial control” (Cheng and Garlan, 2001, p. 104)
15 “The IMA architecture consists of a distributed system, where many aircraft applications can be executed in the
same hardware module, sharing computing resources, communications and input and output devices.” (Gomes,
2012, p. 3)
16 “The operating system of the IMA architecture is designed in such a way to prevent, through the concept of
partitioning, direct communication among applications. It ensures that none of the partitions can share the same
memory area or processing time slice.” (Gomes, 2012, p. 4)
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research. Even though CZT (Malik and Utting, 2005) can be used for type checking a
Circus specification, it does not show helpful error messages making it difficult to type
check a Circus specification.
2.6 BCF using Circus
This section illustrates how BCF is instantiated using the Circus notation. Recall from
Section 2.3 that this instantiation is referred as ‘BCF in Circus’ throughout the rest of
this thesis.
2.6.1 User inference through observation
The Circus specification notation provides constructs called channels that allow external
actors to interact with a system through inputs and outputs. Through the aforemen-
tioned communications and combined with the knowledge about the source code of
the system, users may learn information about the values assumed by certain state
variables in a particular state or states. This information obtained by a user is termed a
user observation of that particular state or states of the system. If a user does not know
the exact value of a variable in a particular state, the user will be uncertain about the
exact value of that variable in that particular state.
Consider the trivial system in Figure 2.4 that maintains a secret number. Figure 2.5
shows how the inference of two users Alice and Bob differ based on the channels they
can access from the system in Figure 2.4.
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All Circus specifications presented in this thesis follow the naming convention
presented in Table 2.3. This convention has been inspired by the naming convention
used by Barden et al. (1995) for presenting specifications using the Z notation. The
names used in the example column of the Table 2.3 are borrowed from the Circus
specification in Figure A.1, except in the case of Free data type.
Circus construct Naming convention used Example
Basic data type Written with all caps. CUSTOMER
Free data type The data type name is written with all caps.
The elements of the free type are written
using all lowercase letters. For example,
STAFF is a free type with elements no and
yes.
STAFF ::= no | yes
State variable Written using all lowercase letters. If the
state variable name is a combined word
then starting from the second word, capit-
alize the first letter of each word.
spent
currentCustomer
buyItem
Channel Written using all lowercase letters. If the
channel name is a combined word then
starting from the second word, capitalize
the first letter of each word.
Add the postfix ‘In’ at the end of the chan-
nel name if the channel is used for input-
ting data into the system. Add the postfix
‘Out’ at the end of the channel name if the
channel is used for outputting data from
the system.
buyItemIn
Channel set,
Action,
Schema
Capitalize the first letter and use lowercase
letters afterwards. If the name is a com-
bined word then capitalize the first letter of
each word and use lowercase letters after-
wards.
Customer
RecordMyRecipt
State
Table 2.3: Naming convention used for Circus specifications
Naming convention used in Circus specifications
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State
n : 1..9
channel xIn, xOut : 1..9
channelset Alice == {| xIn, xOut |}
channelset Bob == {| xOut |}
process SecretNumber =̂ begin
state State
RecordSecret =̂ var x : 1..5 • xIn?x−→ n := x?
ShowSecret =̂ xOut!(nmod 2)−→ Skip
• RecordSecret ; ShowSecret
end
Figure 2.4: Circus specification of the secret number system
1
Alice Bob
Initial observation n ∈ {1..9} n ∈ {1..9}
when executing
RecordSecret
channel xIn visible Yes No
can observe x (through xIn) x ∈ {1..5} (from spec)
can infer about n n = x (from spec) n ∈ {1..5} (from spec)
ShowSecret
channel xOut visible Yes Yes
can observe nmod2 (through xOut) nmod 2 (through xOut)
can infer about n already know value of x
and that n = x
if nmod 2 is 1 then n ∈ {1, 3, 5}
if nmod 2 is 0 then n ∈ {2, 4}
certainty about the
value of n
certain uncertain
Figure 2.5: Inferences of Alice and Bob from system observations
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Alice In the post state of ShowSecret, Alice knows the exact value of n because she
knows the exact value of x and n = x. In this case, the value of the twin
variable n˜ is the same as the value of the variable n as follows.
U(n = x)
= (definition of U)
n = x ∧ n˜ = x
= (predicate logic)
n = n˜
Bob In the post state of ShowSecret, Bob only knows that the value of n is such that
either n ∈ {1, 3, 5} or n ∈ {2, 4}. Assume that Bob figures out that n ∈ {2, 4}.
In this case the value of n˜ in the twin system will be such that n˜ ∈ {2, 4} as
shown below.
U(n ∈ {2, 4})
= (definition of U)
n ∈ {2, 4} ∧ n˜ ∈ {2, 4}
If a user observes the exact value of a state variable n in a particular state then the value
of the twin variable in that particular state is such that n˜ = n as we have seen from
Alice’s inference. We call this the coercion of observation. In the case of Bob’s inference,
the uncertainty around the value of the variable n makes it possible for n and n˜ to have
different values in the state immediately after the operation ShowSecret. BCF captures
the notion of information secrecy based on this uncertainty as discussed in Section 2.6.2.
The indistinguishability relation. The indistinguishability relation I(L) (Banks, 2012,
p. 87) codifies the observable behaviour of the Circus process17 P in the original
system and the Circus process P˜ in the twin system as indistinguishable to a user,
having window L to a system, when:
17 “Each Circus process has a state and accompanying actions that define both the internal state transitions and the
changes in control flow that occur during execution.” (Sampaio et al., 2002, p. 451)
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• the two processes have the same values for the auxiliary variables (ok, wait,
etc).
• the projection18 of the traces (Banks, 2012, p. 24) through L are the same.
• the refusal sets are the same, as long as the behaviour has not terminated.
Here, the user’s window L is defined as “the set of events communicated by a
reactive process which are visible to the user” (Banks, 2012, p. 40). The indistin-
guishability relation I(L) is defined as follows:
I(L) =̂

ok = o˜k ∧ ok′ = o˜k′
∧ wait = w˜ait∧wait′ = w˜ait′
∧ (tr′ − tr)  L = (t˜r′ − t˜r)  L
∧ wait′ ⇒ ref ′ ∩ L = r˜ef ′ ∩ L

By lifting the semantics of the Circus action A using the construct U(A) and
enforcing I(L) on the resulting relation, we confine the observational capabilities
of the user to the user’s window. This process is captured using the predicate
transformer UC.
UC(L, A) =̂ U(A) ∧ I(L)
Banks models a user’s window as the subset of the channels in a Circus process
(Banks, 2012, p. 114). Such a channel set (Oliveira et al., 2009, p. 5) that contains
only the set of events visible to a particular group of users reflects the user window
of those users to the system.
18 A projection is an observable trace of a process in relation to a particular user window L, where L is a channelset
through which the user access a system.
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Blocks. A block is a syntactic structure of BCF in Circus that can be used to specify
how Circus actions should be translated to lifted state space. A block is defined
as:
〈L : A〉 , (UC (L, a) C ` = L B A)
where L is a channelset, A is a Circus action and ` is a window label.
Blocks delineate the boundaries between lifted actions explicitly. BCF in Circus
assumes that a system user can only learn information about the program counter
at these boundaries. Further, the information that the user can learn at these
boundaries depends on the channels which the user can access from L. BCF in
Circus formalizes the information the user can learn at these delineated boundaries
by proposing back propagation laws. Each back propagation law is proposed
for a particular type of Circus action A and is used to calculate a predicate that
represents the information that the user can learn immediately after the execution
of the action A. The back propagation laws discussed later in Table 2.4 show how
these formal predicates can be calculated from blocks.
Blocks provide a systematic structure to extend the state space of a given Circus
action A while the indistinguishability relation allows us to identify the distinguishable
knowledge that can be learnt by observing A through a given channelset L. The objective
of a confidentiality requirement in the context of a system environment is to limit this
knowledge someone can obtain by observing the system through the same channelset L.
To address this objective, an approach for formalizing the confidentiality requirements
of a system is required, so that those formalized requirements can be integrated into
a formal specification in such a way that the resulting system specification can be
analysed for consistency.
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2.6.2 Formalising a confidentiality requirement
Confidentiality requirements demand constraints on the information that can be re-
vealed to a user through the user’s interactions with a system. BCF captures confid-
entiality requirements by maintaining a user’s uncertainty about the value assumed
by a state variable, based on his/her observation of the state space of the system. For
example, a confidentiality requirement is defined such that x 6= x˜, where x is a variable
in a system. In this case all values of x˜ that are different from the current value of
x serve as cover stories (Banks, 2012, p. 61) or alternative possible values for x. By
combining variables from the original system and its twin counterpart as in x 6= x˜, BCF
encapsulates a relation between the two when defining a confidentiality requirement.
The resulting predicate defines a coercion between a variable in a particular state and
its twin counterpart.
The confidentiality predicate must be associated with a channelset to define the scope
of the system communications on which the confidentiality predicate can be enforced.
For example, the construct 〈L | x 6= x˜〉 encodes that the confidentiality predicate x 6= x˜
must be enforced on all the communications through the channels that are included in
the channelset L.
A confidentiality annotation (CA) (Banks, 2012, p. 105) is a structure similar to a block
(see Section 2.6.1) where a logical predicate confidentiality predicate that encapsulates
a confidentiality requirement is associated with a set of channels channelset as in
Equation (2.4).
〈channelset | confidentiality predicate〉 (2.4)
The CA defined in Equation (2.4) mandates that if the user observing a system at
a particular state has access to a channel in the set of channels channelset then the
confidentiality constraint defined by the predicate confidentiality predicate must be
enforced on that state. Confidentiality is a ‘relative’ phenomena whereby confidentiality
may be conditional on several attributes such as who to conceal the information
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from and under which other conditions19 the information must be concealed. These
constraints may be applied as part of the antecedent of a confidentiality predicate.
Since confidentiality requirements in a system can now be formalized and integrated
into a formal system specification, the back propagation approach (Section 2.7) provided
in BCF in Circus can now be utilized.
2.7 Analysing confidentiality requirements using BCF in Circus
BCF contains a predicate transformer bw that derives a predicate from a Circus specific-
ation S that may contain both Circus actions A as well as a confidentiality predicate20
Conf . The predicate transformer bw calculates the weakest precondition of A. The
derived predicate is used to reason about the consistency of the requirements in S.
S =̂ 〈A〉 ; 〈Conf 〉
The specification S embeds the requirement whereby the confidentiality predicate
Conf must be satisfied immediately after the execution of A. To validate whether this
requirement is satisfied, we calculate the weakest precondition of A such that the post
state of A can satisfy Conf . This calculation can be done using the function bw(A, θ)
whereby it calculates the weakest precondition of A such that the post state of A can
satisfy θ, where θ is a predicate.
If the action was a sequential composition of two or more actions, then the weakest
precondition calculation is carried out iteratively starting from the right most action.
Consider the specification S1.
S1 =̂ 〈B1 ; B2〉 ; 〈Conf 〉
19 Tschantz and Wing (2008) describes a requirement as a conditional confidentiality requirement if it contains a conditional
information flow where information flow occurs only when some condition is met at runtime (Tschantz and Wing,
2008, p. 108). The same has been highlighted later in Section 6.2.4.
20 It must be noted that many confidentiality predicates can be integrated into a single specification.
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To observe whether Conf is respected immediately after the action 〈B1 ; B2〉 we first
calculate the weakest precondition of the action 〈B2〉 using the formula bw(〈B2〉, 〈Conf 〉)
and use the resulting predicate when calculating the weakest precondition of 〈B1〉.
Hence the overall weakest precondition of the system is defined as:
bw(〈B1 ; B2〉, 〈Conf 〉) ≡ bw(〈B1〉, bw(〈B2〉, 〈Conf 〉)) (2.5)
In BCF in Circus terminology, calculating the weakest precondition of a Circus action in
this manner is called back propagation. Banks (2012, p. 138) has provided a set of back
propagation laws to compliment BCF in Circus. These laws facilitate the calculation of
the weakest precondition for certain atomic actions and composite constructs defined
using the Circus notation as shown in Table 2.4.
2.7.1 Back propagation laws
The process of back propagation proposed in BCF in Circus uses a collection of back
propagation laws (Banks, 2012, p. 138). Later in this thesis, some of the back propagation
laws are used to analyse specifications of systems modelled using the Circus notation.
The definitions of these back propagation laws are presented in Table 2.4. The back
propagation approach for validating the consistency of the requirements in a system
specification involves:
• back propagating the specification of the system to generate a resulting predicate
that can be used to reason about the consistency of the requirements in the system
specification.
• simplifying the generated predicate to reveal whether the predicate is satisfiable.
According to BCF in Circus, a satisfiable predicate indicates that the specification
respects all the confidentiality properties coded in the specification whereas if the
predicate has a contradiction, this indicates that there is an inconsistency in the specific-
ation.
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Action Syntax BCF in Circus
Assign a := E bw(〈L : a := E 〉, θ) = θ[E , E˜/a, a˜]
Output c!E−→Skip bw(〈L : c!E −→ Skip〉, θ) =
{
θ ∧ E = E˜ if c ∈ L
θ if c 6∈ L
Input c?e : P bw(〈L : c?e : P −→ e := e?〉, θ)
=
{
∀ e : δ(c) • P(e)⇒ θ[e/e˜] if c ∈ L
∀ e : δ(c) • P(e)⇒ ∃ e˜ : δ(c) • P(e˜) ∧ θ if c 6∈ L
Guard g & B bw(g & B , θ) = (bw(B , θ) ∧ U(g)) ∨ U(¬ g)
External
choice
B1 @ B2 bw(B1 @ B2, θ) = bw(B1, θ) ∧ bw(B2, θ)
Scope vara : T • B bw(var a : T • B , θ)
= ∀ a : T • ∃ a˜ : T • bw(B ,∀ a : T • ∃ a˜ : T • θ)
Table 2.4: A subset of back propagation laws of BCF in Circus by Banks (2012)
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2.8 Limitations of BCF in Circus
In addition to the limitations of BCF, highlighted in Section 2.3.2, below are some of
the limitations specific to BCF in Circus.
BCF in Circus does not have a mechanizable law for parallel processes. Banks (2012,
p. 145) provides a discussion on how to back propagate a CA through a paral-
lel construct. However, this approach involves manual intervention to ‘reform’
(Banks, 2012, p. 147) the parallel process and so cannot be mechanised. There-
fore, further research is required to define a systematic approach and possibly a
restricted parallel construct for Circus that can be mechanised.
BCF in Circus has not been applied to a real system. Banks (2012) demonstrated
the practical application of BCF by using BCF in Circus to analyse the confid-
entiality requirements of a small fictitious auction system. However, he used a
heuristic approach when doing the necessary BCF calculations rather than doing
them from first principles (Banks, 2012, p. 135). Further, he did not apply BCF in
Circus to a real problem.
Back propagation laws has not been machine verified. While all back propagation
laws of BCF in Circus has been derived and justified by hand proofs, some of
these derivations include non-trivial and lengthy manual calculations.
“All theorems, lemmas and laws presented in this thesis have been justified by
hand proof. Nevertheless, it would be expedient to verify their correctness by
encoding their proofs in a theorem prover” (Banks, 2012, p. 187).
Therefore, it would be strongly advisable to machine verify the correctness of
these laws before using them. For example, the “bw specification statement”
has been derived through such lengthy manual calculations. During the current
research, an error with "bw input prefix" law was identified and the correct
definition of the law was proposed (see Section 3.3).
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2.9 Summary
The main objective of this chapter is to present a preliminary description of the
background material that is required to follow the discussions in the remaining chapters
of this thesis. It must be recalled that the intention of this research is to develop
a practically applicable approach for analysing data leakage related confidentiality
requirements in systems using BCF.
Similar to Banks (2012), the intention is to use the instantiation of BCF in Circus for
modelling systems. The definition of a practically applicable approach in the current
context is a mechanisation where system models can be written and type checked
using a tool, extracting the predicate from BCF analysis on the system model can be
automated and the simplification of the derived predicate can be automated.
In this chapter:
• a brief description of UTP including the theory of relations, the theory of design,
weakest precondition, program correctness and refinement was presented.
• a brief description of the Circus notation was presented.
• a detailed description of BCF was presented.
• other formal and semi-formal approaches that have been proposed by other
researchers for analysing confidentiality properties related to data leakage in
systems with a confidentiality requirement were reviewed.
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3.1 Introduction
The core objective of this thesis is to produce a practically applicable approach for
reasoning about confidentiality in systems using BCF in Circus. While working on
achieving this objective, we were also determined to extend the value of BCF in
Circus for the research community. Therefore, while designing a practically applicable
and suitable mechanisation, the efficiency of the mechanisation was also considered.
Figure 3.1 shows the benefits derived from the mechanisation that has extended the
value of BCF in Circus. Further, they can be considered as high-level criteria for
evaluating the mechanisation produced in this thesis. The benefits derived from the
mechanisation are described below.
Practicality explore the development of a practically applicable approach that
uses BCF in Circus for analysing systems with a confidentiality
requirement. During this exercise, we have fixed an erroneous law
in BCF.
Suitability evaluate the suitability of the mechanisation for analysing the
different types of confidentiality requirements, as identified in
page 149 under Section 5.2.5.
Efficiency explain one possible approach for determining the efficiency of
the mechanisation. Compare the efficiency achieved with mechan-
isation when compared to the manual process.
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Figure 3.1: Value added from mechanising BCF in Circus
The above criteria demand the adoption of a combination of design and development
research (Ellis and Levy, 2010) and case study research (Easterbrook et al., 2008). In
this context, the design and development research involves developing a solution that
is practically applicable for analysing systems with a confidentiality requiremet, using
BCF in Circus. The practicality of the mechanisation has been been evaluated through
a number of case studies. Case studies for this analysis has been selected through an
explicit framework as advised by Easterbrook et al. (2008).
The following subsection discuss how the mechanisation helps in achieving a prac-
tically applicable approach for analysing a system using BCF in Circus. After that,
the subsequent subsections discuss why the mechanisation is suitable for analysing
different types of confidentiality properties supported by BCF in Circus and how the
relative efficiency of the mechanisation in comparison to the manual approach can be
determined.
88
3.2 Practicality
3.2 Practicality
The practical use of BCF has been hindered by the following issues:
1. The application of BCF is lengthy and hence, tedious and error prone.
2. Because of the state explosion problem, the back propagation of a system spe-
cification results in a huge logical predicate spanning multiple pages. Manually
simplifying such huge predicates is error prone.
“Manual proofs are time-consuming, error-prone and often not economically
viable” (Cao and Yu, 2012, p. 48).
Therefore, the application of BCF can only be viable if it is done through a software
tool. Further, to mitigate manual errors and to be economically viable, the evaluation
of lengthy predicates should be automated or machine assisted so that the users can
enjoy the luxury of both “time and precision” when using BCF.
3.2.1 Rationale for a custom tool for mechanising BCF in Circus
Currently, there are no tools that support the mechanised application of BCF. However,
mechanising the application of BCF and subsequently automating the simplification
of the generated predicate will remove the complex, time-consuming and error prone
exercise demanded during the use of BCF. Since BCF is based on the Circus notation,
one would be tempted first to try and extend an existing tool that supports the Circus
notation, to reduce the development life cycle for the required tool. A custom tool
development should only be considered if an extendible candidate cannot be found.
Tool support for the Circus notation is limited. To the author’s knowledge, the only tools
that provide any form of support for specifying systems using the Circus notation are
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Symphony IDE1 (Coleman et al., 2014) supporting the COMPASS Modelling Language
(CML) (Woodcock and Miyazawa, 2012), CZT (Malik and Utting, 2005) and CRefine
(Oliveira et al., 2008). A detailed look into the architecture of these three tools (see
Appendix A.2) revealed that the work required to modify any of these tools to support
an extension to the Circus notation is not viable within the realm of this doctoral
research.
Since there was no viable platform that could be adopted and extended to support
BCF in Circus, a decision was made to develop a simple tool for the same purpose.
The tool has been named the ‘Confidentiality Framework Application Tool’ (CFAT).
And subsequently, the notation supported in this tool is referred as the CFAT notation.
Even though BCF has been instantiated for the Circus notation in BCF in Circus, CFAT
notation is a non-LATEX notation. Later, in Section 3.2.3 under the title “CFAT notation”,
a discussion is presented that details the reasons for adopting a non-LATEX notation for
modelling systems for the purposes of this thesis.
3.2.2 The proposed mechanisation of BCF in Circus
The proposed mechanisation for analysing systems using BCF in Circus is centred on a
tool-chain that contains the CFAT tool developed by the author, Isabelle theorem prover
for theorem proving and CZT for type checking Circus specifications. The CFAT tool
generates the necessary input that is required by each of the other two tools. Figure 3.2
shows the overall architecture and flow in the proposed mechanisation.
1 COMPASS Modelling Language (CML) is a language designed for modelling and analysing systems of systems
(Woodcock and Miyazawa, 2012). CML is based on VDM (Gulati and Singh, 2012), CSP (Hoare, 1980) and Circus
(Oliveira et al., 2006). Symphony IDE (Coleman et al., 2014) is a tool that utilizes CML models to generate theorem
files to reason about certain properties of these models. The generated theorem files are based on the Isabelle/UTP
framework (Woodcock et al., 2015). Isabelle/UTP is a deep embedding of UTP notation in the Isabelle theorem
prover (Nipkow et al., 2014).
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3.2.2.a The process of analysing a system for data leakage using BCF in Circus
The process of analysing a system for data leakage using BCF in Circus includes four
stages as shown in Figure 3.3. They are the Specification stage, the Back propagation stage,
the Predicate simplification stage and the Conclusion stage as described below.
Specification stage
A formal model of the system is developed at this stage. Further, the confidential-
ity requirements of the system are integrated in to the formal model.
• In the case of the manual analysis, the system and the confidentiality re-
quirements are modelled using BCF in Circus.
• In the case of the proposed mechanisation, a model of the system and its
confidentiality requirements are developed using the CFAT notation.
Back propagation stage
The back propagation calculation is carried out at this stage.
• In the case of manual analysis, the calculation results in a logical predicate.
• In the case of the proposed mechanisation, a HOL based theory file compat-
ible with the Isabelle theorem prover is generated.
Predicate simplification stage
The simplification of the generated predicate is carried out at this stage.
• In the case of the manual analysis, the simplification of the generated
predicate is carried out manually.
• In the case of the proposed mechanisation, the simplification of the generated
predicate is carried out using the Isabelle theorem prover.
Conclusion stage
At this stage, a conclusion is drawn from the result of the simplification carried
out during the previous stage.
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3.2.2.b Why each component of the mechanisation is required
The following is a brief description of each component in the tool chain including the
reason why the component is required.
Specification stage
Parser. The system model is supplied to the tool in the CFAT nota-
tion. The parser is required to parse the input and build
an object model that depicts the components of a Circus
specification.
LATEX interpreter. The LATEX interpreter is required to generate a Circus spe-
cification from the CFAT object model of the system, derived
by the parser.
Community Z tools (CZT). CZT is used to type-check the Circus specification of the
system, generated by the LATEX interpreter.
Confidentiality Framework 
Application Tool
System Model (in CFAT format)
Back propagated predicate
(Theorem File)
HOL predicate Proof
Type Checked Circus
generates
Community Z 
Tools
Parser AST
Isabelle/HOL
InterpreterHOL Mathematical tool-kit
Back propagation laws
Latex 
Interpreter
System specification
In Circus notation
Latex document
submit to
Isabelle 
Theorem 
Prover
verifies
submit to
generates
verifies
Figure 3.2: The architecture and the flow of the mechanisation of
BCF in Circus for analysing systems with a confidentiality
requirement
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Back propagation stage
Back propagation laws. Back propagation laws of BCF are a catalogue of transform-
ation laws for Circus actions. It contains algebraic logic that
converts Circus specification statements of certain patterns
to formal predicates in higher order logic. Therefore, back
propagation laws are required to generate this predicate that
can be used to reason about confidentiality in the related
system. Table 2.4 presents a subset of the back propagation
laws of BCF.
HiVE mathematical tool-kit. The Z data structures in the generated predicate needs to be
mapped to their equivalent implementations in the target
platform, that will be used for predicate simplification. Sec-
tion 3.2.3 discusses possible frameworks that can be used for
this mapping and why HiVE was selected for the particular
mechanization approach discussed in this thesis. The HiVE
tool-kit provides an implementation of Z data structures
in the Isabelle/HOL platform, which is used for predicate
simplification. The function names defined in HiVE are
used for semantic mapping between Z data structures and
their HOL equivalent functions, when the HOL compliant
back-propagated predicate is generated by the Isabelle/HOL
interpreter.
Isabelle/HOL interpreter. The Isabelle/HOL interpreter is responsible for creating
HOL definitions for the data types defined in the CFAT
model. Further, the interpreter packages these definitions
and generates a HOL compliant Isabelle theorem prover
theory file which contains the back-propagated predicate
and the data type definitions in HOL. The interpreter also
creates other supporting theorem files as required. The
93
3 Mechanisation of BCF
Isabelle/HOL interpreter is required because it generates all
the necessary theorem files that are required for analysing
confidentiality in a given system.
Predicate simplification stage
Isabelle theorem prover. The Isabelle theorem prover is required to machine assist the
simplification of the back-propagated predicate, generated
by the Isabelle/HOL interpreter.
3.2.3 Design decisions
Decisions were made in selecting specific tools for building the mechanised tool chain.
The following is an explanation of what features about the specific tools influenced the
design decisions.
Parser. The CFAT tool uses a grammar based on ANTLR 4 (Parr, 2013) for parsing
specifications of systems submitted to the CFAT tool. Some other potential parsers
include yacc (Johnson, 1975) and JavaCUP (Hudson et al., 1998). The grammar file for
yacc is difficult to read because both the grammar rules as well as the instantiations
are in the same file. In comparison, ANTLR keeps the grammar rules and the visitor
classes2 in seperate files. Further, to the author’s knowledge there is no GUI tool that
supports yacc. However, there is GUI support for ANTLR through the standalone
tool ANTLRWorks (Bovet and Parr, 2008) as well as through plugins for NetBeans
(Salter and Dantas, 2014), Eclipse (Burnette, 2005) and IntelliJ (JetBrains, 2017). The GUI
support for ANTLR is very useful in debugging a grammar. In addition, the visitor
classes are generated in Java, the same language used for CFAT tool development.
The parsed system model can subsequently be used for generating the proof files
containing the HOL predicates that are then submitted to a theorem prover for simpli-
fication. The parsed system model can also be used for generating Circus specifications
2 A visitor class is an interface that computes and returns values by walking the parse tree (Parr, 2013, p. 40).
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requirement using the manual approach as well as using the Confidentiality
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in LATEX that can be type checked using the CZT tool to assure that the CFAT tool
correctly transforms the given CFAT specification to the Circus LATEX syntax.
CFAT notation. One concrete syntax of the Circus notation is compatible with LATEX.
However, inspired by the non-LATEX approach adopted by CRefine (Oliveira et al., 2008),
Perfect Developer (Crocker, 2003) and Symphony IDE (Coleman et al., 2014) (that is
discussed in Appendix A.3), a decision was made to support a simple and concise
notation in our tool, that closely resemble the structure of Circus specifications, but
also one that can easily be transformed using a preprocessor into data structures that
collectively represent a system model.
To the author’s knowledge, there is no official BNF for the Circus notation. However,
there is a need to decide on a clear definition of the Circus notation, before BCF
in Circus can be mechanized. Moreover, since our Circus specifications will be
type checked using the CZT (Malik and Utting, 2005), it was logical to follow
the Circus BNF presented in Leonardo Freitas’s doctoral thesis “Model Checking
Circus" (Freitas, 2005); the preliminary work that integrated Circus type checking as
part of the CZT tool.
Formal definition of the Circus notation
Isabelle theorem prover. The earlier design decision to build a custom tool to carry
out the back propagation process (see Section 3.2.1) further required a decision on a
platform that will be used to evaluate the predicate resulting from the back propagation.
The critical criteria when selecting a platform for evaluating this predicate is its support
for the Z data structures. In this regard, the theorem prover extensions Isabelle/HiVe
(Mahony et al., 2009), Isabelle/ZF, ProofPower-Z (Lemma 1 Ltd., 2006, p. 1), Z/EVES
(Freitas, 2004) and the translation tool Z2SAL (Derrick et al., 2011) are suitable since
they all contain an encoding of the Z data structures.
Isabelle theorem prover is a LCF style interactive theorem prover (Nipkow et al., 2014).
It has a fixed set of core axioms to which all proofs must conform. ProofPower-Z
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(Lemma 1 Ltd., 2006, p. 40) extends ProofPower (Lemma 1 Ltd., 2006, p. 1) and supports
specification and proofs in Z. ProofPower is also an LCF style interactive theorem prover
(Lemma 1 Ltd., 2006, p. 6). Z/EVES is an extension to the EVES proof engine and
supports specification and proofs in Z (Freitas, 2004, p. 1). Z2SAL (Derrick et al., 2011)
is a translation tool for model checking Z specifications by translating Z specifications
to SAL input language (Moura et al., 2003) to be used by tools in the SAL tool suit.
Hands-on experience of some academics with Z2SAL has revealed that they have run
into difficulty in running the SAL simulator because of the state explosion problem
which is related to model checking (Siregar et al., 2014, p. 230). This is not a limitation
when using theorem proving. This persuaded the adoption of an approach based on
theorem proving, to simplify the predicate.
Z/EVES has a handful of tactics3 available for dispatching proofs whereas ProofPower
has over thousand tactics (Freitas, 2004). However, support for automatic theorem
provers (ATPs) and satisfiability-modulo-theories (SMT) solvers in the Isabelle theorem
prover lifts the Isabelle theorem prover platform to a whole new level in automating the
proof dispatch process. As stated by Blanchette and Paulson (2016), the sledgehammer
tool in the Isabelle theorem prover provides support for ATPs such as AgsyHOL
(Lindblad, 2014), Alt-Ergo (Bobot et al., 2008), E (Schulz, 2002), E-SInE (Hoder and
Voronkov, 2011), iProver (Korovin, 2008), iProver-Eq (Korovin and Sticksel, 2010),
LEO-II (Benzmüller et al., 2008), Satallax (Brown, 2012), SNARK (Stickel et al., 1994),
SPASS (Weidenbach et al., 2009), Vampire (Riazanov and Voronkov, 2002), Waldmeister
(Hillenbrand et al., 1997) and Zipperposition (Cruanes, 2015) and SMT solvers such as
CVC3 (Barrett and Tinelli, 2007), CVC4 (Barrett et al., 2011), veriT (Bouton et al., 2009),
and Z3 (Böhme and Weber, 2010). In addition, the Isabelle theorem prover has other
automatic proof dispatch tools such as auto and blast (Blanchette and Paulson, 2016,
p. 24). The decision to select an encoding based on the Isabelle theorem prover has
been supported further by the fact that Isabelle theorem prover is a stable and mature
3 “A tactic is an ML function which, when applied to a goal, reduces the goal to a list of subgoals and provides a
‘proof function’ which justifies why solving the subgoals will solve the goal” (Cant, 1992, p. 30).
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theorem prover (Feliachi et al., 2013) and has been utilised in many projects. Further,
its has a huge on-line community base and is constantly under development.
The author was not able to find a comparison between Isabelle/ZF and Isabelle/HiVe in
the publicly accessible literature. And so, the preference to use HiVe tool-kit was purely
based on the “possible” quality of the tool-kit. Isabelle/HiVe has been sanctioned by
a government body4 whereas the the code-base of Isabelle/ZF has been maintained
at the University of Cambridge by interested researchers. It may be assumed that
Isabelle/HiVe would have gone through a rigorous audit process for a clean and
accurate code but this maybe less true for Isabelle/ZF.
HOL mathematical toolkit. A mathematical tool-kit is required for the semantic rep-
resentation of data structures that are translated from Circus to Isabelle/HOL. Data
structures in the Circus notation are defined as per the Z notation (Z Standards Panel,
2000) where the semantics of the Z notation is based on the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
(Spivey, 1988). The HiVe mathematical toolkit by Mahony et al. (2009) and the HOL-Z
2.0 tool-kit by Brucker et al. (2003), both encode the mathematical data structures of the
Z notation in the Isabelle/HOL. HiVe was selected rather than the HOL-Z 2.0 because
the publicly available version of the HiVe toolkit supports Isabelle 2013-2 whereas the
HOL-Z 2.0 is much older and was written in 2003 raising compatibility issues with
Isabelle 2013-2 and further is not available publicly. A subset of the definitions from the
HiVe tool-kit has been used to encode the mathematical structures of Z using Isabelle
theorem prover data structures. From now on, the HiVe mathematical toolkit maybe
referred as the ‘mathematical toolkit’. Some of the mathematical notations being used
in this thesis is include in Appendix A.4.
Community Z Tools (CZT). Community Z Tools by Malik and Utting (2005) supports
the parsing of Circus specifications. In spite of the the many limitations (see Section 7.6),
CZT is the only available tool for type checking Circus specifications. Therefore, CZT
was utilized for this function.
4 Australian Department of Defence (Mahony et al., 2009).
98
3.2 Practicality
3.2.4 Requirements of the major components in the architecture
Input/output format and the content type. A number of integration challenges resulted
from the architectural decisions that were considered while designing the tool chain, as
shown in Figure 3.2. The main three components of the tool chain are the CFAT tool,
Isabelle theorem prover and the CZT tool. Table 3.1 shows the input and output file
format and content and the additional components required by each major component
in the tool chain to perform its function.
Component Input file format
and content type
Output file format
and content type
Additional components
required for the
component to function
CFAT tool System
specification in
CFAT format
- theorem file generated with
.thy extension
- Circus specification file
generated in LATEX format
with .tex extension
- Back propagation laws
of BCF in Circus
Isabelle
theorem
prover
Isabelle theorem
prover theory file
format
(extension .thy)
Result of the simplification is
shown in the results pane of
the theorem prover.
(No output file is produced.)
- HiVe mathematical tool
kit
- Typing files generated by
CFAT tool
CZT tool Circus
specification of a
system in the LATEX
format
(extension .tex)
Result of type checking is
shown on the editor pane of
CZT.
(No output file is produced.)
- LATEX type setting pack-
age ‘circus’
Table 3.1: The input and output format of each major component of the
architecture of the mechanisation of BCF in Circus
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Syntactic renaming. The input and output variables in the Circus notation have the
postfix decorations ‘?’ and ‘!’ respectively. Likewise the same postfixes are attached to
similar variables in the CFAT notation. The Isabelle theorem prover does not accept
these decorations. Hence, a syntactic renaming of the input and output variables are
carried out before generating the Isabelle theorem files, one of which contains the back
propagated predicate. When generating the predicate, the input and output variables
are renamed whereby the “?" and “!" decorations are replaced with “ i" and “ o"
respectively.
Each variable of the twin state in BCF in Circus (see Section 2.4.5) is decorated with a
tilde such as x˜ where x is a state variable. This decoration is not supported by either
CZT or by the Isabelle theorem prover. Therefore, when writing the confidentiality
annotation using the CFAT notation, each twin variable in the confidentiality annotation
is written with a ‘Z’ prefix. The ‘Z’ prefix represents the twidle decoration on the twin
variable.
When generating the theorem file for analysis using the Isabelle theorem prover, every
twin variable reference x˜ has been renamed by prefixing the variable with a ‘Z’ such as
Zx in place of x˜.
When generating the predicate for the Isabelle theorem prover, the twin variables
continue to have the ‘Z’ prefix in their variable name. However, when generating the
Circus specification file for type checking with CZT, the ’Z’ prefix is removed from
each each twin variable Zx in the CFAT specification followed by decorating the same
variable with a subscript such as x9. The subscript integer 9 or the prefix ‘Z’ are
arbitrary choices that do not clash with anything else provided that the restrictions on
naming variables are followed as specified next.
Restrictions on variable names. In the current development of the CFAT tool, variables
of the twin state are identified using the prefix ‘Z’, input variables are identified using
the suffix ‘ i’ and output variables are identified using the suffix ‘ o’. Therefore, the
following restriction have been applied to any specification submitted via the CFAT
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tool editor interface.
• A variable name cannot have the letter ‘Z’ as the first letter.
• A variable name cannot end with the suffix ‘ i’ or ‘ o’.
The above restrictions are specific to the current version of the tool and does not hinder
the functionality of the tool. In a future iteration of the tool, these literal identifiers can
be replaced with other identifiers outside the letters of the alphabet.
Transforming CFAT notation to constructs of the Circus notation and Isabelle/HOL. The
CFAT notation provides support for a limited number of constructs which can be
used to specify variables, relations, actions and schemas of a Circus specification. The
structures must be converted from the original CFAT specification to the target notation
using constructs from the target notation that represent the structures of the CFAT
notation. Two different types of files are generated by the CFAT tool.
• For type checking purposes, the LATEX based Circus specification generated has the
same system model as the submitted CFAT model.
• For theorem proving purpose, the file generated contains a logical predicate and
has no system model. However, the predicate uses data structures from the
original CFAT specification. Therefore, the data objects specified using the CFAT
notation must be represented using the host notation in the Isabelle theorem prover.
The data objects of the CFAT notation themselves represent Z data structures.
Appendix A.4 describes how this can be achieved. It is important to note here
that Appendix A.4 does not represent a translation from Z to HOL. But rather,
Appendix A.4 discusses how type definitions, variable definitions and relation
definitions specified using the CFAT notation, that represents their equivalent Z
data structures, can be represented using the host language in the Isabelle theorem
prover.
101
3 Mechanisation of BCF
Figure 3.4: The CFAT editor window
Figure 3.4 contains part of the CFAT specification of the Circus specification in Figure 6.8. A parser built using ANTLR
is used to parse the CFAT specification. The labels in blue color resemble structures of a Circus specification. Predicates
can be presented with the same syntactic notation as written using Circus. The keywords var, guarded, assign, output
are special keywords in CFAT notation to identify the type of action and chan is used to specify a channel or channelset
depending on whether you associate a datatype to it. Liftedvar defines the variables on the twin system.
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Figure 3.5: How the predicate (loginUser 6∈ (cashiers ∪ managers)) is parsed using the
CFAT tool
Figure 3.5 shows how the predicate (loginUser 6∈ (cashiers∪managers)) is parsed using
the in-built parser in the CFAT tool. How to read the parse tree in Figure 3.5 can be
found in the ANTLR Reference Manual (Parr, 2013).
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3.2.5 The mechanised analysis process
Once a confidentiality integrated CFAT specification is developed from a system de-
scription, the consistency of the confidentiality and functionality requirements captured
in that specification can be analysed using the mechanised tool chain proposed in this
chapter. Figure 3.6 shows the steps which must be followed during this analysis. The
following is a description for each step.
1 Develop a CFAT specification of the system based on the description and use
cases of the system
Based on the descritpion and models of a system, a CFAT specification for the
system is generated. There is no formal translation between the system model or
system description to the CFAT specification. The requirement for this translation
has been highlighted in Section 7.8 as a potential area of further research that can
add value to the mechanised evaluation process.
2 Feed the specification into the mechanised tool
Next, the CFAT specification of the system is fed into the CFAT tool. This is done
by typing the specification into the editor interface of the CFAT tool.
3 Generate the back propagated predicate and typing files
The CFAT tool has an interface button called ‘Generate’. When the user presses
this button, the tool executes the back propagation of the submitted specification
as shown in Figure 3.3. This execution generates theorem files for both the back
propagated predicate and the data types defined in the specification. Both these
files utilize Z data constructs from the HiVe Mathematical Toolkit by Mahony et al.
(2009). The files are generated in a format compatible with the Isabelle theorem
prover.
4 Feed the theorem files into the Isabelle theorem prover
The theorem file generated in step 3 for the back propagated predicate is
opened in the Isabelle theorem prover. During preprocessing of the file, the
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Mechanised tool 
for BCF in Circus
CFAT 
Specification
Back propagated 
predicate
(theorem file)
Typing info
(theorem file)
HiVe Mathematical 
toolkit
Isabelle theorem 
prover
2
3
Feed the specification into the 
mechanised tool
4
Feed the theorem files into the 
Isabelle theorem prover
Simplified : 
Counter example found :
Theorem prover timeout : 
Results of analysing the system for 
consistency of requirements
5
Generate the back propagated 
predicate and typing files
Uses data 
constructs from
Apply interactive commands in the 
Isabelle theorem prover such as:
sledgehammer
smt
auto
etc...
There are no contradictions
There is a contradiction
Isabelle cannot conclude whether there are 
no contradictions
System description 
and (or) use cases
1
Develop a CFAT specification of the 
system based on the description and 
use cases of a system
Figure 3.6: The mechanised analysis process
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Isabelle theorem prover loads all the necessary dependencies. In this case, it
includes loading the HiVe Mathematical Toolkit theory package (Mahony et al.,
2009) and the theorem files generated for the types defined in the system.
5 Apply interactive commands in the Isabelle theorem prover
Relevant commands in the Isabelle theorem prover are then used at the provided
interactive interface to simplify the predicate.
3.2.6 Interpreting the result of a mechanised analysis
Once the Isabelle theorem prover theory files, generated as per 3 in Figure 3.6, is
submitted to the Isabelle theorem prover, as per step 4 in Figure 3.6, the user can use
interactive theorem proving commands on the theorem prover, as per 5 in Figure 3.6,
to simplify the predicate in the theorem file.
The final result of the simplification may identify one or more contradictions in the
predicate. This may be as a result of contradictions between the functional require-
ments in the system or between the functional requirements and the confidentiality
requirements of the system. At the end of the analysis, three possible outcomes can be
expected as shown in Figure 3.3. They are:
Simplified If the predicate could be simplified to true, then according
to BCF in Circus, there are no contradictions in the system
model being analysed.
Counter example found If the theorem prover identifies a counter example, then
according to BCF in Circus, there might be a possible
contradiction in the system model being analysed. Page
250 shows the automatic generation of a counter example
while analysing a specification using the mechanisation
developed in this chapter.
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Theorem prover time-out If the theorem prover cannot reach a conclusion on simpli-
fying the predicate but rather times-out, then nothing can
be concluded about the presence or absence of contradic-
tions in the specification. Therefore the predicate could be
true or false. This may be a limitation of the mechanisation
proposed in this thesis. In some cases, even though the tool
has timed out, it may be possible to manually demonstrate
whether the predicate is ‘true’ or ‘false’.
3.3 Fixing the input prefix law
During the mechanisation process it was identified that the bw input prefix law (Banks,
2012, p. 140) was erroneous. Banks presented the following Circus input action
bw(〈L : c?e : P−→ e := e?〉, θ) (3.1)
and described his encoding of the input prefix law as follows.
“A prefixing which accepts an input value e? from the environment on
channel c reveals the exact value of e? to Low, provided Low can observe c.
Conversely, if Low cannot observe c, Low can still infer that e? has the type
δ(c) and that P(e?) holds” (Banks, 2012, p. 140).
The expression P defines a set of values that represent the type of the variable e?.
However, P may also be defined in terms of one or more state variables of the system.
For example, consider a system with a state variable called bal and a Circus action called
CheckBalance, where PERSON is a set of identifiers for customers.
bal : PERSON 7 7→N
CheckBalance =̂ c?e : (dom bal)−→ e := e?
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In CheckBalance, the type P of the variable e? is represented by the expression dom bal.
In the lifted state space, the equivalent e˜? will have the type P˜ with the expression
dom b˜al. In the system state space the typing constraint P(e) must hold and in the
lifted state space the typing constraint P˜(˜e?) must hold. Which means, if Low cannot
observe c, Low can still infer that e˜? has the type δ(c) and that P˜(˜e?) holds. Based on
this discussion, the corrected input prefix law is defined in Definition 3.1.
Definition 3.1. bw Input prefix law (corrected). A prefixing which accepts an input
value e? from the environment on channel c reveals the exact value of e? to Low,
provided Low can observe c. Conversely, if Low cannot observe c, Low can still infer
that e˜? has the type δ(c) and that P˜(˜e?) holds.
bw(〈L : c?e : P−→ e := e?〉, θ)
=
∀ e : δ(c) • P(e)⇒ P˜(e) ∧ θ[e/e˜] if c ∈ L∀ e : δ(c) • P(e)⇒ ∃ e˜ : δ(c) • P˜(˜e) ∧ θ if c 6∈ L
In comparison, the existing bw input prefix law (Banks, 2012, p. 140) proposed in BCF
is:
bw(〈L : c?e : P−→ e := e?〉, θ)
=
∀ e : δ(c) • P(e)⇒ θ[e/e˜] if c ∈ L∀ e : δ(c) • P(e)⇒ ∃ e˜ : δ(c) • P(˜e) ∧ θ if c 6∈ L
Examining the issue with the existing bw input prefix law
Consider the Circus action ShowBalance and the channelset cashier.
channelset cashier == {| c, nout |}
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ShowBalance =̂ c?e : (dom bal)−→ nout!bal e?−→ Skip
Assume that a confidentiality annotation CA is back propagated through ShowBalance
where ShowBalance is lifted through the channelset cashier.
〈cashier | ShowBalance〉 ; 〈CA〉
The application of BCF is as follows.
〈ShowBalance〉 ; 〈CA〉
= (definition of ShowBalance)
〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ nout!bal e?−→ Skip〉 ; 〈CA〉
= (decomposing the prefix)
〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ Skip〉 ; 〈nout!bal e?−→ Skip〉 ; 〈CA〉
= (definition of bw sequence)
〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ Skip〉 ; bw(〈nout!bal e?−→ Skip〉, 〈CA〉)
= (definition of bw output, nout ∈ cashier)
〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ Skip〉 ; 〈bal e? = b˜al e˜? ∧ CA〉
= (definition of bw sequence )
bw(〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ Skip〉, 〈bal e? = b˜al e˜? ∧ CA〉)
= (definition of the existing bw input prefix law , c ∈ cashier)
∀ e? • e? ∈ dom bal⇒ bal e? = b˜al e? ∧ CA
Looking at the resulting predicate, we see that there is not enough information in the
predicate to determine if e? ∈ dom b˜al. If this is the case, b˜al e? might be undefined for
certain values of e?.
Now, the same calculation is carried out again, but with the new input prefix law
proposed in Definition 3.1.
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〈ShowBalance〉 ; 〈CA〉
= (definition of ShowBalance)
〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ nout!bal e?−→ Skip〉 ; 〈CA〉
= (decomposing prefix)
〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ Skip〉 ; 〈nout!bal e?−→ Skip〉 ; 〈CA〉
= (definition of bw sequence)
〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ Skip〉 ; bw(〈nout!bal e?−→ Skip〉, 〈CA〉)
= (definition of bw output, nout ∈ cashier)
〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ Skip〉 ; 〈bal e? = b˜al e˜? ∧ CA〉
= (definition of bw sequence )
bw(〈c?e : (dom bal)−→ Skip〉, 〈bal e? = b˜al e˜? ∧ CA〉)
= (definition of the new bw input prefix law , c ∈ cashier)
∀ e? • e? ∈ dom bal⇒ e? ∈ dom b˜al ∧ bal e? = b˜al e? ∧ CA
The result of the above calculation shows that e? ∈ dom b˜al and so b˜al e? has been
defined for all possible values of e?.
3.4 Suitability
The usefulness of the mechanisation of BCF in Circus can be evaluated in terms of its
suitability for the intended purpose. For this, there is a need to check if the types of
confidentiality analysis supported by BCF in Circus can be carried out using the using
the mechanisation.
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3.4.1 Types of data leakage supported by BCF in Circus
Recall from Section 1.3 that Shabtai et al. (2012, p. 5) describe data leakage as the
intentional or unintentional distribution of private or sensitive data to an unauthorised
entity. Following are some types of data leaks that BCF in Circus can be used to reason
about.
Data leakage through direct communication. One way data might leak is through direct
communication to the environment. This may happen if a function communicates
the value of a state variable x to the environment, while x has already been
declared as confidential by a confidentiality requirment in the same system. BCF
in Circus can identify such contradictions. For example, the Circus action ShowX in
Equation (3.2) outputs the value of x through the channel out. The confidentiality
requirement ConfX in Equation (3.3) states that x must never be revealed through
the channelset L. Assume that out ∈ L.
ShowX , 〈L | out!x −→Skip〉 (3.2)
ConfX , 〈L | x 6= x˜〉 (3.3)
The contradiction between the functionality ShowX and the confidentiality Conf is
brought to light with the following calculation. 1
〈ShowX〉 ; 〈ConfX〉
= bw((〈ShowX〉 ; 〈ConfX〉),True) [Back propagation]
= bw(〈ShowX〉,bw(〈ConfX〉,True)) [Law 6.32 - bw sequence]
= bw(〈ShowX〉, 〈x 6= x˜〉)) [Law 6.18 - bw CA]
= x = x˜ ∧ x 6= x˜ [Law 6.34 - bw output]
= False [Simplify]
Given a particular user u with a user role having access to the channels in the
channelset L, if u cannot observe the channel out then the value of x will not
111
3 Mechanisation of BCF
be revealed to u. This can be possible if out 6∈ L. Such role based access control
restrictions can be implemented using BCF in Circus.
Data leakage through inference. One of the ways in which a data leakage may occur is
through inference. A data leakage through inference is where a legal functionality
allows an authorised user to deduce something about a part of the system state
to which they do not have access rights. The challenge in addressing such a data
leakage is called an inference problem (Farkas and Jajodia, 2002).
“The inference problem is denoted as the compromise or increased probability
of compromise by deduction of unauthorized information due to combinations
of the possession, known existence, known absence, chronology and location of
authorized information” (Hubbard et al., 1986, p. 23).
In the context of software systems, access control mechanisms regulate the access
which subjects (users or other processes) have on the objects (state variables) of
a system (Denning, 1999). However, access control cannot capture the flow of
information.
“Access control checks place restrictions on the release of information but not
its propagation” (Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003, p. 5).
The philosophy of BCF “for protecting the confidentiality of information is to regulate
the information flow from systems to their users” (Banks, 2012, p. 54). Therefore, BCF in
Circus maintains knowledge about the origin of the information that is communicated
to the environment through a particular state variable x rather than just knowing the
value of x that is communicated to the environment. By bundling this capability with
an RBAC implementation5 in BCF in Circus, engineers can address some inference
problems in Circus specifications.
5 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) can be modelled in Circus specifications by regulating user access to channels
used in a specification.
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How BCF in Circus can track the flow of information is demonstrated using the
following example. For example, the Circus action AssignX in Equation (3.4) assigns
the value of the state variable y to the state variable x. The confidentiality requirement
ConfY in Equation (3.5) states that y must never be revealed through any channel in the
channelset L. Assume that out ∈ L.
AssignX , 〈L | x := y〉 (3.4)
ConfY , 〈L | y 6= y˜〉 (3.5)
Consider the program fragment 〈AssignX〉;〈ShowX〉;〈ConfY〉. From an access control
point of view, the fragment does not have a contradiction because the only output
action ShowX in the fragment does not reveal the state variable y, that is required to be
kept confidential by ConfY. However, the indirect flow of confidential information in y
through the channel out is revealed if the fragment is analysed using BCF in Circus, as
shown in the following calculation. 1
bw((〈AssignX〉 ; 〈ShowX〉 ; 〈ConfY〉),True)
= bw((〈AssignX〉 ; 〈ShowX〉),bw(〈ConfY〉,True)) [Law 6.32 - bw sequence]
= bw((〈AssignX〉 ; 〈ShowX〉), 〈y 6= y˜〉) [Law 6.18 - bw CA]
= bw(〈AssignX〉,bw(〈ShowX〉, 〈y 6= y˜〉)) [Law 6.32 - bw sequence]
= bw(〈AssignX〉, 〈x = x˜ ∧ y 6= y˜〉) [Law 6.34 - bw output]
= 〈x = x˜ ∧ y 6= y˜〉[y, y˜/x, x˜] [Law 6.31 - bw assignment]
= 〈y = y˜ ∧ y 6= y˜〉 [Renaming]
= False [Simplify]
In summary, BCF in Circus can be used to analyse systems to reason about the:
• direct communication of values of state variables to the environment, that are
required to be kept confidential as per a confidentiality requirement.
• indirect communication of a confidential data to the environment through a state
variable authorised for that particular user.
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3.4.2 Analysing data leakage through indirect communication using BCF in
Circus
How the mechanised analysis proposed in this chapter detects a possible data leakage
through direct communication is demonstrated later in Section 6.2.1. In this section,
data leakage through indirect communication is demonstrated using the results of a
mechanised analysis carried out on a fictitious hand crafted specification.
The system has two bidders defined by the free type BIDDER where the bidder can
either Alice or Bob. The system maintains the highest bidder of a round of bidding
using the state variable highestBidder and the last bidder who has proposed a bid for
the same round using the state variable lastBidder. The channelsets Clerk,CustomerX and
CustomerY represents user roles where a person having that user role can observe com-
munications through any channels included in that channelset. A detailed discussion
of user roles and their importance in the data leakage analysis carried out in this thesis
is presented in Section 6.2.3.d. The channel recordBidderIn is used to submit the name of
a bidder to the system while showOnlyLastBidderOut and showLastBidderOut are used to
output the name of a bidder to the environment. The Circus action RecordHighestBidder
is used to record the name of the highest bidder of a bidding round, ShowLastBidder and
ShowLastBidderOnly are used to output the name of the last bidder who has submitted
a bid for the current round and finally, the Circus action HideHighestBidder (through the
schema HideHighestBidder) defines a confidentiality property where the value of the
highest bidder must never be revealed. To keep the example small, it is assumed that a
value for lastBidder has already been recorded.
The possible interpretations of the results of a mechanised analysis are considered in
Section 3.2.6. Table 3.2 discusses the possible reasons for the results of the mechanised
analysis of HideHighestBidder. The results show that the mechanisation is suitable for
identifying data leakage through indirect flow of confidential data.
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BIDDER ::= Alice | Bob
State
lastBidder, highestBidder : BIDDER
HideHighestBidder
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
highestBidder 6= highestBidder9
channel recordBidderIn, showOnlyLastBidderOut, showLastBidderOut : BIDDER
channelset Clerk == {| recordBidderIn |}
channelset CustomerX == {| showOnlyLastBidderOut |}
channelset CustomerY == {| showLastBidderOut |}
process Secret Highest Bidder =̂ begin
state State
RecordHighestBidder =̂ var recordBidder : BIDDER •
recordBidderIn?recordBidder−→
highestBidder := recordBidder?
ShowLastBidder =̂ lastBidder := highestBidder;
showLastBidderOut !(lastBidder)−→ Skip
ShowOnlyLastBidder =̂ showOnlyLastBidderOut !(lastBidder)−→ Skip
HideHighestBidder =̂ HideHighestBidder
• µX •
 〈RecordHighestBidder〉@ 〈ShowLastBidder〉@ 〈ShowOnlyLastBidder〉
 ; 〈HideHighestBidder〉 ; X

end
Figure 3.7: Specification of Secret Highest Bidder - code block 1 of 1
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User role Outcome of the
analysis
Reason for the outcome
Clerk Counter
example found
Any user with the user role Clerk has access to the
channel highestBidderIn and therefore the user already
knows the highest bidder highestBidder. The confid-
entiality requirement HideHighestBidder to maintain
the secrecy of the highest bidder from this user role
will rightly result in a contradiction as shown from
the outcome of the analysis.
CustomerY Counter
example found
The value that represents the highest bidder
highestBidder is passed to the state variable lastBidder
through the assignment action in ShowLastBidder and
therefore the value being revealed in ShowLastBidder
through the state variable lastBidder is not the original
value of the last bidder but the value of the highest
bidder. Since a user with the user role CustomerY
has access to the channel showLastBidderOut that user
will learn the value of the highest bidder. This know-
ledge contradicts with the confidentiality requirement
HideHighestBidder where it demands to maintain the
secrecy of the highest bidder from all users. The ana-
lysis identifies this by producing a counter example.
CustomerX Simplified The value that represents the highest bidder is not
passed to the state variable lastBidder and therefore
the value being revealed through the state variable
lastBidder is the current value that represents the last
bidder.
Table 3.2: Analysing data leakage through indirect communication
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3.4.3 Confidentiality violation through recursion
The analysis carried out in Section 3.4.2 has been restricted to a single run of the system
because BCF in Circus and therefore its mechanisation does not support the analysis of
recursive constructs in Circus. This has been highlighted as an important future area of
research (see Section 7.2).
The analysis carried out in Section 3.4.2 is a scenario where the support for recursion
in BCF in Circus would have revealed the highest bidder to a user with the user role
CurtomerX, in contradiction to the outcome shown in Table 3.2 . The execution of
ShowLastBidder would pass the value of the highest bidder highestBidder to the state
variable lastBidder and a subsequent execution of the ShowOnlyLastBidder would have
reveal the value of the highest bidder that has been recorded in the variable lastBidder .
3.5 Efficiency
Efficiency is a measure of the estimated cost which includes the total time taken for
executing user procedures (Seffah et al., 2006, p. 164). Efficiency of a process can
be measured in relation to the level of effectiveness achieved to the expenditure of
resources where a resource can be the time taken for the process, which can be used
to give a measure of the temporal efficiency of the process (Bevan and Azuma, 1997,
p. 176). The efficiency measure can be used to compare two or more tasks when carried
out in an environment where all parameters of the environment are the same except
the variable property of the environment that is being studied. The objective is to check
the relative efficiency of the mechanised process in comparison to the manual process.
The manual impracticality of both the back propagation as well as the simplification of
the generated predicate when analysing a non-trivial system has been the inspiration
for this thesis. Therefore, it goes without question that time taken for the manual
analysis of non-trivial systems cannot be obtained. However, since the mechanization
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developed in this chapter is an important contribution of this thesis, it is important to
compare the relative efficiency between the manual and the mechanized analysis of a
small specification of a system, for which the time taken for the manual analysis can be
obtain.
3.5.1 Comparison of efficiency between the manual and the mechanized analysis
Section 4.2 presents a manual analysis of the system specification in Figure 4.1. The
time taken for this analysis as well as the analysis of the same system using the mech-
anization developed in this chapter is shown in Table 3.3. It must be noted here that
there are no matrices to accurately measure the manual analysis of a system using
BCF in Circus. Therefore, the stated time for the manual analysis is an estimate. As
stated earlier in Section 3.2.6 , the outcome “Simplified” indicates that there are no
contradictions between the functionality and the confidentiality requirements in the
system. Bevan and Azuma (1997, p. 176) propose the following formulae to measure
temporal efficiency of a process.
Temporal Efficiency = Effectiveness/(Task Time)
It is assumed that the Effectiveness is the same for both the manual as well as the
mechanized analysis in this example since the analysis outcome from both are the
same as shown in Table 3.3. There is no particular unit of measurement given for the
Effectiveness measurement. For example, if we state that in this particular scenario
both approaches were 100% effective, then the Temporal Efficiency can be calculated as
shown in Table 3.3.
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Type of analysis Analysis
outcome
Time taken for the
analysis
Temporal Efficiency
Manual Simplified 3600000 ms 100/3600000 = 0.000027
Mechanized Simplified 120 ms 100/120 = 0.833333
Table 3.3: Time taken for analysing Figure 4.1 using BCF in Circus
For this particular scenario, the ratio of the Temporal Efficiency of the mechanized
approach in comparison to the manual approach is 1 : 0.003 as shown below.
(Manual efficiency / Mechanized efficiency) = (0.000027/0.833333) = 0.003
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3.6 Summary
The main contribution of this chapter is the proposition of a mechanisation to make the
process of analysing systems using BCF in Circus practically applicable. In addition,
this chapter discusses the suitability of the proposed mechanisation, for analysing the
different types of confidentiality requirements, supported by BCF in Circus. Finally, the
chapter presents a comparison of efficiency between the manual and the mechanized
analysis of a given system.
The proposed mechanisation is a tool chain that consists of a custom tool, Isabelle
theorem prover and CZT. The custom tool is used for the mechanized back propagation
and generation of a back propagated predicate for a given system. The Isabelle theorem
prover is used to simplify the predicate, the result of which is used to reason about
confidentiality in the given system. The tool further generates a Circus specification of
the given system which is type checked using the CZT tool. The mechanisation will be
evaluated in Chapter 6.
In this chapter:
• the mechanisation approach that has been adopted in this research, to extend the
value of BCF in Circus, has been described.
• the types of confidentiality requirements that can be analysed using BCF in Circus
has been identified.
• the correct definition in place of an erroneous definition of the existing bw input
prefix law has been proposed.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the approach which has been followed in evaluating the usefulness
of the mechanisation of BCF in Circus. There is a need to analyse case studies using
the mechanisation so that the advantage of the mechanisation can be demonstrated in
terms of saving time and detecting the possibility of a data leakage in systems with a
confidentiality requirement. Since the function of the mechanisation is to detect data
leakage in a given system, every potential case study system chosen mush have one
or more distinct confidentiality requirements relating to data leakage so that the case
study can be useful in this analysis.
An ideal evaluation would require testing the mechanisation on a range of realistic
case studies with different specifications and confidentiality requirements. Such an
evaluation can illustrate that the mechanised analysis approach can cope with varied
Circus specifications having data leakage related confidentiality requirements. However,
such realistic case studies can only be carried out using real world requirement spe-
cifications of systems. Such requirement specifications maybe obtained from officially
published documents of real life systems. However, if such documents are not available,
as was the case in this research, we would have to compile them by being in the field
and studying the original system and engaging with the real stakeholders. Such an
approach was used by Srivatanakul (2005) in conducting a case study on the Baggage
Handling System of the Bangkok International Airport in Thailand. However, based
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on the structure of a given Ph.D. research, such an engagement might not be always
possible, given the time limitation as was the case in this doctoral research.
4.2 The advantage of mechanisation over a manual approach
Mechanising the back propagation process can save a lot of resources related to time
which otherwise might be required when following manual calculations which needs
to be carried out with meticulous detail, to avoid human error. The advantage that this
mechanisation brings is self evident in a manual run that involves back propagating a
non-trivial Circus specification of a system. In this section, a step-by-step walk through
for back propagating a small component of a fictitious system is presented.
Figure 4.1 presents the Circus specification of the patient details component of a Health
Information System where a doctor uses a system to access details of patients who
are being treated by that doctor. The descriptions of the types, state variables, state
invariants, channels and actions of this specification are included in Table 4.1.
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PATIENT The set of all possible patient identifiers.
PATIENTDETAILS The set of all possible patient detail identifiers.
treats The set of people currently being treated at the clinic
where the doctor practices.
reqPatient The identifier of the patient whose patient details is being
requested from the system.
patientInfo A function that identifies the details of a patient, if any.
treats ⊆ dom patientInfo The set of people treated must be from the set of patients
whose patient details are recorded in the system.
patientIn The use of this channel by the system is to input the
identifier of the patient whose details are being requested
from the system.
detailsOut The use of this channel by the system is to output the
details of the particular patient being requested from the
system.
PatientDetails Allows a person to request the details of a patient, if the
identifier of that particular patient is in the set treats.
ConfType Enforces a confidentiality requirement that if the requested
patient is not in treats then do not reveal the details of the
patient.
Table 4.1: Descriptions of the constructs of the Patient details component
of the Health Information System
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[PATIENT, PATIENTDETAILS]
State
treats : PPATIENT
patientInfo : PATIENT 7 7→ PATIENTDETAILS
reqPatient : PATIENT
treats ⊆ dom patientInfo
HidePatientDetails
ΞState
∃ S˜tate •
reqPatient 6∈ treats⇒
(patientInfo reqPatient 6= ˜patientInfo ˜reqPatient)
channel patientIn : PATIENT
channel detailsOut : PATIENTDETAILS
channelset All == {| detailsOut, patientIn |}
process PatientSystem =̂ begin
Init =̂ [State′]
PatientDetails =̂ var patient : PATIENT •
patientIn?patient−→ reqPatient = patient?;
(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo) N
detailsOut!(patientInfo patient?)−→ Skip)
ConfType =̂ HidePatientDetails
• 〈Init〉 ; 〈PatientDetails〉 ; 〈ConfType〉
end
Figure 4.1: Specification of the patient details component of a
Patient information system
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Assume that the state variables patientInfo and treats have already been populated. The
following is a step-by-step back propagation of the specification in Figure 4.1.
bw((〈Init〉 ; 〈PatientDetails〉 ; 〈ConfType〉),True)
= [Law 6.32 - bw sequence]
bw((〈Init〉 ; 〈PatientDetails〉), bw(〈ConfType〉,True))
= [Law 6.18 - bw CA]
bw((〈Init〉 ; 〈PatientDetails〉), 〈ConfType〉)
= [Law 6.32 - bw sequence]
bw(〈Init〉, bw(〈PatientDetails〉, 〈ConfType〉))
The following is the back propagation calculation for bw(〈PatientDetails〉, 〈ConfType〉).
bw(〈PatientDetails〉, 〈ConfType〉)
= [definition of PatientDetails]
bw(〈var patient : PATIENT •
patientIn?patient−→ reqPatient := patient?;
(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo &
detailsOut!(patientInfo patient?)−→ Skip)〉,
〈ConfType〉)
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= [Law 6.27 - bw scope]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw((〈patientIn?patient−→ reqPatient := patient?〉;
〈(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo &
detailsOut!(patientInfo patient?)−→ Skip)〉),
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT • ConfType)
= [Lemma 5.23]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw((〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉;
〈reqPatient := patient?〉;
〈(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo &
detailsOut!(patientInfo patient?))−→ Skip〉),
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT • ConfType)
= [Law 6.32 - bw sequence]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw(〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉;
〈reqPatient := patient?〉,
bw(〈(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo &
detailsOut!(patientInfo patient?))−→ Skip〉,
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT • ConfType))
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= [Law 6.33 - bw guard]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw(〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉;
〈reqPatient := patient?〉,
(bw(〈detailsOut!(patientInfo patient?)−→ Skip〉,
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT • ConfType)
∧ U(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))
∨ U(¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)))
= [Law 6.34 - bw output]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw(〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉;
〈reqPatient := patient?〉,
(((∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT • ConfType ∧
(patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo ˜patient?))
∧ U(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∨ U(¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))))
= [Law 6.32 - bw sequence]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw(〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉,
(bw(〈reqPatient := patient?〉,
(((∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT • ConfType ∧
(patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo ˜patient?))
∧ U(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))
∨ U(¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)))))
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= [Law 6.31 - bw assignment]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw(〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉,
(((∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT • ConfType ∧
(patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo ˜patient?))
∧ U(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))
∨ U(¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))))
[reqPatient, ˜reqPatient/patient?,˜patient?]
= [Definition of ConfType]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw(〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉,
(((∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
(reqPatient 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo reqPatient 6= ˜patientInfo ˜reqPatient)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo ˜patient?))
∧ U(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))
∨ U(¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))))
[reqPatient, ˜reqPatient/patient?,˜patient?]
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= [Renaming reqPatient, ˜reqPatient]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw(〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉,
(((∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
(patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo ˜patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo ˜patient?))
∧ U(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))
∨ U(¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))))
= [remove quantifiers - no bound variable]
∀ patient : PATIENT • ∃ p˜atient : PATIENT •
bw(〈patientIn?patient−→ Skip〉,
(((patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo ˜patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo ˜patient?)
∧ U(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))
∨ U(¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))))
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= [Law 6.36 - bw input prefix]
∀ patient? : PATIENT • ∃˜patient? : PATIENT •
((∀ patient? : PATIENT •
(((patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo ˜patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo ˜patient?)
∧ U(patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))
∨ U(¬ (patient? ∈ treats
∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo))))[patient?/˜patient?])
= [Law 6.33 - definition of U]
∀ patient? : PATIENT • ∃˜patient? : PATIENT •
((∀ patient? : PATIENT •
(((patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo ˜patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo ˜patient?)
∧ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ (p˜atient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ p˜atient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))
∨ (¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ ¬ (p˜atient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ p˜atient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))))
[patient?/˜patient?])
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= [Renaming]
∀ patient? : PATIENT • ∃˜patient? : PATIENT •
(∀ patient? : PATIENT •
(((patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))
∨ (¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ ¬ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))))
= [Eliminate outer existential quantifier]
∀ patient? : PATIENT •
(∀ patient? : PATIENT •
(((patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))
∨ (¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ ¬ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))))
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= [Combine outer universal quantifiers]
∀ patient? : PATIENT •
(((patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))
∨ (¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ ¬ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo)))
Continuing the back propagation from page 125;
bw(〈Init〉, bw(〈PatientDetails〉, 〈ConfType〉))
= [simplification of bw(〈PatientDetails〉, 〈ConfType〉)]
bw(〈Init〉,
(∀ patient? : PATIENT •
(((patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))
∨ (¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ ¬ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo)))))
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= [No change in state in 〈 Init 〉]
∀ patient? : PATIENT •
( ( (patient? 6∈ treats⇒
patientInfo patient? 6= ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patientInfo patient? = ˜patientInfo patient?)
∧ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo))
∨ (¬ (patient? ∈ treats ∧ patient? ∈ dom patientInfo)
∧ ¬ (patient? ∈ t˜reats ∧ patient? ∈ dom ˜patientInfo)))
= [Predicate calculus]
true
The above manual back propagation of the specification in Figure 4.1 took approxim-
ately one hour to complete whereas the mechanised back propagation of the same
specification using the tool (see Chapter 3) developed in this research took 120 mil-
liseconds to complete. This shows a time-saving advantage of the mechanised back
propagation approach over the manual approach. In addition, the amount of human
errors that could be avoided through this mechanised calculation approach is self
evident.
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4.3 Value of the mechanisation
During the case study analysis carried out as part of this research, we were able to
verify the consistency of the requirements in a specification where a real issue with
the formalisation of the confidentiality requirement was not apparent at first glance.
However, later it was noticed that specification was seemingly incorrect. Upon further
review, it was identified that we had circumvented the weakness in the specification of
the system by strengthening the formalisation of the confidentiality requirement, that
allowed us to verify the consistency of the requirements in the system. In this thesis,
such a specification is called a ‘weak specification’.
Weak specification. For the purposes of this research, a specification is referred as
a ‘weak specification’ if the specification is seemingly incorrect but the mechanised
analysis of the specification using BCF in Circus results in a predicate that can be
simplified to true, thereby verifying the consistency of the requirements.
This experience with a ‘weak specification’ is discussed and demonstrated in Sec-
tion 6.2.7 using a fictitious hand-crafted system. The discussion further demonstrates
the value of the mechanisation. This is because the analysis did not verify the consist-
ency of the requirements until the confidentiality requirements were strengthened.
4.4 Benchmark for evaluation
To the author’s knowledge, there is no existing literature that defines a “benchmark
set” of case studies that can be used to evaluate a potential tool for analysing systems
with a confidentiality requirement. However, many papers that cover a broad range
of systems especially in the domain of information flow theories, security and privacy
discusses various confidentiality properties. And so, deriving an initial catalogue of
case studies that can be used for evaluating the mechanisation of BCF in Circus or other
similar mechanisations of security related tools as well as that can be extended by other
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researchers would be a useful contribution. Such a catalogue is proposed in the next
chapter. Later in this thesis, this catalogue is used for evaluating the mechanisation of
BCF in Circus.
4.5 Limitations of the catalogue approach for evaluation
The papers identified in Chapter 5 discuss confidentiality requirements that are re-
quired in certain system contexts. However, none of the identified papers contain any
description or formal specification of these systems. Therefore, in order to analyse each
identified confidentiality pattern CP, the following activities were carried out.
• Select a confidentiality requirement from Table 5.3 that reflects the pattern CP.
• Hand-craft a set of system requirements for a typical system for which CP has
been identified as a confidentiality requirement.
• Develop a formal specification by interpreting the hand-crafted system require-
ments for the system.
It is a limitation of this research that specifications for case studies had to be developed
based on hand-crafted system requirements. However, if there was at least a full
description of a system in the identified papers, the system description could have
been re-written using a Controlled Natural Language (CNL)1. An unambiguous and
structured system description that follows a CNL can systematically be translated to
formal specifications that can be used for analysing those systems for data leakage.
Cabral and Sampaio (2008) have produced a tool that can translate a specification
written in a particular CNL to CSP. CSP being the reactive notation used in the Circus
notation, such an approach can directly map reactive characteristics from a requirement
document to a formal specification in the Circus notation. Since a CNL can be used
1 “CNLs are engineered subsets of natural languages whose grammars and vocabularies have been restricted in a
systematic way in order to reduce both the ambiguity and complexity of full NLs (e.g. English, French, etc.)”
(Feuto Njonko et al., 2014, p. 68).
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in such translations, further research can be carried out as to how the data structures
can be mapped from a similar CNL to the Z notation, where the Z notation is used to
encode data structures using the Circus notation. An effort in this direction is the work
by Becker (2007) who proposed the use of Cassandra2 to formalise policy specifications.
Translating specifications written in a particular CNL to the Circus notation might be
appropriate as a further extension to the mechanisation presented in this thesis.
2 Cassandra is a policy specification language that is based on Datalog (Abiteboul et al., 1995) with constraints.
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4.6 Evaluation plan
The evaluation of the tool will be carried out using the following steps.
1. Identify a set of patterns recurring in the catalogue of confidentiality requirements
that has been derived from literature, where these requirements are related to
data leakage.
2. Present a case study example for each identified confidentiality requirement
pattern. The case study example will involve:
• hand-crafting an unambiguous description of the system.
• developing an appropriate Circus specification of the system.
• encoding the confidentiality requirements using BCF in Circus.
• using the mechanisation of BCF in Circus to analyse the formalized system
for data leakage by executing the back propagation process and simplifying
the resulting predicate using the Isabelle theorem prover.
3. Demonstrate how the weakness in a specification can be circumvented to make it
verifiable when analysed using BCF in Circus.
4. Demonstrate how a contradiction in a specification can be detected when a system
specification is analysed using BCF in Circus by introducing a contradiction
purposely in the specification.
5. Demonstrating positive tests where specifications in the above case studies
without a contradiction are verified when analysed using BCF in Circus.
6. Use the time taken for executing the back propagation process using the tool and
the time taken for simplifying the generated predicate as parameters, to compare
the relative resource utilization when different specifications are analysed using
the proposed mechanisation on a common platform.
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The objective of the evaluation is to show that the mechanisation correctly identifies the
specifications that contain an inconsistency within the specification and specifications
that do not. As you may recall from Section 2.7.1 on page 82, BCF concludes that a
system may leak data if the predicate generated by back propagating the specification
of a system contains a contradiction. Similarly, if the predicate generated does not
contain a contradiction, then BCF concludes that the system will not leak data. Here,
a contradiction reflects a logical inconsistency within the formal definitions of the
functional and confidentiality requirements in a system specification.
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Types of specifications analysed
During the evaluation, the following different types of specifications have be analysed.
Positive specification For the purposes of this research, a positive specification is
defined as one which is written without any contradictions
between the functionality and confidentiality requirements
of the system. It is expected that applying the mechanised
tool on such a specification will produce a predicate that
can be Simplified to true by the Isabelle theorem prover.
Weak specification Recall from Section 4.3 in page 134 that during the analysis
we were able to verify the consistency of the requirements
that seemed to be incorrect. However, this verification was
possible by circumventing the weakness with the specifica-
tion using a modified formalisation of the confidentiality
requirement. This issue has been demonstrated in Sec-
tion 6.2.7.
Negative specification For the purposes of this research, a negative specification
is defined as one which is written with at least one definite
contradiction between the functionality and confidentiality
requirements of the system. It is expected that applying
the mechanised tool on such a specification will produce a
predicate that cannot be Simplified by the Isabelle theorem
prover. Rather, attempting to simplify the predicate using
the Isabelle theorem prover will result in either Theorem
prover time-out or Counter example found as outcomes.
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Possible categories of specifications based on analysis outcome
In general, there can be four different categories of specifications as listed below.
positive and provable A positive specification that can be proved automatically
automatically using proof tactics.
positive and not provable A positive specification that cannot be proved automatic-
ally using proof tactics. In this case, expert assistance
is required for theorem proving. The theorem proving
exercise may result in a time-out when some automated
theorem proving commands are executed.
negative and provable A negative specification for which a counter example can
be generated automatically using proof tactics.
negative and not provable A negative specification for which a counter example can
be generated using automatically using proof tactics.
In this case, expert assistance is required for identifying
a counter example. The theorem proving exercise may
result in a time-out when some automated theorem
proving commands are executed.
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4.7 Summary
The main objective of this chapter is to layout a plan for evaluating the proposed mech-
anisation of BCF in Circus. This plan has been derived based on both the capabilities of
the mechanisation as well as the factors that confine the space where the mechanisation
can be utilized.
In this chapter:
• The comparative advantages of the proposed mechanisation over the manual
approach has been demonstrated.
• How the proposed mechanisation can be beneficial in identifying weak specifica-
tions which otherwise might be overlooked when following the manual approach
was demonstrated.
• The limitations that guide and confine the approach that has been taken in
mechanising BCF in Circus was discussed.
• The plan for evaluating the mechanisation of BCF in Circus has been discussed.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an approach for compiling a catalogue of confidentiality require-
ment patterns from the literature. A pattern is a generalized description of a commonly
occurring requirement (Dwyer et al., 1999, p. 412). A pattern catalogue is a collection of
related patterns subdivided into different categories (Hakeem, 2010, p. 23).
In this chapter, a literature search for confidentiality requirements are carried out
and the results are analysed to identify recurring patterns in those confidentiality
requirements. In the next chapter, system models that contain confidentiality properties
based on these patterns will be used in evaluating the practical applicability of the
mechanisation of BCF. To the author’s knowledge, system models that contain con-
fidentiality properties based on such a pattern catalogue has not been published in
the publicly accessible literature to this date. However, such a catalogue is required to
evaluate the BCF in Circus mechanisation developed through this research. This chapter
discusses how such a catalogue has been compiled to address this need. A systematic
literature search process is adopted to identify publications that can be included in
such a catalogue.
In addition, this chapter includes an approach for extracting generalized formalisations
from the formalisations of confidentiality requirement patterns. The result is a set of
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minimum unique patterns of formalisation required to capture all the identified pat-
terns of confidentiality requirements. Any technique or approach intending to provide
support for the catalogue of confidentiality requirements can do so by providing sup-
port for this minimum set of generalized formalisations. In this research, this set of
generalized formalisations is referred to as the “generalized patterns of confidentiality
requirements”. Similarly, when designing a software to support the catalogue of con-
fidentiality requirements, we must ensure that the software supports the specification
templates that reflect the generalized patterns of confidentiality requirements.
The ‘pattern’ approach for software engineering became common place in the software
development community after Gamma et al. (1995) published the book Design Patterns:
Elements of Reusable Object-oriented Software. In their book, they used “patterns to
capture good solutions to common problems programmers experienced when designing
software” (Adolph et al., 2003, p. 7).
5.2 Systematic literature search for case study material
A systematic process is followed in this literature search to enhance the quality and
relevance of the resulting dataset.
5.2.1 Research question
The research question addressed in this chapter is:
What confidentiality properties or requirements have been discussed in software
engineering literature?
BCF in Circus integrates aspects of secure information flow theories with a formal
system development approach. Formal system development is a software engineering
approach that aims at delivering reliable software.
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“Software engineering is the establishment and use of sound engineering principles
in order to obtain economically software that is reliable and works efficiently on real
machines” (Andreson, 2014, p. 496).
An unambiguous description of a system is required for formal system development.
Further, scenarios with a confidentiality requirement or confidentiality property are
needed to test secure information flow theories related to confidentiality.
Therefore, the ideal set of testing data for analysing BCF in Circus must have unam-
biguous descriptions of systems with a confidentiality requirement. The above research
question confines the literature search to software engineering to limit the search base
while maximising the possibility of extracting unambiguous descriptions of systems.
5.2.2 Identification of indexing services
The following phrases were used as a composite search string in Google Scholar to
identify the literature that discusses systematic literature review of software engineer-
ing.
"systematic literature review" "software engineering"
The first 20 results were considered. The motivation was to categorize the collection
of indexing services which each author thought was relevant for software engineering
research. Table 5.1 lists the most recurring indexing services which the author used.
Based on the number of papers where the indexing server was mentioned, as shown
in Table 5.1 , the indexing services IEEE Explorer, ACM Digital Library, ScienceDirect,
SpringerLink and Google scholar were selected as indexing services to based the
systematic literature search on. CiteSeer was excluded because it has a smaller digital
library than Google Scholar (Khabsa and Giles, 2014, p. 1) even though both had the
same number of mentions.
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5.2.3 Inclusion criteria
The inclusion criteria for the documents retrieved were as follows.
1. The document must be in English.
2. Do not include repeated copies of the same document.
3. PDF and postscript documents were considered for this collection.
4. Only full documents rather than parts of documents were considered.
5. Only published journal papers, conference papers, thesis and reports were con-
sidered.
The collection of documents that conformed to the inclusion criteria is called the
literature base.
During the preparation for the literature search, the author identified that privacy and
confidentiality were often used in the context of lawyer-client confidentiality, patient
privacy and patient-doctor confidentiality. However, sometimes these discussions were
not centred on system engineering and design. During the literature search, such papers
were therefore not considered. Section 5.2.1 explains how confining the literature search
to software engineering may help in getting search results that discusses confidentiality
analysis centred on system engineering and design.
5.2.4 Search keywords
The ecosystem of research addressed in this thesis is confidentiality engineering. A
keyword map that represents the confidentiality engineering ecosystem is presented in
Figure 5.1.
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Indexer # of times mentioned in the
20 papers
IEEE Explorer 16
ACM Digital Library 15
ScienceDirect 11
SpringerLink 9
Google scholar 5
CiteSeer 5
Table 5.1: Relevant catalogues for software engineering research
Privacy
Confidentiality
requirements
Security
Verification
Information system
includes
Confidentiality 
verified
information
systemachieves
Confidentiality engineering 
during system design
achieves
assured by
demands 
assurances for
Formal specification
uses formal methods 
to produce
is a property of
Figure 5.1: Keyword map describing the confidentiality engineering ecosystem
Based on the keyword map in Table 5.1, the following words and phrases were used to
search for literature that may discuss confidentiality engineering during system design.
• “confidentiality” and “formal methods”
• “confidentiality” and “system design”
• “confidentiality properties”
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• “confidentiality requirements”
• “security engineering”
• “secure by design”
• “privacy1 by design”
5.2.5 Literature selection
The literature search carried out in this research showed that very few published papers
described a complete model of a system. Rather, papers discussed scenarios within
the system execution where a confidentiality assurance is required and how to fix it.
Therefore, any literature that mentioned the need for confidentiality of information in
the context of an information system was included.
Search results revealed 490 articles. All articles were put on a Mendeley catalogue
(Mendeley Ltd., 2016). The catalogue was searched using the keyword ‘confidential‘.
The inbuilt search system in Mendeley was used to search for the keyword. If a
keyword existed in a paper, Mendeley showed the number of occurrences of that
keyword in that paper. Mendeley takes the user directly to each occurrence in the paper
through its inbuilt interface. The paragraph, table or diagram where each occurrence
of the keyword was reviewed to see if a confidentiality requirement was described.
Table 5.3 presents the collection of confidentiality requirements that have been identified
following this search process.
Sequential access implementations. The system contexts where some of these confid-
entiality requirements were described might have been based on systems with
concurrent access. However, the systems modelled in this research have been
restricted to sequential access implementations because the catalogue of back
1 As highlighted in the introduction section, the words Privacy and Confidentiality have been used interchangeably
by many author’s to mean the same thing. Our objective is to cover a broad ground regarding the existing literature
that discusses confidentiality assurances required in system design.
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propagation laws for BCF in Circus does not provide support for parallel processes.
This limitation has been discussed in Section 2.8.
Types of data leakage risks considered. As discussed in "On data leakage and the in-
ference problem" on pages 111 - 113 , BCF in Circus can be used to reason about
the possibility of data leakage through:
• direct communication of values of state variables to the environment, that
are required to be kept confidential as per a confidentiality requirement.
• indirect communication of confidential data to the environment through a
state variable authorised for that particular user.
Therefore, the confidentiality requirements selected for inclusion in the confiden-
tiality catalogue have been restricted to the above types of requirements.
The importance of analysing patterns of confidentiality requirements. When evaluating
a technique that has been proposed for analysing confidentiality requirements in
systems, it will be more justifiable to consider candidate requirements from groups
of requirements having the same pattern, rather than individual requirements.
By using this approach, a broader range of requirements can be addressed
during the evaluation of the mechanized analysis technique. Confidentiality
requirements take similar forms in many contexts. Such similarities can be the
basis for grouping confidentiality requirements. Each resulting group will have
confidentiality requirements with the same pattern. The next section presents
the derivation of groups of confidentiality requirements, each having a different
pattern.
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5.3 Patterns of confidentiality requirements
The main objective of this section is to identify and review common patterns that may
exist in a collection of confidentiality requirements, which has been extracted from
literature. Each confidentiality requirement in this collection has been identified by a
unique identifier of the form CRX where X represents a unique integer assigned to
that particular requirement. A total of 33 CRs (CR1–CR33) were extracted from the
literature and these confidentiality requirements are presented in Table 5.3, Section 5.3.1.
Table 5.2 presents the patterns that exists in the descriptions of these confidentiality
requirements. The table further groups the collection of confidentiality requirements
based on which pattern each confidentiality requirement falls under. A pattern reflects
data leakage risks of a similar form across many contexts.
Pattern
id
Pattern description Confidentiality requirement where the
pattern exists
CP1 do not reveal the relation between
x and y in S
CR3, CR4, CR5, CR6, CR7, CR8,
CR9, CR11, CR12, CR13, CR18,
CR23, CR27, CR29, CR33
CP2 do not reveal whether x is a member
of S
CR10, CR14, CR20, CR21, CR22,
CR24, CR25, CR26
CP3 do not reveal the set S CR28, CR30, CR32
CP4 do not reveal the exact value of x CR1, CR2, CR15, CR16, CR19, CR31
CP5 do not reveal whether the value
of x is lower/higher than a given
threshold n
CR17
Table 5.2: Patterns of confidentiality requirements
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5.3.1 Deriving patterns of confidentiality requirements
Table 5.2 includes the collection of confidentiality requirements, identified from the
set of literature, short-listed in Section 5.2.5. It is important to discuss briefly, the
process which has been followed in identifying and deriving patterns of confidentiality
requirements from this collection. The steps in this process include:
• Extracting a direct quote or paraphrasing the confidentiality requirement dis-
cussed in a given paper.
• Rephrasing the extracted description of each confidentiality requirement using a
structured statement.
• Categorizing the structured statements based on commonalities in their descrip-
tions.
• Presenting each category as a pattern of confidentiality requirements in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.3: A collection of confidentiality requirements from literature
Context
scenario
Confidentiality property/goal required
a structured general definition for the confidentiality requirement
Context : Sealed bid auction system
The bid value b and the randomiser r must not be revealed to anyone
except the bidder until the bid submission phase.
(Viswanathan et al., 2000, p. 416)
CR1 if the user is not the bidder of b
then do not reveal the value of b (which represents the bid value)
CR2 if the user is not the bidder of b
then do not reveal the value of r (which represents the randomiser value)
Context : Clinical information system
“personal information about patients must be kept secure and confiden-
tial”.
“identifying information must not be made available to government and
health authorities.”
(Gurses et al., 2005, p. 7,10)
CR3
if the user belongs to the government or a health authority
then do not reveal the association between
the patient and his/her medical data
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
“An unauthorized source should never access to the content”. No one
apart from authorised personal can have access to personal identifiable
health information.
(Juan et al., 2011, p. 26)
CR4
if the user does not have the necessary authorisation
then do not reveal the association between
the patient and his/her medical data
“The IS shall protect the privacy of patients and their associated medical
records. The confidentiality of data shall be guaranteed. Moreover, the
database shall be available for allowing the access of patient medical
information in case of urgent need”.
“Focusing on the patient data and its relationship with medical data, a
privacy goal is associated with them. However medical data (without
its associated relationship with patient data) is not constrained by this
privacy goal.”
(Mayer et al., 2005, p. 2,10)
CR5
if the user does not have the necessary authorisation
and the request is not made under a condition of urgency
then do not reveal the association between
the patient and his/her medical data
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
“For example, a patient typically gives consent to his/her medical record
to physicians in a call group (set of physician sharing a practice), however,
patients with particular conditions might only give consent to their family
physician”.
Onabajo and Jahnke (2006b)
CR6
if the patient has a particular condition
and the user is not the family physician
then do not reveal the association between
the patient and his/her medical data
“The context of the confidentiality statement is not only based on the
purpose, but also on potential user(s) or stakeholder(s) who require access
to data e.g., a patient would normally give access to his/her medical
record to a physician for care-delivery, but deny access to non-medical
staff”.
“For example, access to sections of a medical record, such as prescription
history, might have potential influence on treatment options, particularly
during emergencies”.
(Onabajo and Jahnke, 2006a, p. 3,4)
CR7
if the user is not a physician
then do not reveal the association between
the patient and his/her medical data
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
It is important to preserve individual privacy of the persons in healthcare
information systems.
(Trouessin, 1999, p. 450)
CR8
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the association between
the patient and his/her medical data
“We motivate the need for conditional confidentiality by referring to the
doctor example from the introduction. As described before, the system
should allow access to the X- ray only if the user is a doctor.”
(Tschantz and Wing, 2008, p. 111)
CR9
if the user is not a doctor
then do not reveal the association between
a patient and his/her x-ray
“Protection of the integrity and confidentiality of medical images is an
issue in the management of patients’ medical records. Confidentiality
states that unauthorized parties should not be granted to access medical
images during transmission”.
(Ulutas et al., 2011, p. 341)
CR10
if the user is not authorized
then for every given x,
do not reveal whether x is a member of the set S
(where S contains the set of x-rays)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
“the specific association between individual patients and their illnesses is
sensitive and should be maintained confidential”.
(De Capitani di Vimercati et al., 2014, p. 214)
CR11
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the association between
a patient and his/her illness
“The last kind of attribute is the confidential attribute,the values of which
we have to protect”.
“For example, if the attribute is a HIV test result, then the revelation of a
‘+’ value may cause a serious invasion of privacy”.
(Wang et al., 2007, p. 257)
CR12
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the association between
a patient and his/her HIV result
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
Context : e-payment system
“Several items in this system may need protection: (i) User’s private
information as known to the local host (ii) Account information provided
by User to the applet upon form submission (iii) Order information similar
to (ii) (iv) The mere fact that User is engaging in a transaction with
Merchant (v) Secrets concerning User’s account possessed by Acquirer
such as account balance or credit limit.”
(Dam and Giambiagi, 2000, p. 235)
CR13
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the association between
a customer and his/her account balance result
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
Context : Phone book
The existence of a particular phone number in a phone book should be
kept secret.
“The property to be kept secret for the example is whether a particular
string, say ‘555-55’ is in the phone book. Let us denote it by secret. We
want to verify that the attacker cannot infer whether the secret holds or not
based on her knowledge of the program and observation of the outputs
(in this case, the variable message)”.
(Cerny and Alur, 2009b, p. 175)
CR14
if the user is not authorized
then for every given x,
do not reveal whether x is a member of the set S
(where S contains the phone numbers in the phone book)
Context : Smart card
The confidentiality of the personal data stored in a smart card must be
maintained.
“Due to its particular nature, a major concern of smartcards applications is
to guarantee confidentiality and integrity of data”.
(Barthe and Dufay, 2005, p. 133,164)
CR15
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the value of x
(where x is any personal detail stored in the smart card)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
Context : e-Purse
“In that specific example, agents who are not the card holder should not
know that there is at least $v in the e-purse (whatever the value of v is)”.
“An agent should not know the exact value of some state variable”.
“An agent should not know that the value of some state variable is
below/above some threshold”.
(De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde, 2005, p. 44)
CR16 if the agent is not the card holder
then do not reveal the value of x
CR17
if the agent is not the card holder
then do not reveal whether the value y is
above/below a certain threshold n
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
Context : Bank information system
The paper uses confidentiality requirements from Chandra and Khan
(2010, p. 17), which reads, “Confidentiality protects data/information from
unauthorised user access. Security demands that sensitive information
should not be disclosed publicly. For example, in a bank account man-
agement system, function get balance () shows the current balance amount
of user. In this case permission should be granted only for authorised user
to see the information”.
(Parveen et al., 2015, p. 2)
CR18
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the association between
a customer and his/her current balance
“This enables us to check confidentiality properties, e.g., that critical data
such as credit card information are shared only with authorized partners”.
“a driver in trouble must be assured that information about his credit card
and his location cannot become available to unauthorized users”.
(Lapadula et al., 2008, p. 713,714)
CR19
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the value of y
(where y is a credit card information of the card holder)
Continued on next page
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Context : Examination system
“No examinee should learn any details of the contents of the examination
before the start of the examination”.
“No examinee should learn any details of the contents of any other ex-
aminees answer paper between the start of the paper and the end of the
examination”.
“No examinee should learn any details of the marking until results are
posted”.
(Foley and Jacob, 1995, p. 143)
CR20
if the user u is registered in an exam e
and exam e has not started
then for every given x,
do not reveal whether x is a member of the set S
(where S represents the contents of the exam e)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
CR21
if the user u currently using the system is not requesting information
that belongs to him/her
and exam e has started and but not ended
then do not reveal the set S
(where S represents the answers recorded by a user other than u
in the exam e)
CR22
if the user u is registered in an exam e
and the results of exam e has not been posted
then for every given x,
do not reveal whether x is a member of the set S
(where S represents the markings for the exam e)
The crucial information that is confidential2 in a computer assisted assess-
ment and diagnosis system includes the testing number, the name of the
candidates, title, score and user account amongst others.
(Cao and Wang, 2009, p. 292)
CR23
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the association between
a candidate and his/her candidate details
Continued on next page
2 Cao and Wang (2009) describes a mechanism that protects the confidential data via encryption.
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Context : Java card
The confidentiality of data in a multi-application Java card must be guar-
anteed as per the applet isolation principle.
(Andronick et al., 2003, p. 335)
CR24
if the applet A is not authorised on the applet B
then for every given x,
do not reveal whether x is a member of the set S
(where S represents the set of data in the applet A)
“Open smart cards let you download code onto cards after their issuance
(postissuance)”.
“One of the main issues when deploying these applications is to guarantee
to the customer that these applications will be safe i.e., that their execution
will not jeopardise the smart card’s integrity or confidentiality.”.
(Casset, 2002, p. 290)
CR25
if the applet A is not authorised on the applet B
then for every given x,
do not reveal whether x is a member of the set S
(where S represents the set of data in the applet A)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
“This objective prevents the objects owned by one applet from being used
by another applet without explicit sharing. The isolation between the
applets covers two security properties: confidentiality and integrity. The
confidentiality ensures that during its execution, an applet cannot read
the information stored in the other applets”.
(Chetali and Nguyen, 2008, p. 202)
CR26
if the applet A is not authorised on the applet B
then for every given x,
do not reveal whether x is a member of the set S
(where S represents the set of data in the applet A)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
Context : Conference management system
The following confidentiality properties are addressed.
“A group of users learn nothing about a paper unless one of them becomes
an author of that paper or a PC member at the paper’s conference.
A group of users learn nothing about a paper beyond the last submitted
version unless one of them becomes an author of that paper.
A group of users learn nothing about the content of a review beyond the
last submitted version before the discussion phase and the later versions
unless one of them is that review’s author.
The author’s learn nothing about the discussion of their paper”.
(Kanav et al., 2014, p. 168)
CR27
if the user u is not the author of the paper x
and u is not a PC member at the conference
where x is submitted
then do not reveal the association between
the paper x and any details related to that paper
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
Context : Broker subscription system
“Confidentiality is important here because Pubs want to make sure that
only paying customers have access to the quotes. We say that a CBPS
system provides publication confidentiality if Brokers can neither identify
the content of the messages published by Pubs nor infer the distribution
of attribute values of the message”.
(Ion et al., 2010, p. 134)
CR28
if the user u is a Broker
then do not reveal the set S
(where S is the set of contents
in the messages published by a publisher)
“We say that a CBPS system provides subscription privacy if Brokers can
neither identify what subscriptions Subs made nor relate a set of subscrip-
tions to a specific Sub”.
(Ion et al., 2010, p. 134)
CR29
if the user u is a Broker
then do not reveal the association between
a subscriber and his/her set of subscriptions
Continued on next page
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Context : Military information system
“Information about mission plans, strategy, and deployment of troops
must remain confidential on the C4I computer system and networks of all
type”.
“If an adversary gets access to the logistics information stored in a file or
database may be used to misguide the army commander in the deployment
of troops”.
(Alghamdi et al., 2010, p. 131)
CR30
if the user u is not authorised
then do not reveal the set S
(where S is the set of logistics information)
Context : Information retrieval system
The confidentiality of the search query as well as the contents of the
retrieved documents should be maintained.
“The proposed method maintains the confidentiality of the query as well
as the content of retrieved documents”.
(Swaminathan et al., 2007, p. 12)
CR31
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the value of x
(where x is the search query)
CR32
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the set S
(where S is the set of contents in the retrieved documents)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page
Context : Human resource
“For example, to maintain the confidentiality of personnel data while
handling the requests for HR data, the security requirement shall guaran-
tee that only those requests coming from the members of human resources
staff are considered”.
(Yu et al., 2015, p. 104)
CR33
if the user is not authorized
then do not reveal the association between
an employee and his/her personal details
It is important to identify any commonalities that may exist in the formalisation of
the patterns in Table 5.2 using BCF in Circus. Such commonalities maybe considered
as generalized patterns, as they exist across more than one confidentiality pattern.
However, before a confidentiality pattern can be formalized, any vagueness within
its description must be removed. In Table 5.3, CP3 is identified as having a vague
description. The next section discusses the possible different interpretations of CP3
that can be formalised.
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5.4 Subtleties in formalizing generic patterns of confidentiality
requirements using BCF in Circus
Most of the confidentiality requirements presented in Table 5.3 are not described in a
clear and concise manner. Therefore, the patterns derived from these confidentiality
requirements can be formalised in more than one way. The subtleties with these
different formal definitions translate to different upper limits on the information that
can be disclosed to an unauthorised audience.
Such subtleties may be required during the system design stage where there are often
trade-offs between functional and non-functional requirements (Yu and Liu, 2001, p. 185;
Santen, 2006, p. 154). For example, rather than concealing every single bid in a set of
bids Bids it will be acceptable to conceal at least 1 bid. By doing so, the uncertainty
about the highest bid in Bids can be maintained as the the concealed bid may be the
highest bid.
In this section, we discuss possible different formal definitions of inequality between
two sets, as required by pattern CP3. The pattern CP3 states:
do not reveal the set S
Even though the pattern demands that the set S must not be revealed, the specifics of
how much information about S must be concealed has not been defined in the original
literature. Table 5.4 lists some possible ways in which the inequality between two sets
may be formalized using BCF in Circus.
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Possible ways of specifying set inequality Syntax in BCF in Circus
do not reveal the exact composition of the set S S 6= S˜
do not reveal any elements of the set S S∩ S˜ = {}
do not reveal at least n elements from the set S (# S+ n) ≥ # S˜
Table 5.4: Possible ways of specifying an inequality between two sets S and S˜
The subtleties listed in Table 5.4 is demonstrated using a set of tuples of the function
S and S˜ as shown in Figure 5.2. Each function maps a person identifier to his/her
salary. Each mapping (x, y) is a tuple, such as (Alex, 1000) in Figure 5.2a, (Fred, 400) in
Figure 5.2e and (Casey, 1000) in Figure 5.2h. Table 5.5 shows the differences between
the function map in Figure 5.2a and each of the the function maps in Figure 5.2b to
Figure 5.2i.
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Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(a) S
Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(b) S˜
Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(c) S˜
Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(d) S˜
Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(e) S˜
Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(f) S˜
Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(g) S˜
Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(h) S˜
Alex 1000
Bob 2000
Casey 3000
Dave 400
Fred 500
(i) S˜
Figure 5.2: A function map for a function S and possible function maps for different variants
of a its twin function S˜
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dom(S) ran(S) S∩ S˜ = {} S 6= S˜ (#S+ 1) ≥ # S˜
function map (b) as S˜ 5 3 5
dom(S˜) =
ran(S˜) =
function map (c) as S˜ 5 3 3
dom(S˜) 6=
ran(S˜) 6=
function map (d) as S˜ 3 3 5
dom(S˜) =
ran(S˜) =
function map (e) as S˜ 5 3 5
dom(S˜) =
ran(S˜) 6=
function map (f) as S˜ 3 3 3
dom(S˜) 6=
ran(S˜) 6=
function map (g) as S˜ 5 3 3
dom(S˜) 6=
ran(S˜) 6=
function map (h) as S˜ 3 3 3
dom(S˜) 6=
ran(S˜) 6=
function map (i) as S˜ 3 3 3
dom(S˜) 6=
ran(S˜) 6=
Table 5.5: A comparison of equality in function maps from Figure 5.2
NOTE:
- The n in (# S+ n) ≥ # S˜ has been instantiated to 1, for the purposes of demonstration in Table 5.5.
- The 3 denotes that the property defined in the column heading is satisfied while 5 denotes that the property is not
satisfied.
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5.4.1 Scenarios where different subtleties with inequality between two sets may
satisfy a confidentiality requirement
The Table 5.6 shows how effective each possible way of specifying inequality between
two sets is against confidentiality requirements, that have been identified in Section 5.3.
The set S in Table 5.6 may be any expression that results in a set. The 3 denotes that
the property is satisfied by the type of implementation.
Set to be kept
secret (S)
Specify a set inequality where we
Conceal the exact contents of the
set
Conceal all the ele-
ments of the set
Conceal at least n ele-
ments from the set
set of salaries in a
salary band with
x number of employees 3
may reveal M where M ⊂ S. M
might contain x− 1 salaries. Us-
ing M and x we can compute
the sum of the hidden salaries
thereby revealing the only hid-
den salary
3 3 (if n > 1)
answers of a candidate c 4 May reveal all answers except 1 3 May reveal (# S− n) an-
swers from S
set of medicines
in a patients
prescription history 5
may reveal M where M ⊂ S.
M might contain a specific medi-
cine implying a specific medical
condition of the patient
3 may reveal M where
M ⊂ S. M might con-
tain a specific medicine
implying a specific med-
ical condition of the pa-
tient
Table 5.6: How confidentiality properties are addressed by subtleties in set
inequality.
3 Chivers (2006, p. 89) discusses a scenario where the relationship between an employee and his/her salary is
confidential. Lunt (1989, p. 104) states that if the set of employees in a group is small enough then the association
between a particular employee and his/her salary can be inferred.
4 Foley and Jacob (1995, p. 143) state that the answers recorded by an examinee must not be revealed to any other
examinee during the examination.
5 Onabajo and Jahnke (2006a, p. 844) state that restricting the visibility of the prescription history is a patient’s
confidentiality requirement.
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5.5 Identifying and formalizing generic patterns of confidentiality
This section presents a discussion on extracting generalized patterns from formal
specifications of confidentiality requirement patterns that were identified in Section 5.3.
The approach involves identifying commonalities that may exist in formalizing these
patterns and deriving generalized patterns of confidentiality requirements based on
these commonalities. These generalized patterns can also be categorised as property
specification patterns since these patterns have been extracted from specifications of
properties.
“A property specification pattern describes the essential structure of some aspect
of a system’s behaviour and provides expressions of this behaviour in a range of
common formalisms” (Dwyer et al., 1998, p. 9).
Konrad et al. (2003) provide a template for specifying security patterns. Further, he
suggests a systematic process for simulating as well as model checking the resulting
models. Figure 5.3 shows the steps that were followed in deriving these generalized
patterns.
CP1 The confidentiality pattern CP1 states:
do not reveal the relation between x and y in S
Here, the objective of CP1 is to maintain the secrecy regarding the existence
of the tuple or pair (x, y) in the set S. Binary relations and functions from the
Z notation are used to model such a set of tuples (Spivey, 1989, p. 27).
“A relation is defined to be a set of pairs. A function is a particular form
of relation, where each domain element has only one corresponding range
element” (ISO/IEC, 2002).
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CP5
do not reveal whether 
the value x is lower/higher than 
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at least n 
elements 
from S
do not 
reveal 
the exact 
composition
of S
if S is a 
non-functional
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.. ..
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m and n
if x is 
higher than n
if x is 
lower than n
Generalized patterns of confidentiality properties
do not 
reveal 
any 
element 
in S
Figure 5.3: Deriving generalized patterns from patterns of confidentiality requirements
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Recall from Section 2.5 that Circus combines the Z notation with other nota-
tions and techniques. The following are two formalisations of CP1 depending
on whether the set S is a relation or a function.
Where S is a non-functional relation, one possible formalisation of CP1
using BCF in Circus can be:
(x, y) ∈ S⇒ (x˜, y˜) 6∈ S˜ (5.1)
The formalisation used in Equation (5.1) for specifying confidentiality in
set S is specific to tuples. However, the formalisation is concerned with
maintaining the secrecy of an element of in a given set. This is simillar to
the requirement pattern captured in CP2.
If S in CP1 is a non-functional relation
Where S is a function, one possible formalisation of CP1 using BCF in
Circus can be:
S(x) 6= S˜(x˜) (5.2)
The formalisation in Equation (5.2) can be used in BCF in Circus to conceal
the exact value of S(x). This fulfils the confidentiality requirement pattern
in CP1 where CP1 is concerned with maintaining the secrecy of the tuple
(x, S(x)). Here, S(x) represents the variable y is CP1. This is simillar to
the requirement pattern captured in CP4.
If S in CP1 is a function
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CP2 The confidentiality pattern CP2 states:
do not reveal whether x is a member of S
One possible formalisation of CP2 using BCF in Circus can be:
x ∈ S⇒ x˜ 6∈ S˜ (5.3)
While Equation (5.3) is a possible formalisation of CP2, Equation (5.3) is also a
more generalized formalisation of Equation (5.1) . The following generalized
pattern can be derived from Equation (5.3).
 Generalized pattern GP1 : do not reveal whether x is in S
CP3 The confidentiality pattern CP3 states:
do not reveal the set S
In Section 5.4, the need for introducing some subtly different interpretations
of CP3 were discussed. Further, formalisations for those interpretations were
presented and how they address different confidentiality properties were
discussed. Due to the lack of clear descriptions of confidentiality properties
under CP3, it was important that those interpretations were available for
accurately formalising the confidentiality properties. For this reason, the
subtly different interpretations of CP3 can be adopted as generalised patterns
for maintaining the secrecy of a set. Here, the contents of Table 5.4 in Table 5.7
are being duplicated for easy reference. Further, a unique identifier for each
possibility listed in Table 5.7 has been introduced.
177
5 A systematic literature search for case study material
id Possible ways of specifying set inequality BCF in Circus
S1 do not reveal the exact composition of the set S S 6= S˜
S2 do not reveal any elements of the set S S∩ S˜ = {}
S3 do not reveal at least n elements from the set S (# S+ n) ≥ # S˜
Table 5.7: Possible ways of specifying an inequality between two
sets S and S˜
The formalisation of S1 in Table 5.7 is similar to the requirement pattern
captured in CP4 where CP4 is a more generic formalisation of S1.
The following generalized pattern can be derived from the formalisation of S2
in Table 5.7.
 Generalized pattern GP2 : do not reveal any elements of the set S
The following generalized pattern can be derived from the formalisation of S3
in Table 5.7.
 Generalized pattern GP3 : do not reveal at least n elements from the set S
CP4 The confidentiality pattern CP4 states:
do not reveal the exact value of x
Here, the objective of CP4 is to maintain the secrecy of the exact value of x.
One possible formalisation of CP4 using BCF in Circus can be:
x 6= x˜ (5.4)
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Pattern CP4 with definition “do not reveal the exact value of x” is a weak
pattern because even after CP4 is applied, sometimes critical information
may be revealed, without revealing the exact value that is required to be
kept secret. For example, consider the requirement where the exact value
of a customer bank account is required to be a secret. If the balance bal
of a customer called bob is $500 and if a user has access to the binary
representation of the state variable bal except the last two bits, then
the user can infer that bal is definitely between 500 and 503. In this
scenario, even though CP4 has been satisfied through bit obfuscation,
the inference made by the user might not be acceptable. This is because,
through inference, the user is able to learn bal to a high degree of accuracy.
Table 5.8 represents the bit representation of numbers from 500 to 503.
values 256 128 64 32 16 8 4 2 1
500 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
501 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
502 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
503 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Table 5.8: Bit representations of bank balances between
500 and 503
When using bit obfuscation for confidentiality, as discussed above, the
minimum number of bits that needs to be obfuscated to maintain the
secrecy of a value will depend on the confidentiality requirement, where
the confidentiality requirement must define the degree to which the value
should be kept confidential.
Limited inference while maintaining secrecy of the exact value
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Essentially, both Equation (5.4) and Equation (5.2) are concerned with main-
taining the secrecy of the exact value of an expression expr, where expr ≡ x
in Equation (5.4) and expr ≡ f (x) in Equation (5.2). The expression e˜xpr is
derived by renaming each state variable y in expr with its twin counterpart y˜
as in expr[y/y˜]. Equation (5.5) represents a more generalised formalisation of
CP4.
expr 6= e˜xpr (5.5)
We may derive the following generalized pattern from Equation (5.5).
 Generalized pattern GP4 : do not reveal the exact value of any expression expr
CP5 The confidentiality pattern CP5 states:
do not reveal whether the value of x is lower/higher than a given
threshold n
The objective of CP5 is to maintain the secrecy of the upper bound and the
lower bound of a value against some given thresholds. The pattern CP5 has
been extracted from the paper (De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde, 2005,
p. 4). Infact, this pattern contains three generic patterns of confidentiality
properties which they have formalised separately in (De Landtsheer and
Van Lamsweerde, 2005, p. 4) using epistemic logic. Following are possible
formalisations of those patterns using BCF in Circus.
lower bound do not reveal whether x is lower than the threshold m
x ∈ {y | y < n} ⇒ x˜ 6∈ {y | y < n} (5.6)
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upper bound do not reveal whether x is higher than the threshold m
x ∈ {y | y > n} ⇒ x˜ 6∈ {y | y > n} (5.7)
between do not reveal whether x is between m and n
x ∈ m..n⇒ x˜ 6∈ m..n (5.8)
The formalisation used in Equation (5.8) specifies that the knowledge that
the value of x falls within a certain range must be confidential. In general,
the formalisation is concerned with maintaining the secrecy of an element in
a given set, which in this case is the set of values in the range m..n. This is
similar to the requirement pattern captured in CP2.
5.6 Generalized patterns of confidentiality requirements
A literature-related set of generalized patterns of confidentiality requirements related
to data leakage has been derived through research carried out in this chapter. The set
of generalized patterns derived are shown in Table 5.9. The table further shows how to
specify each generalized pattern of confidentiality requirement using BCF in Circus.
Pattern
id
Pattern description How to specify a
property with the pattern
using BCF in Circus
GP1 do not reveal whether x is in S x ∈ S⇒ x˜ 6∈ S˜
GP2 do not reveal any elements of the set S S∩ S˜ = {}
GP3 do not reveal at least n elements from the set S (# S+ n) ≥ # S˜
GP4 do not reveal the exact value of any expression expr expr 6= e˜xpr
Table 5.9: A catalogue of generalized patterns of confidentiality requirements
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5.7 Confidentiality requirement patterns in literature
Gurses et al. (2005) list a set of attributes that describe a confidentiality requirement.
They include the owner of the confidentiality data, degree of agreement between the
stakeholders of the data, the counter-stakeholder or the role from whom the owner wants
to hide the data, the information to which the confidentiality requirement refers to, the
owners rationale for the confidentiality requirement, the temporal range or how long the
confidentiality requirement must be in place and the context or the cluster of system
functionality where the requirement must be implemented.
De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde (2005) presents a catalogue of patterns on con-
fidentiality along two dimensions. One is concerned with the degree of appropriate
knowledge that must be kept confidential. The second is concerned with timing ac-
cording to which the knowledge must be kept confidential. Similar to De Landtsheer
and Van Lamsweerde (2005), BCF in Circus helps to formally specify the degree of
confidentiality that must be maintained about a piece of data. BCF in Circus can address
timing related confidentiality properties in terms of the order of states.
Both De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde (2005) and the generic patterns proposed
in this thesis share the pattern “do not reveal the exact value of a variable”. Further, De
Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde (2005) proposed the pattern Confidential lower/up-
per bound which states that “An agent should not know that the value of some state variable
is below/above some treshold”, which has been dissected into two generic patterns and
included in the catalogue of generic patterns in Table 5.9. Also, De Landtsheer and Van
Lamsweerde (2005) proposed the pattern Fully confidential value which states “An
agent should not be able to infer any property about the value of some state variable”.
This pattern is just a conjunction of many other patterns proposed in his catalogue.
The timing related confidentiality patterns by De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde
(2005, p. 45) include Confidential now that states that “In the current state, an agent
should not know about some state variable”; Confidential until expiration date that states
that “An agent should not know about some state variable until some delay has expired”;
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Confidential unless/until condition states that “An agent should not know about some
state variable unless or until some condition becomes true”; Confidential forever that states
that “An agent should never know about some state variable”. Both confidentiality until a
condition is met (see Section 6.2.4) and confidentiality forever are properties that can
also be specified using BCF in Circus.
5.8 Patterns in software engineering
In the early 1990s, there was an interest in the software engineering community to
identify situations in which design knowledge could be represented and shared between
practitioners (Fowler, 1997, p. 5). Engineers explored the possibility of using the pattern
language approach by Alexander et al. (1977) to represent knowledge that can possibly
be shared. The OOPSLA workshops (Meyrowitz, 1986) provided an early platform for
such discussions. Currently, the Pattern Languages of Programs (PLoP) conference
series (The Hillside Group, 2017) is one of the annual platforms for such discussions.
Alexander et al. (1977) introduced the notion of pattern languages in the context of
building architecture where the elements of the language were entities called patterns.
He defined the term ‘pattern’ as follows.
“Each pattern describes a problem which occurs over and over again in our envir-
onment, and then describes the core of the solution to that problem, In such a way
that you can use this solution a million times over, without ever doing it the same
way twice.” (Alexander et al., 1977, p. x)
In the field of software engineering, pattern based approaches has been discussed with
respect to various stages of a system development process. Some of the different kinds
of patterns used in a system development process include music design patterns (Bouaziz
et al., 2011), design patterns6 (Andrews et al., 2008; Angkasaputra and Pfahl, 2004;
6 “Capturing expert-knowledge and providing proven solutions for recurring problems is the basic idea of software (design)
patterns.” (Schumacher, 2001, p. 4)
183
5 A systematic literature search for case study material
Baggetun et al., 2004; Bézivin et al., 2005; Fiadeiro and Andrade, 2001; Gamma et al.,
1995; Gangemi et al., 2007), learning flow patterns (Bote-Lorenzo et al., 2004), requirement
patterns (Maiden, 1998), process patterns (Ambler, 1998; Ambysoft and Ambler, 1998; Ha-
gen and Gruhn, 2004; Ribó and Franch, 2002; Tran et al., 2006), analysis patterns (Fowler,
1997; Hahsler and Informationswirtschaft, 2001; Kodaganallur and Shim, 2006; Purao
et al., 2003), collaboration patterns (Coplien, 2004), re-factoring pattern (Andrews et al.,
2008), architecture patterns (Buschmann et al., 1996; Shaw and Garlan, 1996), architecture
reference patterns (Buschmann et al., 1996), improvement patterns (Appleton, 1997) and
organizational patterns (Campbell, 2004; Lukosch and Schümmer, 2006; Sommerville,
2016).
Patterns have also been utilized in formal methods technology. Freitas and Whiteside
(2014) proposed proof tactics to facilitate less experienced proof engineers to attempt at
difficult lemmas, reducing the proof cost and effort in the process.
5.9 Limitations of the study
There are a number of inherent limitations in the process adopted in compiling the
catalogue of confidentiality properties. Firstly, during the literature search, it was
found that often the search results included papers that discussed legal aspects of
privacy and confidentiality while those papers had no discussions on confidentiality
requirements. Combining this reality with our inclusion criteria where we select only
the first 20 results from each “indexing service × keyword phrase” pair meant that
papers discussing confidentiality requirements might have been pushed further down
the stack past the first 20 results.
The interpretations proposed for some vague confidentiality requirements may be
reasonable. However, those interpretations are still hand-crafted and hence need
further evidence to strengthen the argument that the patterns derived from such
interpreted confidentiality requirements are important. Rather than reading all 490
search results word for word, the effort was concentrated on locating any discussions of
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confidentiality properties both in the abstract as well as around each paragraph where
the keyword ‘confidential’ was located.
The search functionality in Mendeley software was used to locate keywords in each
paper. Such an approach was necessary because of the limited time frame available
for this Ph.D. However, some useful discussions of confidentiality properties that did
not contain the specific word ‘confidentiality’ might have been missed, as a result of
following this process.
Finally, documents that cannot be indexed by Mendeley would not have been included
in the search results that Mendeley produced. One or more potential discussions on
confidentiality properties might have been overlooked because of this. It must be noted
here that the decision to use Mendeley was a personal choice and has to do with its
ease of user for the author.
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5.10 Summary
The main objective of this chapter is to derive a set of generic patterns of confidentiality
requirements from literature. Such a set is required to fill a vacuum in terms of a
benchmark of confidentiality requirement patterns that can be used in testing tools that
analyse systems for confidentiality.
In this chapter:
• a catalogue of confidentiality requirements from literature was compiled.
• a literature related set of patterns of confidentiality requirements were derived.
• generic patterns of confidentiality requirements were identified and formalized.
• existing literature specific to patterns of confidentiality requirements, as well
as the emergence and use of patterns in software engineering in general was
discussed.
186
6 Evaluation of mechanisation
6.1 Introducing
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that the CFAT tool developed under this
research is practically applicable. This chapter presents an evaluation of the mechanisa-
tion of BCF in Circus described in Chapter 3. The evaluation of the mechanisation will
involve analysing systems with different patterns of confidentiality requirements, that
has been identified in Section 5.2.
In Chapter 5, a literature search was carried out to identify case studies that discusses
systems with a confidentiality requirement. However, none of the papers identified in
Chapter 5 contained a full system description or a full formal specification of a system,
discussed in that paper. Further, none of the papers presented a confidentiality analysis
using BCF. Papers by De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde (2005) and Howitt (2008)
describe confidentiality analysis of systems based on other modelling techniques. In
Section 2.2, a discussion of the differences between those techniques and the approach
adopted by BCF in Circus (Banks, 2012) has been presented.
In the absence of a literature-supported full formal specifications of systems, hand-
crafted possible system requirement specifications for systems had to be developed.
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We will work through an example of each identified pattern where we will:
1. introduce a hand-crafted set of requirements for a system.
2. illustrate the functional structure of the system using a use-case diagram.
3. construct a Circus specification of the system manually.
4. specify the confidentiality requirements of the system using BCF in Circus.
5. construct a CFAT specification of the system based on the Circus specification and
confidentiality requirement.
6. analyse the CFAT specification using the mechanisation tool to check the consist-
ency of the requirements defined in the system.
There is no formal mapping between the use case and the formal model of the system
captured in the Circus specification. The back propagation laws of BCF in Circus (Banks,
2012, p. 138) does not contain a back propagation law that can be used on parallel
processes. And so, currently BCF in Circus can only be used to evaluate sequential
access systems. Therefore, in all cases it is assumed that the systems modelled in this
chapter are single user access.
The confidentiality requirements used in the analysis carried out in this chapter are
deduced from the discussion of confidentiality in the published papers. This exercise
has been carried out in Chapter 5 and the deduced confidentiality properties are listed
in Table 5.3. An informal approach has been used to state the requirements of each
system in natural language and then a Circus specification has been presented for that
system.
In order to analyse each identified confidentiality requirement pattern CP, we will
model a system Y described in one of the referenced papers RP in Table 5.3. Each
confidentiality requirement CR stated for Y in Table 5.3 has been derived from the
confidentiality properties discussed in RP. A CP represents a generalized definition for
each CR. Table 5.2 groups all confidentiality requirements based on the CP which they
188
6.1 Introducing
The concept of BCF is that at least one alternative similar observation exists for
each observation of a state variable in the original system. BCF notation uses the
decoration tilde (˜) as in S˜ to specify a similar state space of a given state schema S.
However, this notation is not supported by the CZT tool (Malik and Utting, 2005),
which is used for type and syntax checking the Circus specification of the system.
A similar state space of a state schema S can be specified in the Circus notation
using LATEX by subscripting the schema name with a number such as by writing S9.
Each variable x in the new schema S9 can then be referenced using the notation x9.
It must be highlighted that in all the formal statements presented in this chapter,
x9 has been used to represent each state variable x in the twin state space.
It must be noted here that the subscript 9 is an arbitrary choice that does not clash
with anything else as long as the restrictions on the naming conventions are in
place as discussed on Page 100. It must also be noted that using the subscript 9 is a
coding trick to enable syntax and type checking by the CZT tool. It is important to
declare this only as a coding trick because the semantics of this coding trick does
not correctly capture the BCF concept ‘at least one alternative similar observation exists
for each observation of a state variable in the original system’.
Encoding the concept of the twin or shadow state using the Circus notation
represent. Each case study analysis in this chapter involves using the mechanisation to
verify the consistency of a BCF in Circus based formal model of Y against an associated
CR.
The BCF in Circus based formal specification of a system contains syntactic decorations
that are not supported by both CZT as well as the Isabelle theorem prover. Therefore,
for the purposes of type and syntax checking the formal specification using CZT and
for theorem proving using the Isabelle theorem prover, syntactic renaming of the twin
state variables in the formal specification are required. Recall that Section 3.2.4 in
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Page 100 discusses all the variables of the system specification that must be renamed
by the user during the submission of the system specification to the mechanised tool
as well as that will be renamed when files are generated by the mechanised tool. The
explanation on Page 189 recalls how the twin or shadow state space is encoded in a
Circus specification generated by the mechanised tool so that the specification can be
type and syntax checked using CZT.
6.2 Mechanised analysis of confidentiality patterns
In Chapter 5, a set of patterns has been extracted from the confidentiality requirements
described in a systematically compiled literature set. In this section, we will discuss the
mechanised analysis of systems having confidentiality properties with one or more of
those patterns.
The following steps will be carried out in each case study.
• Present the system requirement specification of the case study system.
• Develop and describe a possible formal specification of the functionality require-
ments of the case study system using the Circus notation.
• Discuss a possible formalisation of the confidentiality requirement(s) of the case
study system using the extended Circus notation.
• Describe how the mechanisation in Chapter 3 can be used to analyse the formal
specification.
• Present and discuss the results of the mechanised analysis of the formal specifica-
tion that integrates the confidentiality requirement.
The above steps will be discussed in detail for the first pattern. For the subsequent
patterns, the pattern and subsequently the results from analysing a system with a
confidentiality property having that pattern will be present. Recall from Section 6.1
that BCF in Circus only supports sequential access systems and therefore in all the
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analysis carried out in this chapter, systems will be modelled with sequential access.
Further, recall that all the derived confidentiality patterns are listed in Table 5.2 and all
the identified confidentiality requirements are listed in Table 5.3.
6.2.1 Mechanised analysis of a system having a confidentiality property that
reflects pattern CP1
The first case study to evaluate the mechanisation of BCF in Circus involves analysing
a system with a confidentiality property that reflects the pattern CP1. The confiden-
tiality requirement CR18 has been chosen as an adhoc choice for this analysis. The
confidentiality pattern CP1 states:
do not reveal the relation between x and y in S
For this analysis, a simple accounts system for a bank will be modelled. The system
will be called the Bank information system. The confidentiality property modelled
in this system has been borrowed from discussions by both Parveen et al. (2015) and
Lapadula et al. (2008).
6.2.2 System requirement specification - Bank information system
A hand-crafted system requirement specification of a fictitious Bank information system
is given below. The functions listed in the Bank information system are borrowed from
commonly used use cases by Eckel (2005), Skon (2016) and Pearce (2017) for academic
discussions in the context of a Bank information system.
Organisational structure
A bank balance is represented by a number.
A customer is a person.
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The structures of a system requirement specification may be mapped onto structures
of the Circus notation. Table 6.1 shows such a mapping. Every system requirement
specification presented in this section has been structured accordingly for ease of
readability. It must be noted that each developed Circus specification will be just
one possible implementation of the original system.
System requirement specification Structures of the Circus notation
Organisational structure
(entities and attributes)
data types, data objects,
global constants
Organisational rules and regulations state invariants
Operations performed in the organisation actions
Who can perform the functions channelsets
(representing user roles)
Which staff are included in each user role state invariants that define
elements of sets
Table 6.1: Mapping a system requirement specification to structures in a
Circus specification
Mapping between the structures of a system specification and the Circus notation
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The company uniquely identifies the person who is the manager of the company.
The company uniquely identifies the person who is the current user of the sys-
tem.
The company maintains a list that contains every customer of the company.
The company maintains a list that contains every cashier of the company.
The company maintains a list that contains every user of the company.
The company maintains a bank balance for each existing customer.
Organisational rules
The same person cannot be a customer and a cashier and and the manager.
Every user must be either a customer or a cashier or the manager.
The current user must be included in the user list.
User roles in the system
The banking staff user role includes the manager and all users who are cashiers.
The cashier user role includes all users who are cashiers.
The customer user role contains all users who are customers.
Operations, user roles and permissions
Table 6.2 lists all the system operations, and the specific permissions on those
operations by user role. Figure 6.1 presents a tripartite graph that shows the
user-to-role and role-to-permission assignments in the Bank information system.
User roles and how it is utilised in BCF in Circus for analysing data leakage in a
system is discussed later in Figure 6.3.
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User roles
Operation identifier
Operations allowed on the Bank information system
Ba
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Find own balance
Find the account balance of oneself.
3
Find customer balance
Find the account balance of any customer.
3
Record new customer
Record the personal details of a new customer.
3
Deposit to customer
Calculate and Update the bank balance of a particular
customer which is derived using the customers existing
bank balance and value deposited by the customer.
3
Withdraw from customer
Calculate and Update the bank balance of a particular
customer which is derived using the customers existing
bank balance and value withdrawn by the customer.
3
Table 6.2: Roles and Permissions Matrix of the Bank information system
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user user role permission
Cashier
Manager
Customer
Banking staff
Customer
Cashier
Record_new_customer
Deposit_to_customer
Withdraw_from_customer
Find_customer_balance
Find_own_balance
Figure 6.1: Tripartite graph of user-to-role and role-to-permission
assignments in the Bank information system
Figure 6.2 presents a graphical summary of the system requirement specification of the
Bank information system using a use case diagram.
Bank information system
 
View own 
customer balance
  
View any 
customer balance
 
Register new 
account
Customer
Manager
Cashier
 
Withdraw from 
any customer 
account
 
Deposit to any 
customer account
Violates 
confidentiality policy  
Does not violate 
confidentiality policy  
Figure 6.2: Use case diagram for the Bank information system
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6.2.3 Formal specification - Bank information system
The actions in Table 6.3 addresses the operations of the Bank information system and
reflects the system requirement specification of the Bank information system. The basic
type in Table 6.5, state variables in Table 6.6 and state invariants in Table 6.7 reflect
organisational structures that are described in the system requirement specification of
the Bank information system in Section 6.2.2.
It is important to note that the action Init in Table 6.3 is not in the use case diagram in
Figure 6.2. The action Init initializes the state variable that records the identifier of the
customer whose information is being requested from the system. This is an internal
initialization function.
Table 6.3: Bank information system - Description of the Circus actions
Action Operation performed by the action
NewAccount Allows a cashier to create a customer bank account in the
system.
DepositMoney Allows a cashier to deposit money to an existing bank ac-
count.
WithdrawMoney Allows a cashier to withdraw money from an existing bank
account.
GetMyBalance Allows a customer to view his/her own account balance.
The customer provides his/her person identifier which the
operation uses to retrieve the account balance.
GetAnyCustBalance Allows a cashier to view the account balance of any customer.
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6.2.3.a User roles
As detailed on page 201, user roles are modelled in BCF in Circus using channelsets.
Table 6.2 includes the user roles that are assumed as common in a typical Bank
information system. These user roles in the specification of the Bank information
system has been modelled using channelsets as shown in the Circus specification
of the system in Figure 6.10 and these channelsets are listed in Table 6.4 with their
descriptions.
Table 6.4: Bank information system - Description of the user roles
channelset as user role Functions allowed for the user role
Customer a user role where users have the right to view their own
bank balances
Cashier a user role where users have the right to create a new
customer account with the information provided by the
customer, carry out a deposit or a withdraw transaction
on any customer account and also find the balance of any
customer account.
BankingStaff a user role where users have the right to view the balance
of any customer account.
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6.2.3.b Types
A basic type that contains the identifiers of all the possible people in the system is
defined.
Table 6.5: Bank information system - Description of the basic types
Basic type Description
PERSON The set of all possible person identifiers.
6.2.3.c State variables
The following are organisational components which we believe are common in a bank-
ing environment. A state variable has been declared to represent each organisational
component within the system specification. The description of these state variables are
included in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Bank information system - Description of the state variables
State variable Description
balance A function that identifies the balance of a customer, if any.
managers The set of identifiers of the managers.
cashiers The set of identifiers of the cashiers.
customers The set of identifiers of the customers.
loggedIn The set of identifiers of the users who are logged into the system.
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loginUser The identifier of the person who is currently using the system.
reqCustomer The identifier of the person about whom informaiton is being
requested from the system.
6.2.3.d State invariants
We assume certain system constraints that must be respected throughout the life of
the system. These constraints reflect the relevant organisational rules that we believe
are typical in an accounts system in a bank. These constraints are defined as state
invariants1 in the system specification.
Table 6.7: Bank information system - Description of the state invariants
State invariants Description
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
The current user must be from the set of users logged into the system.
loggedIn ⊆ (customers ∪ cashiers ∪ managers)
The current user of the system must either be from the group of customers,
the group of cashiers or the manager.
(customers ∩ cashiers) = {}
The same person cannot be a customer and a cashier at the same time.
(customers ∩ managers) = {}
1 A state invariant of a system is a property that holds in every reachable state of the system (Kirby et al., 1999,
p. 110).
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The same person cannot be a customer and the manager at the same
time.
(cashiers ∩ managers) = {}
The same person cannot be a cashier and the manager at the same time.
dom (balance) ⊆ customers
Every person who has a bank balance recorded in the system must be a
customer.
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A user role is a named instance where a set of permissions are assigned to a group of
users to perform a set of tasks. In the Circus notation, a user may perform tasks on a
system through communications allowed on a system, that are made possible through
channels. In this regard, a set of permissions are synonymous with a set of channels
or a channelset in the Circus notation. Therefore, a channelset is used to model a
user role in a system. A user may belong to one or more user roles. For example, in
Figure 6.3 user x belongs to the user role A whereas user y belongs to both user roles A
and B.
The observations that a user can make by executing a function depend on the set of
authorized permissions for that user. One way BCF in Circus can be used to analyse
a system for data leakage is by comparing the set of prohibited observations for a
particular user u against the set of observations the user u can make by executing the
system.
A user having a particular 
                user role belongs to a 
        group of users that can execute the 
         functions allowed for that user role and
         make observations from those executions.
x and y 
are users 
in the user 
group
y is a user 
in the user 
group
user x
user y
f1
f2
f3
f4
f5
f2
f5u
se
r 
ro
le
 A
u
se
r 
ro
le
 B
observations from executing f1
observations from executing f3
observations from executing f4
observations from executing f5
observations from executing f2
Figure 6.3: User roles and user observations
In the ongoing Bank information system example, the identity of the specific user who
is currently logged into the system is represented by the variable loginUser and has
the data type PERSON. The group of users that belong to the user role employees is
represented by the variable employees and has the data type F PERSON.
Data leakage is analysed with respect to the user roles held by a user
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6.2.3.e Formal specification of the Bank information system
The full formal specification of the Bank information system is presented in Figure 6.4.
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[ PERSON ]
State
balance : PERSON 7 7→N
reqCustomer, loginUser : PERSON
loggedIn, customers, cashiers,managers : FPERSON
dom (balance) ⊆ customers
(customers ∩ cashiers ∩ managers) = {}
loggedIn ⊆ (customers ∪ cashiers ∪ managers)
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
HideBalCustomer
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
loginUser 6= reqCustomer ∧
loginUser 6∈managers ∧
loginUser 6∈ cashiers ∧
reqCustomer ∈ dom (balance)⇒
(balance reqCustomer) 6= (balance9 reqCustomer9)
channel newBalanceIn,mrbalOut, showBalanceOut,myBalanceOut :N
channel withdrawAmountIn, depositAmountIn :N
channel withdrawCustomerIn, depositCustomerIn,newCustomerIn : PERSON
channel rubIn, customerIn : PERSON
channelset BankingStaff == {| customerIn, showBalanceOut |}
channelset Cashier == {|withdrawAmountIn, customerIn, showBalanceOut,
depositAmountIn, depositCustomerIn,withdrawCustomerIn,
newCustomerIn,newBalanceIn |}
channelset Customer == {|myBalanceOut |}
process Bank information system =̂ begin
state State
Init =̂ reqCustomer := loginUser
NewAccount =̂ var newBalance :N;
newCustomer : PERSON •
newBalanceIn?newBalance−→
newCustomerIn?newCustomer−→
((newCustomer? 6∈ dom (balance) ∧ loginUser ∈ cashiers)N
balance := balance⊕
{(newCustomer? 7→ newBalance?)})
DepositMoney =̂ var depositAmount :N;
depositCustomer : dom (balance) •
depositAmountIn?depositAmount−→
depositCustomerIn?depositCustomer−→
((loginUser ∈ cashiers)N
balance := balance⊕
{(depositCustomer? 7→
(balance depositCustomer?− depositAmount?))})
Figure 6.4: Specification of Bank information system - code block 1 of 2
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WithdrawMoney =̂ var withdrawAmount :N;
withdrawCustomer : dom (balance) •
withdrawAmountIn?withdrawAmount−→
withdrawCustomerIn?withdrawCustomer−→
((loginUser ∈ cashiers)N
balance := balance \
{(withdrawCustomer? 7→
(balancewithdrawCustomer?+withdrawAmount?))})
GetMyBalance =̂ reqCustomer := loginUser;
((loginUser ∈ customers ∧
loginUser ∈ dom (balance))N
myBalanceOut !(balance loginUser)−→ Skip)
GetAnyCustBalance =̂ var customer : PERSON •
customerIn?customer−→
reqCustomer := customer?;
((loginUser ∈ cashiers ∨ loginUser ∈ managers)N
showBalanceOut !(balance customer?)−→ Skip)
HideBalCustomer =̂ HideBalCustomer
UserOptions =̂

NewAccount@ DepositMoney@ WithdrawMoney@ GetAnyCustBalance@ GetMyBalance
 ; HideBalCustomer
• 〈Init〉 ; µY • 〈(UserOptions ; Y)〉
end
Figure 6.4 (cont.) : Specification of Bank information system - code block 2 of 2
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6.2.4 Formalising the confidentiality requirement
In this section, a possible formalisation of the confidentiality requirement CR18 is
specified using the Circus notation. The general definition of CP1 states:
do not reveal the relation between x and y in S
The confidentiality requirement CR18 of the Bank information system reads:
CR18 : permission to view the balance of a customer should be given only to an
authorised user.
The confidentiality requirement CR18 can be re-phrased as follows, to align with the
definition of CP1.
if the user is not authorised
then do not reveal the association
between a customer and his account balance
In this particular confidentiality requirement, the condition to hide the association
between A and B is satisfied if the user is not authorised. Tschantz and Wing (2008)
describes such a requirement as a conditional confidentiality requirement that contains a
conditional information flow where information flow occurs only when some condition is
met at runtime (Tschantz and Wing, 2008, p. 108).
Identify the condition for confidentiality. Papers published by Parveen et al. (2015, p. 2)
and Lapadula et al. (2008, p. 713,714) that contain confidentiality requirements
with CP1 does not mention which set of users are authorised to view the data.
Therefore, in the case of an accounts system at a bank, it is assumed that the
current user of the system loginUser is authorised to view the balance of the bank
account B which belongs to the customer reqCustomer, if one of the following
conditions are satisfied.
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• loginUser is the manager
• loginUser is a cashier
• loginUser and reqCustomer are the same
If none of the above conditions are satisfied, then the balance of the bank account
B must never be revealed to the user loginUser. It must also be ensured that the
account holder reqCustomer has a bank balance recorded in the bank balance
register balance in the system. This combined condition can be written follows.
loginUser is not the manager
and loginUser is not a cashier
and loginUser and reqCustomer are different
and reqCustomer has an associated bank balance record in balance
The above condition may be formalised using the Circus notation as follows.
loginUser 6∈managers
∧ loginUser 6∈ cashiers
∧ loginUser 6= reqCustomer
∧ reqCustomer ∈ dom balance
Identify the confidential data. BCF states that whenever a user can observe the value of
a variable x in the normal system state space he/she can assume that the shadow
system must also have the same value for its twin variable x˜.
In order to prevent the system from revealing the exact value of a particular
variable, we must exclusively state a separation between the value of the variable
in the original system and that in the shadow system. In this scenario we may
write:
x 6= x˜
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In the case of the Bank information system, the value we must not reveal is:
balance reqCustomer
where balance is a function between a customer identifier and the bank balance
of that customer if any and reqCustomer is the identifier of the customer whose
bank balance is being requested. To state a minimum separation between the
value (balance reqCustomer) and its twin counterpart (balance9 reqCustomer9) we
may write:
(balance reqCustomer) 6= (balance9 reqCustomer9)
Build the confidentiality predicate. The condition for confidentiality and the separation
defined for the confidential data are combined to come up with a formal definition
for the confidentiality requirement CR18 . The derived formal definition is shown
below as a Z schema. As described in page 189, a subscript 9 is used to represent
the state schema of the twin system as well as the variables from the twin system.
HideBalCustomer
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
loginUser 6= reqCustomer ∧
loginUser ∈ customers ∧
reqCustomer ∈ dom (balance)⇒
(balance reqCustomer) 6= (balance9 reqCustomer9)
The schema HideBalCustomer includes a confidentiality constraint that must be
enforced on the state space of a particular state or states of the Bank information
system where HideBalCustomer is observed.
A pre-requisite for using BCF in Circus to analyse systems for confidentiality is to
understand how a formalized confidentiality requirement can be integrated into a
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Circus specification.
6.2.5 Structure of the Circus specifications used in the mechanised analysis
A confidentiality integrated Circus specification is a Circus specification which includes
one or more confidentiality annotations2. Figure 6.5 shows how a confidentiality
integrated Circus specification has been structured for the purposes of the mechanised
analysis carried out in this chapter. The structures CA schema name , CA Action and
CA predicate are introduced into a Circus specification to integrate the confidentiality
properties of a system within its specification. A detailed description of the Circus
notation and how its structures can be used to model a system is given in Appendix A.1.
Here, a summarised description of the main structures of a Circus specification are
presented, which has been utilized in the case study specifications in this chapter. It
must be noted that one can produce other possible specifications of the same system
using the Circus notation.
The highlighted words process, begin, state and end in Figure 6.5 are Circus keywords.
The description of the place-holders in Figure 6.5 are given below.
TypeDeclarations The place-holder for the names of the Basic types defined
in the specification.
StateVariableDeclarations The place-holder for the declarations of state variables in
the system.
StateInvariants The place-holder for the state invariants that are required
in the system state.
StateName The place-holder for the name assigned to the schema that
encodes the state of the system.
ChannelDefinitions The place-holder where channels3 are defined in the spe-
2 A brief introduction to confidentiality annotations (Banks, 2012, p. 105) is discussed in Section 2.6.2.
3 The definition of channels and channelsets in the Circus notation are discussed in (Freitas, 2005, p. 13) .
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TypeDeclarations
[StateName]
StateVariableDeclarations
StateInvariants
CA schema name
ΞStateName
CA predicate
ChannelDefinitions
ChannelsetDefinitions
process ProcessName =̂ begin
state StateName
Action 1 =̂ ....
....
Action n =̂ ....
CA Action =̂ CA schema name
• 〈MainAction〉
end
Figure 6.5: Structure of the Circus specifications used in the mechanised analysis
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cification.
ChannelsetDefinitions The place-holder where channelsets3 are defined in the
specification.
ProcessName The place-holder for the name assigned to the Circus process
that is defined in the specification.
Action 1 , ... , Action n Place-holders for the names of the Circus actions that are
defined in the system.
CA schema name The place-holder for the schema name that is defined to
embed the confidentiality predicate.
CA Action The place-holder for the name of the Circus action that
is defined to use the CA schema name schema as a Circus
action.
CA predicate The place-holder for the formal predicate that represents a
confidentiality property of the system being formalised.
MainAction The label MainAction represents the place-holder for the
nameless main action that defines the process behaviour.
For the purposes of the mechanised analysis in this chapter
we define the main action as a composite action that uses
Action 1 to Action n and CA Action.
6.2.6 Using the mechanised tool to analyse the system
The first step in using the mechanisation developed in this thesis, is to submit the
BCF in Circus based formalization of the Bank information system (see Figure 6.10) to
the CFAT tool in the CFAT format. Next, follow the steps in Figure 3.6 to analyse the
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submitted specification using the mechanisation. The possible results from the analysis
and how they can be interpreted are described in Section 3.2.6.
6.2.7 Strengthening a weak specification
Recall from Section 4.3 that a specification is referred as a ‘weak specification’ if
the specification is seemingly incorrect but the mechanised back propagation of the
specification using BCF in Circus results in a predicate that can be simplified to true.
The Bank information system specification in Figure 6.4 has a fundamental weakness in
its role specification, where the three-way intersection is not strong enough to rule out
the same user playing two roles at once. This subsection explores the specific weakness
and its solution.
Assume that a fictitious organisation has the user roles A, B and C. Further, assume
that the organisation has a particular piece of confidential data CI.
A C
B
r
b
a c
Figure 6.6: Intersection of user roles A, B and C
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The seemingly correct formalisation of organisational rules. Assume the following or-
ganisational rules.
• Rule 1 - CI can be visible to users having the user role B and the user role C.
• Rule 2 - CI must not be revealed to users having the user role A.
• Rule 3 - Every user in the organisation must belong to either A or B or C.
• Rule 4 - A user cannot occupy more than one user role in the organisation.
Rule 1 was formalised as;
user ∈ (B∪ C)⇒ show CI (6.1)
and Rule 2 was formalised as;
user ∈ A⇒ conceal CI (6.2)
and Rule 3 was formalised as;
user ∈ (A∪ B∪ C) (6.3)
and Rule 4 was formalised as;
A∩ B∩ C = {} (6.4)
where user is the user who was requesting access to the confidential information
CI, ‘show CI’ is a specification that allows the value of CI to be revealed and
‘conceal CI’ is a specification that states that the value of the state variable CI
must not be revealed in the current state. The consistency of the requirements in
the specification, that included the formalisations Equation (6.1), Equation (6.2),
Equation (6.3) and Equation (6.4), could not be verified using the proposed
mechanisation.
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Strengthening the specification. In order to prove the consistency of the requirements
in the formalised specification of the system, the formalisation of Rule 2 had to
be strengthened by replacing Equation (6.2) with Equation (6.5) as follows.
user 6∈ (B∪ C)⇒ conceal CI (6.5)
Upon further investigation, it was found that the original formalisation of Rule 4
in Equation (6.4) only guaranteed that r in Figure 6.6 was empty. In this scenario,
it may be possible that one or both of the subsets x and z might not be empty.
In such a scenario, Equation (6.1) and Equation (6.2) will contradict each other.
Strengthening the formalisation of Rule 2 worked because Equation (6.5) did not
enforce Rule 2 on subsets x and z. However, this means that there might be the
possibility of data leakage should there be a user who belonged to x or z and who
was requesting for CI based on Rule 1. The mechanisation had detected this data
leakage.
The solution. The correct formalisation of Rule 4 must define the sets x, y, z and r as
empty to ensure that a user cannot occupy more than one user role. For this,
all possible pairwise intersections for the user roles in the organisation must be
defined as empty as shown in Figure 6.7.
A B A C B C
A∩ B = {} A∩ C = {} B∩ C = {}
Figure 6.7: Pairwise disjoint statements for users roles A, B and C
If the pairwise disjoint statements in Figure 6.7 are used as invariants in the
formal specification of the system, then the consistency of the requirements in the
system against the confidentiality property in Equation (6.2) can be verified.
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6.2.8 An example of strengthening a weak specification
Consider a fictitious hand-crafted bidding system where the value of the highest bid
must never be revealed to a customer. Possible formal specifications of the system are
presented in Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9. Figure 6.8 presents a ‘weak specification’ of the
system whereas the specification in Figure 6.9 presents a strengthened specification.
In both Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9, the following representations are followed. The free
type PERSON represents the identifiers of all the users who can use the system which
includes alice, bob, carol, dave and eve. The loginUser is the identifier of the user who is
currently using the system. The groups of users in the system include loggedIn which
includes all the users currently using the system, customers that includes the identifiers
of all the customers, cashiers that includes the identifiers of all the cashiers, managers
that includes the identifiers of all the managers in the system. The system requires that
the set of logged in users must always be from the combined set of customers, cashiers
and managers. The system has two user roles where Customer includes all the users in
customers and Staff includes all users in both cashiers and managers. The system has
a function called RecordHighestBid which can be used to record the highest bid and
ShowHighestBid which shows the highest bid recorded in the system.
Assume that the confidentiality requirement of the system states that the value of the
highest bid highestBidvalue must never be revealed to the customers in the system. The
confidentiality requirement may be formalised using the following schema.
HideHighestBidOriginal
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
loginUser ∈ customers⇒
highestBidvalue 6= highestBidvalue9
The specifcation that includes HideHighestBidOriginal is shown in Figure 6.8. When
simplifying the predicate generated from back propagating the specification Figure 6.8,
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the Isabelle theorem prover highlights that there is contradiction in the predicate. This
is because the triple intersection invariant
customers ∩ cashiers ∩ managers = {}
in the following State schema of the specification in Figure 6.8 does not define the three
sets as disjoint sets, as discussed on Page 214.
State
loginUser : PERSON
loggedIn, customers, cashiers, managers : FPERSON
highestBidvalue : N
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
loggedIn ⊆ (customers ∪ cashiers ∪ managers)
(customers ∩ cashiers ∩ managers) = {}
In this scenario, the loginUser who is currently logged into the system may belong
to both customers and either of cashiers or managers. The conflicting requirements
of the functions allowed for a user role assigned to a manager or a cashier and the
confidentiality requirements enforced on a user role assigned to a customer is detected
during the simplification of the predicate. This conflict is detected as a potential data
leakage.
Therefore, to make the requirements in the specification consistent, an upper limit is
defined on the users to whom the confidential data in the confidentiality requirement
can be revealed. The change is included in the modified confidentiality requirement
HideHighestBidModified as follows.
HideHighestBidModified
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
loginUser 6∈ (cashiers ∪ managers)⇒
highestBidvalue 6= highestBidvalue9
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The confidentiality requirement in HideHighestBidModified states that highestBidValue
must never be revealed to anyone except a user who belongs to the combined set of
uses from customers and managers.
6.2.9 Strengthening the specification
In order to use HideHighestBidOriginal, the original formalisation of the confidentiality
requirement that aligns with the description of the confidentiality requirement, we
must modify the system state so that the sets customers, cashiers and managers are
disjoint from each other. The system state is modified as follows to include pairwise
intersections of the sets cashiers, managers and customers.
State
loginUser : PERSON
loggedIn, customers, cashiers, managers : FPERSON
highestBidvalue : N
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
loggedIn ⊆ (customers ∪ cashiers ∪ managers)
(cashiers ∩ managers) = {}
(customers ∩ managers) = {}
(customers ∩ cashiers) = {}
The modified specification of the system is included in Figure 6.9. The consistency of
the requirements in this strengthened specification can now be verified.
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PERSON ::= alice | bob | carol | dave | eve
State
loginUser : PERSON
loggedIn, customers, cashiers,managers : FPERSON
highestBidvalue :N
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
loggedIn ⊆ (customers ∪ cashiers ∪ managers)
(customers ∩ cashiers ∩ managers) = {}
HideHighestBid
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
loginUser 6∈ (cashiers ∪ managers)⇒
highestBidvalue 6= highestBidvalue9
channel recordBidIn, showLastBidOut :N
channelset Customer == {| showLastBidOut |}
channelset Staff == {| recordBidIn, showLastBidOut |}
process SecretHighestBid =̂ begin
state State
RecordHighestBid =̂ var recordBid :N •
recordBidIn?recordBid−→
((loginUser ∈ cashiers ∨ loginUser ∈ managers)N
highestBidvalue := recordBid?)
ShowHighestBid =̂ ((loginUser ∈ cashiers ∨ loginUser ∈ managers)N
showLastBidOut !(highestBidvalue)−→ Skip)
HideHighestBid =̂ HideHighestBid
• µX •
(( 〈RecordHighestBid〉@ 〈ShowHighestBid〉
)
; 〈HideHighestBid〉 ; X
)
end
Figure 6.8: Specification of Secret Highest Bid - code block 1 of 1
( The weak specification )
218
6.2 Mechanised analysis of confidentiality patterns
PERSON ::= alice | bob | carol | dave | eve
State
loginUser : PERSON
loggedIn, customers, cashiers,managers : FPERSON
highestBidvalue :N
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
loggedIn ⊆ (customers ∪ cashiers ∪ managers)
(cashiers ∩ managers) = {}
(customers ∩ managers) = {}
(customers ∩ cashiers) = {}
HideHighestBid
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
loginUser ∈ customers⇒
highestBidvalue 6= highestBidvalue9
channel recordBidIn, showLastBidOut :N
channelset Customer == {| showLastBidOut |}
channelset Staff == {| recordBidIn, showLastBidOut |}
process SecretHighestBid =̂ begin
state State
RecordHighestBid =̂ var recordBid :N •
recordBidIn?recordBid−→
((loginUser ∈ cashiers ∨ loginUser ∈ managers)N
highestBidvalue := recordBid?)
ShowHighestBid =̂ ((loginUser ∈ cashiers ∨ loginUser ∈ managers)N
showLastBidOut !(highestBidvalue)−→ Skip)
HideHighestBid =̂ HideHighestBid
• µX •
(( 〈RecordHighestBid〉@ 〈ShowHighestBid〉
)
; 〈HideHighestBid〉 ; X
)
end
Figure 6.9: Specification of Secret Highest Bid - code block 1 of 1
( The strengthened specification )
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6.2.9.a Strengthened formal specification of the Bank information system
The strengthened formal specification of the Bank information system is presented in
Figure 6.10.
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[ PERSON ]
State
balance : PERSON 7 7→N
reqCustomer, loginUser : PERSON
loggedIn, customers, cashiers,managers : FPERSON
dom (balance) ⊆ customers
(cashiers ∩ managers) = {}
(customers ∩ managers) = {}
(customers ∩ cashiers) = {}
loggedIn ⊆ (customers ∪ cashiers ∪ managers)
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
HideBalCustomer
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
loginUser 6= reqCustomer ∧
loginUser ∈ customers ∧
reqCustomer ∈ dom (balance)⇒
(balance reqCustomer) 6= (balance9 reqCustomer9)
channel newBalanceIn,mrbalOut, showBalanceOut,myBalanceOut :N
channel withdrawAmountIn, depositAmountIn :N
channel withdrawCustomerIn, depositCustomerIn,newCustomerIn : PERSON
channel rubIn, customerIn : PERSON
channelset BankingStaff == {| customerIn, showBalanceOut |}
channelset Cashier == {|withdrawAmountIn, customerIn, showBalanceOut,
depositAmountIn, depositCustomerIn,withdrawCustomerIn,
newCustomerIn,newBalanceIn |}
channelset Customer == {|myBalanceOut |}
process Bank information system =̂ begin
state State
Init =̂ reqCustomer := loginUser
NewAccount =̂ var newBalance :N;
newCustomer : PERSON •
newBalanceIn?newBalance−→
newCustomerIn?newCustomer−→
((newCustomer? 6∈ dom (balance) ∧ loginUser ∈ cashiers)N
balance := balance⊕
{(newCustomer? 7→ newBalance?)})
DepositMoney =̂ var depositAmount :N;
depositCustomer : dom (balance) •
depositAmountIn?depositAmount−→
depositCustomerIn?depositCustomer−→
((loginUser ∈ cashiers)N
balance := balance⊕
{(depositCustomer? 7→
(balance depositCustomer?− depositAmount?))})
Figure 6.10: Specification of Bank information system - code block 1 of 2
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WithdrawMoney =̂ var withdrawAmount :N;
withdrawCustomer : dom (balance) •
withdrawAmountIn?withdrawAmount−→
withdrawCustomerIn?withdrawCustomer−→
((loginUser ∈ cashiers)N
balance := balance \
{(withdrawCustomer? 7→
(balancewithdrawCustomer?+withdrawAmount?))})
GetMyBalance =̂ reqCustomer := loginUser;
((loginUser ∈ customers ∧
loginUser ∈ dom (balance))N
myBalanceOut !(balance loginUser)−→ Skip)
GetAnyCustBalance =̂ var customer : PERSON •
customerIn?customer−→
reqCustomer := customer?;
((loginUser ∈ cashiers ∨ loginUser ∈ managers)N
showBalanceOut !(balance customer?)−→ Skip)
HideBalCustomer =̂ HideBalCustomer
UserOptions =̂

NewAccount@ DepositMoney@ WithdrawMoney@ GetAnyCustBalance@ GetMyBalance
 ; HideBalCustomer
• 〈Init〉 ; µY • 〈(UserOptions ; Y)〉
end
Figure 6.10 (cont.) : Specification of Bank information system - code block 2 of 2
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6.2.10 Results of the analysis
Table 6.8 presents the results of the mechanised analysis of the Bank information system.
The total time taken for the mechanised analysis is the combined total of the time it
takes to back propagate the specification using the CFAT tool and the time it takes to
simplify the generated predicate using the Isabelle theorem prover.
The process of back propagation calculates the user’s inference about the process state
at each step of the process execution (Banks, 2012, p. 186). The results of the back
propagation are dependent on the set of channels that is accessible to a user (see page
201 ). Since each user role in this system has access to a different set of channels, the
results of the mechanised analysis of the system is presented in relation to users in
each user role.
User role against which the system has being
analysed C
as
hi
er
C
us
to
m
er
M
an
ag
er
Time taken for back propagation 474 ms 1055 ms 641 ms
Time taken for predicate simplification 2043 ms 2194 ms 2120 ms
Total time taken for evaluation 2517 ms 3249 ms 2761 ms
Result of the mechanised evaluation Simplified Simplified Simplified
Table 6.8: Results of the mechanised analysis of the Bank information system
The results show that the tool saves time by executing the back propagation in a matter
of milliseconds. However, as demonstrated with a smaller specification in Section 4.2 ,
a manual application of the back propagation process will be very much slower while
also being error prone.
Table 6.8 shows that the analysis of the system with respect to the three user roles in the
Bank information system results in the outcome “Simplified”. Recall from Section 3.2.6
that if the predicate generated from back propagating a system specification can
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be simplified, then according to BCF in Circus, there are no contradictions in the
specification of the system being analysed.
6.2.11 Negative testing
Positive testing is used to verify the functionality of a product whereas negative testing
is used to verify that a product does not do something (Oehlert, 2005, p. 58). In the
context of this thesis, positive testing is used to verify that there are no contradictions
between the functionality and confidentiality requirements in a system. Negative
testing uses cases that are expected to fail (Olan, 2003, p. 320).
”Negative testing is performed to ensure that the system is able to handle inconsist-
ent information. Negative acceptance tests (often expressed in the form of negative
scenarios) are increasingly recognized as a powerful way of thinking about require-
ments, possible conflicts, and identifying threats.” (Melnik et al., 2006, p. 41)
In the context of testing systems for data leakage related confidentiality requirements,
using BCF in Circus, a potential negative test will be to evaluate what will happen in a
scenario where one accidentally introduces a side channel that violates access control
requirements in a system. To simulate this scenario, an explicit side channel has been
introduced to the hand-crafted system specification of the Bank information system.
The basic approach is to:
introduce a channel based access to a piece of data d for a user role ur
while there is already an existing confidentiality requirement that exclusively
restricts the user role ur from having access to d.
Such a test is expected to fail since there is a contradiction in the defined access
parameters.
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To introduce a side channel, a function with unconstrained access is introduced to
the system specification of the Bank information system. This new Circus action,
called GetBalance, allows any user using the system to view the account balance of any
customer. The formal specification of the action GetBalance is as follows.
GetBalance =̂ var rub : dom (balance) •
rubin?rub−→
reqCustomer := rub?;
mrbalOut !(balance rub?)−→ Skip
The confidentiality requirement HideBalCustomer restricts certain users from knowing
the balance of any customer while the Circus action GetBalance allows any user to know
the balance of any customer. Table 6.9 illustrates the results of a mechanised analysis of
a formal specification that includes GetBalance.
Table 6.9 shows that the analysis of the Bank information system specification (that
includes the side channel), with respect to the user role “Customer”, results in the
outcome “Time-out”. Recall from Section 3.2.6 that if the predicate generated from back
propagating a system specification does not reach a conclusion during simplification
but rather times-out, then nothing can be concluded about the presence or absence of
contradictions in the specification. As stated earlier in Section 3.2.6, the result can be
interpreted as provably true or provably false.
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User role against which the system has
being evaluated C
as
hi
er
C
us
to
m
er
M
an
ag
er
Time taken for back propagation 374 ms 344 ms 350 ms
Time taken for predicate simplification 771 ms - 930 ms
Total time taken for evaluation 1145 ms 344 ms 1280 ms
Result of the simplification by the
theorem prover
Simplified Time-out Simplified
Table 6.9: Result of the mechanised evaluation of the Bank information system with a
side channel
6.2.12 Analysing other confidentiality patterns
Next , the confidentiality patterns CP2, CP3, CP4 and CP5 will be analysed in order.
6.2.12.a Analysing the confidentiality pattern CP2
The following is an analysis of a system with a confidentiality property that reflects the
confidentiality pattern CP2. The confidentiality requirement CR14 has been chosen as
an adhoc choice for this analysis.
The mechanised analysis of CR14 will be discussed using a hand-crafted system
requirement specification of a fictitious Phone book system of a Secret government
agency (Cerny and Alur, 2009b, p. 175). The fictitious Phone book system of a Secret
government agency has been used as a case study for confidentiality analysis by others
such as Lunt (1989) and Jajodia and Meadows (1995).
The full formal specification for the Phone book system is included in Appendix A.5.1.
Here, we present the requirement specification of the system and the results of analysing
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the presented specification of the system. It must be noted that the formal specification
included in Appendix A.5.1 is just one possible implementation of the system using
the Circus notation.
6.2.12.a.1 Requirement specification of a system having CP2
The following requirement specification of the Phone book system has been divided
into the organisational structure, the organisational rules, the user roles in the system,
the operations and the user roles and permissions matrix of the system. Figure 6.11
presents a summarised use case diagram of the Phone book system.
Organisational structure
• Every engineer, secretary, official and the manager is an employee of the agency.
• The agency uniquely identifies the employee who is the manager of the
agency.
• The agency maintains a list that contains every engineer of the agency.
• The agency maintains a list that contains every secretary of the agency.
• The agency maintains a list that contains every official of the agency.
• The agency maintains a list that contains every official with a confidential
phone number in the agency.
• The agency maintains a phone number for a subset of existing officials in the
agency.
Organisational rules
• The same employee cannot be a secretary and an engineer.
• The same employee cannot be a secretary and the manager.
• The same employee cannot be an engineer and the manager.
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• The agency phone book can only be used by either a secretary or an engineer
or the manager.
• The set of officials with a confidential phone number must be from the set
of officials whose phone numbers have been recorded in the phone book.
User roles in the system
The following are user roles of the system. These user roles reflect the actors
that are included in the use case diagram in Figure 6.11 The tasks that can be
performed by a user belonging to each user role is described in Table 6.4.
• The Manager user role includes the manager of the agency.
• The Secretary user role includes all users who are secretaries in the agency.
• The Engineer user role contains all users who are engineers in the agency.
Operations, user roles and permissions
Table 6.10 lists all the system operations, and the specific permissions on those
operations by user role.
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User roles
Functions that can be performed in the Phone book system
Se
cr
et
ar
y
En
gi
ne
er
M
an
ag
er
Record the phone number of a particular official in the phone
book.
3
Find the phone number of an official who is not in the list of
officials with a confidential phone number.
3 3
Find the phone number of any official, recorded in the phone
book.
3
Record the name of an official in the list of officials whose
phone numbers are to be kept confidential.
3
Table 6.10: Roles and Permissions Matrix of the Phone book system
6.2.12.a.2 Formalising the confidentiality requirement CR14
In this section, a possible formalisation of the confidentiality requirement CR14 is
presented using the Circus notation. The general definition of CP2 states:
do not reveal whether x is a member of S
The confidentiality requirement CR14 of the Phone book system discussed in Cerny
and Alur (2009b, p. 175) reads:
CR14 : The property to be kept secret for the example is whether a particular
string, say ‘555-55’ is in the phone book.
Recall that the confidentiality requirement CR14 has been rephrased as follows, to
align with the definition of CP2.
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Manager
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Figure 6.11: Use case diagram for the Bank information system
if the user is not authorized
then for every given x,
do not reveal whether x is a member of the set S
(where S contains the phone numbers in the phone book)
This is another confidentiality requirement with a conditional information flow (Tschantz
and Wing, 2008, p. 108) where the condition to hide the information about the member-
ship of x in S is satisfied if the user is not authorised.
Identify the condition for confidentiality. Cerny and Alur (2009b) do not detail the spe-
cific users from whom the information is required to be hidden. Therefore, in the
case of the Phone book system, it is assumed that the current user of the system
loginUser is not authorised to view the phone number of a secret official if the
user is not the manager and the name of the requested official reqOfficial is in the
list of secret officials. These conditions can be combined and written as follows.
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loginUser is not the manager
and reqOfficial is in the list of secret officials
The above condition may be formalised using the Circus notation as follows.
loginUser 6∈managers
∧ reqOfficial ∈ secretList
Identify the confidential data. In order to hide the membership of a particular variable
x in the set S in the normal state space, it is required to have the cover story
that the twin variable x9 is not a member of the twin set S in the shadow state
space. BCF states that whenever a user can observe the value of a variable x in
the normal system state space he/she can assume that the shadow system must
also have the same value for its twin variable x9.
In order to prevent the system from revealing the exact value of a particular
variable, we must exclusively state a separation between the value of the variable
in the original system and that in the shadow system. In this scenario we may
write:
x ∈ S⇒ x9 6∈ S9
In the case of the Phone book system, where phone number of a secret official
reqOfficial is requested, information about the membership of the official in the
phone book register PhoneNumbers must not revealed. This may be formalised as
follows:
reqOfficial ∈ dom phoneNumbers
⇒ reqOfficial9 6∈ dom phoneNumbers9
where PhoneNumbers is a function between an identifier for an official and a phone
number, if any.
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Build the confidentiality predicate. Now, we combine the condition for confidentiality
and the separation defined for the confidential data to come up with a formal
definition for the confidentiality requirement CR14 . The derived formal definition
is shown below as a Z schema.
HideSecretNumber
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
reqOfficial ∈ secretList ∧
reqOfficial 6= loginUser ∧
loginUser 6= manager⇒
reqOfficial ∈ dom (phoneNumbers)⇒
reqOfficial9 6∈ dom (phoneNumbers9)
The schema HideSecretNumber includes a confidentiality constraint that must be
enforced on the state space of a particular state or states of the Phone book system
where HideSecretNumber is observed.
6.2.12.a.3 Results of analysing the Phone book system
Table 6.11 shows that the analysis of the system with respect to the three user roles in the
Phone book system results in the outcome “Simplified”. Recall from Section 3.2.6 that if
the predicate generated from back propagating a system specification can be simplified,
then according to BCF in Circus, there are no contradictions in the specification of the
system being analysed.
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User role against which the system has being
analysed Se
cr
et
ar
y
En
gi
ne
er
M
an
ag
er
Time taken for back propagation 338 ms 223 ms 445 ms
Time taken for predicate simplification 1904 ms 2919 ms 1802 ms
Total time taken for evaluation 2242 ms 3142 ms 2247 ms
Result of the simplification by the theorem prover Simplified Simplified Simplified
Table 6.11: Results of the mechanised analysis of the Phone book system
6.2.12.b Analysing the confidentiality pattern CP3
The following is an analysis of a system with a confidentiality property that reflects the
confidentiality pattern CP3. The confidentiality requirement CR21 has been chosen as
an adhoc choice for this analysis.
The mechanised analysis of CR21 will be discussed using the Secure electronic examin-
ation system by Foley and Jacob (1995). For this, a hand-crafted system requirement
specification of a fictitious Secure electronic examination system has been developed.
Some functions listed in this specification have been borrowed from the description of
the Secure electronic examination system by Foley and Jacob (1995).
The full formal specification for the Secure electronic examination system is included in
Appendix A.5.2. Here, we present the requirement specification of the system and the
results of analysing the presented specification of the system. It must be noted that the
formal specification included in Appendix A.5.2 is just one possible implementation of
the system using the Circus notation.
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6.2.12.b.1 Requirement specification of a system having CP3
The following requirement specification of the Secure electronic examination system
has been divided into the organisational structure, the organisational rules, the user
roles in the system, the operations and the user roles and permissions matrix of the
system. Figure 6.12 presents a summarised use case diagram of the Secure electronic
examination system.
Organisational structure
• A chair is a user.
• A setter is a user.
• A checker is a user.
• A grader is a user.
• The company maintains a chair for each existing subject.
• The company maintains a setter for each existing paper.
• The company maintains a checker for each existing paper.
• The company maintains a grader for each existing paper.
• The company maintains a result for each existing candidate.
• The company maintains a paper status for each existing paper.
• The company maintains a subject of each existing paper.
• The company maintains a list that contains every student of the company.
• The company maintains a list that contains every lecturer of the company.
• The company maintains a list that contains every loggedInUser of the com-
pany.
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• The company uniquely identifies the user who is the current user of the
company.
• The company uniquely identifies the can who is the current user of the
company.
• The company records the relationship between a candidate and a paper.
• The company records the relationship between a candidate and a answer.
• The company records the relationship between a paper and a question.
• The company records the relationship between a paper and a answer.
Organisational rules
• All subject chairs, setters, checkers and graders must be lecturers.
• A lecturer cannot have more than one role. Hence, the lecturer can either be a
subject chair, setter, checker or grader.
• The set of users allowed access to the system is a subset of the set of lecturers
and students.
• A person cannot be both a lecturer and a student in the system.
• Every paper with a paper status must belong to an announced examination.
• Every paper for which a setter has been assigned must have a paper status.
• Every paper for which a checker has been assigned must have a paper status.
• Every paper for which a grader has been assigned must have a paper status.
• Every paper on which a question is recorded must have a paper status.
• Every paper on which an answer is recorded must have a paper status.
• Every paper registered for, must have a paper status.
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• Every student registered for a paper must be a registered candidate.
• Every student registered as a candidate must be a student recorded in the
system.
• Every result must belong to a registered paper.
• Every answer recorded must be for a registered paper.
• Lecturers who record questions in the system must be setters.
• Every question recorded in the system must be for a registered paper.
• Every answer recorded in the system must be for a registered paper.
User roles in the system
The following are user roles of the system. These user roles reflect the actors
that are included in the use case diagram in Figure 6.12. The tasks that can be
performed by a user belonging to each user role is described in Table 6.12.
• The Chair user role contains all users who are subject chairs in the institution.
• The Setter user role includes all users who are setters of examination papers
in the institution.
• The Checker user role includes all users who check examination papers in
the institution.
• The Marker user role includes all users who grade the examination papers in
the institution.
• The Student user role contains all users who are studying in the institution.
Operations, user roles and permissions
Table 6.12 lists all the system operations, and the specific permissions on those
operations by user role.
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User roles
Functions that can be performed on the Phone book
system
C
ha
ir
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Announce an examination for a particular subject. 3
Appoint a lecturer for the position of a setter from the
relevant subject group to set the paper.
3
Appoint a lecturer for the position of a checker from
the relevant subject group to check the papera.
3
Appoints a lecturer called a grader from the relevant
subject group to grade the candidates who grade the
paper.
3
Set a paper if the user is authorised to do so. 3
Release a paper if the user is authorised to do so. 3
Close an examination if the user is authorised to do
so.
3
Check a paper if the user is authorised to do so. 3
Grade a paper if the user is authorised to do so. 3
Publish grades of candidates who set for a particular
paper if the user is authorised to do so.
3
Register oneself as a candidate to sit for a particular
paper.
3
Record an answer for particular paper if the user is
registered as a candidate for that particular paper.
3
Find results of oneself for a particular paper. 3
Cancel ones own registration for a particular paper. 3
Table 6.12: Roles and Permissions Matrix of the Secure electronic examination system
a In the paper Secure Electronic Examinations by Foley and Jacob (1995) many setters and checkers could be appointed.
However to keep our model simple, we consider a single setter and a single checker for a paper.
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Figure 6.12: Use case diagram for the Secure electronic examination system
6.2.12.b.2 Formalising the confidentiality requirement CR21
The general definition of confidentiality pattern CP3 reads:
do not reveal the set S
The confidentiality requirement CR21 identified from the Secure electronic examination
system states:
CR21 : No examinee should learn any details of the contents of any other exam-
inees answer paper between the start of the examination and the end of
the examination.
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Recall from page 162 that the confidentiality requirement CR21 has been rephrased as
follows, to align with the definition of CP3.
if the user u currently using the system is not requesting information
that belongs to him/her
and exam e has started but not ended
then do not reveal the set S
(where S represents the answers recorded by a user other than u
in the exam e)
Similar to the earlier discussion in Section 6.2.4, CR21 is also a conditional confiden-
tiality requirement (Tschantz and Wing, 2008). The formalisation of the condition for
confidentiality and the confidential data are discussed separately.
Identify the condition for confidentiality. In this particular confidentiality requirement,
the condition to hide the set containing the answers recorded by other examinees
from the current user of the systems is satisfied if the examination for the paper
of the requested userhas started and has but not ended yet.
In our hand-crafted formal specification for the Secure electronic examination
system (see Appendix A.5.2), the possible states of a paper is represented by
the free type PAPERSTATUS. The description of all these states can be found in
Appendix A.5.2. The status of the paper between the start of an examination for
that paper and its end is represented by the value released.
We may write the conditions required to satisfy the confidentiality requirement
using the Circus notation as follows:
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condition stated in the confidential-
ity requirement
one possible specification in Circus
examination of the paper for which
the current user is a candidate has
started and not ended
pStatus (regPaper theCandidate) = released
the user currently using the system
is not requesting information that
belongs to him/her
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser 6= theCandidate
Table 6.13: Formal specification of conditions required to satisfy the confidential-
ity requirement CR21
The confidentiality of the data must be enforced if all the conditions in Table 6.13
are satisfied. We may write this combined condition as follows.
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser 6= theCandidate
∧ pStatus (regPaper theCandidate) = released
Identify the confidential data. Here, we are to hide every single answer recorded by the
examinee theCandidate from the current user. The set of answers recorded by the
examinee theCandidate is represented by the set answersB:
answersB ≡ {theCandidate} −C ansStudent
where ansStudent is a relation between candidate identifiers and answers they
have recorded. In the shadow system, the set of answers recorded by the examinee
theCandidate is represented by the set answersB9:
answersB9 ≡ {theCandidate9} −C ansStudent9
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where ansStudent9 is the twin counterpart of ansStudent. To prevent the system
from revealing any value in the set answersB we state that the sets answersB and
answersB9 are disjoint.
({b} −C ansStudent) ∩ ({b9} −C ansStudent9) = {}
Build the confidentiality predicate. We now combine the condition and the action to
come up with a formal definition for the confidentiality requirement CR21 . The
derived formal definition is shown below.
HideOthersAnswers
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser 6= theCandidate ∧
pStatus (regPaper theCandidate) = released⇒
(ran({theCandidate} −C ansStudent) ∩
ran({theCandidate9} −C ansStudent9)) = {}
The schema HideOthersAnswers includes a confidentiality constraint that must be en-
forced on the state space of a particular state or states of the Secure electronic examina-
tion system where HideOthersAnswers is observed.
6.2.12.b.3 Results of analysing the Secure electronic examination system
Table 6.14 shows that the analysis of the system with respect to the user roles in the
Secure electronic examination system results in the outcome “Simplified”. Recall from
Section 3.2.6 that if the predicate generated from back propagating a system specification
can be simplified, then according to BCF in Circus, there are no contradictions in the
specification of the system being analysed.
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User role against which
the system has been
evaluated
Se
tt
er
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t
Time taken for
back propagation
12854 ms 15282 ms 4860 ms 7378 ms 9887 ms
Time taken for
predicate simplification
7772 ms 8808 ms 7371 ms 6201 ms 7558 ms
Total time taken for
evaluation
20626 ms 24090 ms 12231 ms 13579 ms 17445 ms
Result of the simplification
by the theorem prover
Simplified Simplified Simplified Simplified Simplified
Table 6.14: Results of the mechanised evaluation of the Secure electronic examination
system
6.2.12.c Analysing the confidentiality pattern CP4
The following is an analysis of a system with a confidentiality property that reflects the
confidentiality requirement pattern CP4. The confidentiality requirement CR16 has
been chosen as an adhoc choice for this analysis.
The mechanised analysis of CR16 will be discussed using a hand-crafted system
requirement specification of a fictitious CR16 . The fictitious ePurse system has been
used as a case study for confidentiality analysis by De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde
(2005, p. 44).
The full formal specification for the ePurse system is included in Appendix A.5.1. Here,
we present the requirement specification of the system and the results of analysing the
presented specification of the system. It must be noted that the formal specification
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included in Appendix A.5.3 is just one possible implementation of the system using
the Circus notation.
6.2.12.c.1 Requirement specification of a system having CP4
The following requirement specification of the ePurse system has been divided into
the organisational structure, the organisational rules, the user roles in the system,
the operations and the user roles and permissions matrix of the system. Figure 6.13
presents a summarised use case diagram of the ePurse system.
Organisational structure
• The ePurse system maintains an ePurse for every buyer identifier from a
subset of buyers in the system.
• The ePurse system maintains a balance identifier for every ePurse from a
subset of ePurses in the system.
• The ePurse system maintains an ePurse identifier for every transaction
from a subset of transactions in the system.
• The ePurse system maintains a terminal identifier for every transaction
from a subset of transactions in the system.
• The ePurse system maintains a balance identifier for every transaction from
a subset of transactions in the system.
• The ePurse system maintains an ePurse for every buyer from a subset of
buyers in the system.
• The ePurse system maintains a validation status for every transaction from a
subset of transactions in the system.
• The ePurse system uniquely identifies the agent that is currently request-
ing to execute a function in the system.
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• The ePurse system uniquely identifies the ePurse, the balance of which is
requested from the system.
Organisational rules
• The ePurse, of which a balance is requested from the system, must have a
balance recorded in the system.
• The ePurse, of which a balance is requested from the system, must have an
associated owner recorded in the system.
• Every transaction that has an associated agent must also have a transaction
amount recorded in the system.
• Every transaction that has an associated ePurse must also have a transaction
amount recorded in the system.
• Every transaction that has an associated validation status must also have a
transaction amount recorded in the system.
• Every ePurse that has a transaction associated with it must also have a
balance recorded in the system.
• Every ePurse that has a balance associated with it must belong to an agent
in the system.
User roles in the system
The following are user roles of the system. These user roles reflect the actors
that are included in the use case diagram in Figure 6.13 The tasks that can be
performed by a user belonging to each user role is described in Table 6.15.
• The Buyer user role includes the buyers in the ePurse system.
• The Seller user role includes the sellers in the ePurse system.
• The Terminal user role includes the terminals in the ePurse system
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Operations, user roles and permissions
Table 6.15 lists all the system operations, and the specific permissions on those
operations by user role.
User roles
Operations that can be performed on the ePurse system
Se
lle
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r
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al
Record a transaction in the system. 3
Approve a transaction on the ePurse of a buyer. 3
Process the payment for a translation. 3
Get the balance in the ePurse of a given buyer. 3
Table 6.15: Roles and Permissions Matrix of the ePurse system
e-Purse system
Buyer
   
Get balance of 
e-Purse 
 
Record 
transaction 
 
Approve 
transaction on   
e-Purse
 
Seller
 
Process 
payment 
Terminal
User role
Information flow violates 
confidentiality policy
Information flow 
is allowed
Figure 6.13: Use case diagram for the e-Purse system
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6.2.12.c.2 Formalising the confidentiality requirement CR16
In this section, a possible formalisation of the confidentiality requirement CR16 is
specified using the Circus notation. The general definition of CP4 states:
do not reveal the exact value of x
The confidentiality requirement CR16 of the ePurse system by De Landtsheer and Van
Lamsweerde (2005, p. 44) reads:
CR16 : agents who are not the card holder should not know the exact value of
some state variable.
Recall that the confidentiality requirement CR16 has been rephrased as follows, to
align with the definition of CP4.
if the agent is not the card holder
then do not reveal the value of x
Once again, like the previous confidentiality requirements, this confidentiality require-
ment requires confidentiality of information under certain conditions.
Identify the condition for confidentiality. De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde (2005,
p. 44) state that the current agent currAgent using the system is not authorised
to view the exact value of a state variable if does not. If that state variable is the
balance of a particular ePurse reqPurse, then the requirement states that currAgent
must not know the exact balance of reqPurse if currAgent does not own reqPurse.
This confidentiality condition can be written as follows.
currAgent is not the owner of the ePurse
The above condition may be formalised using the Circus notation as follows.
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(currAgent 7→ reqPurse) 6∈ owns
where own is a function that identifies the ePurse of a given agent, if any.
Identify the confidential data. In order to prevent the system from revealing the exact
value of a particular variable, we must exclusively state a separation between the
value of the variable in the original system and that in the shadow system. In the
case of the ePurse system, such a separation is formalised as follow.
(balance reqPurse) 6= (balance9 reqPurse9)
Build the confidentiality predicate. Now, the condition for confidentiality and the sep-
aration defined for the confidential data must be combined to come up with a
formal definition for the confidentiality requirement CR16 . The derived formal
definition is shown below as a Z schema.
HideExactBalance
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
(currAgent 7→ reqPurse) 6∈ owns ∧
currAgent 6= terminal ∧
reqPurse ∈ dom (balance)⇒
(balance reqPurse) 6= (balance9 reqPurse9)
The schema HideExactBalance includes a confidentiality constraint that must be
enforced on the state space of a particular state or states of the ePurse system
where HideExactBalance is observed.
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6.2.12.c.3 Results of analysing the ePurse system having CR16
Table 6.16 shows that the analysis of the system with respect to the three user roles
in the ePurse system results in the outcome “Simplified”. Recall from Section 3.2.6
that if the predicate generated from back propagating a system specification can
be simplified, then according to BCF in Circus, there are no contradictions in the
specification of the system being analysed.
User role against which the system has
being analysed
Se
lle
r
Bu
ye
r
Te
rm
in
al
Time taken for back propagation 481 ms 394 ms 653 ms
Time taken for predicate simplification 1590 ms 1329 ms 1460 ms
Total time taken for evaluation 2071 ms 1723 ms 2113 ms
Result of the simplification by the
theorem prover
Simplified Simplified Simplified
Table 6.16: Results of the mechanised analysis of the ePurse system
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6.2.12.c.4 Negative test with an automatic counter example
In some scenarios the theorem prover may identify a counter example after running
possible combinations to simplify the submitted predicate. Consider the Circus spe-
cification of the ePurse system in Figure A.8. Extend the specification in Figure A.8 by
introducing the schema HideIfNotTerminal that represents a confidentiality annotation
and the Circus action ShowAnyBal. The schema HideIfNotTerminal formalises a confiden-
tiality requirement where the system must never reveal the balance of any ePurse if the
current user agent is not a terminal. The Circus action ShowAnyBal formalises a function
where the balance of any requested ePurse can be viewed. The descriptions of the
variables in both HideIfNotTerminal and ShowAnyBal are included in Appendix A.5.3.
HideIfNotTerminal
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
currAgent 6= terminal⇒
(balance reqPurse) 6= (balance9 reqPurse9)
ShowAnyBal =̂ var anyPurse : dom (balance) ∩ ran owns •
anyPurseIn?anyPurse−→
reqPurse := anyPurse?;
showAnyPurseOut !(balance anyPurse?)−→ Skip
The main action of the specification of the ePurse system in Figure A.8 is modified to
include HideIfNotTerminal and ShowAnyBal as follows.
• µX •

SelectAgent ;

〈ApproveTrnsctn〉@ 〈ShowBalSec〉@ (〈ShowAnyBal〉 ; 〈HideIfNotTerminal〉)@ 〈DoPayment〉@ 〈RecordTrnsctn〉

; X

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Analysing the resulting specification using the mechanisation of BCF in Circus pro-
posed in this research resulted in the Isabelle theorem prover suggesting a counter
example. The Isabelle theorem prover command “apply smt” suggested that the vari-
able currAgent might assume the value seller or buyer. In this case, the antecedent
in the implication in HideIfNotTerminal will be satisfied resulting in a contradiction
between the output action in ShowAnyBal and the consequent in the implication in
HideIfNotTerminal.
Figure 6.14: Counter example generated due to an insecure operation
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6.2.12.d Analysing the confidentiality pattern CP5
The ePurse system discussed earlier contains the confidentiality property CR17 that
reflects the confidentiality requirement pattern CP5. Therefore, the same model of
that ePurse system will be reused here for analysing a system with a confidentiality
property that reflects CP5. As mentioned earlier, the full formal specification for the
ePurse system is included in Appendix A.5.3 and it must be noted that this formal
specification is just one possible implementation of the system using the Circus notation.
6.2.12.d.1 Formalising the confidentiality requirement CR17
In this section, a possible formalisation of the confidentiality requirement CR17 is
specified using the Circus notation. The general definition of CP5 states:
do not reveal the exact value of x
The confidentiality requirement CR17 of the ePurse system by De Landtsheer and Van
Lamsweerde (2005, p. 44) reads:
CR17 : agents who are not the card holder should not know whether a state
variable is above/below a given threshold.
Recall that the confidentiality requirement CR17 has been rephrased as follows, to
align with the definition of CP5.
if the agent is not the card holder
then do not reveal whether the value y is
above/below a certain threshold n
Once again, like the previous confidentiality requirements, this confidentiality require-
ment requires confidentiality of information under certain conditions. The confidential-
ity requirement CR17 has the same condition.
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The formal definition of the condition for confidentiality has been presented earlier in
the analysis for CP4. The confidentiality requirement CR17 has the same condition for
confidentiality. In addition, the balance of a requested customer being below a certain
threshold bmin is a condition to be enforced this confidentiality requirement.
balance reqPurse ∈ {r : N | r < bmin}
To hide the set of possible values of balance reqPurse we define the set of possible values
of balance reqPurse and balance9 reqPurse9 to be disjoint.
balance reqPurse ∈ {r : N | r < bmin}
⇒ balance9 reqPurse9 6∈ {r : N | r < bmin}
The derived formal definition of CR17 is shown below as a Z schema.
HideMinBalance
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
(currAgent 7→ reqPurse) 6∈ owns ∧
currAgent 6= terminal ∧
reqPurse ∈ dom (balance) ∧
balance reqPurse ∈ {r : N | r < bmin} ⇒
balance9 reqPurse9 6∈ {r : N | r < bmin}
The schema HideMinBalance includes a confidentiality constraint that must be en-
forced on the state space of a particular state or states of the ePurse system where
HideMinBalance is observed. The main action of the ePurse system has been modified
as follows for this analysis.
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• µX •
〈SelectAgent〉 ;

〈ApproveTrnsctn〉@ (〈ShowBalSec〉 ; 〈HideMinBalance〉)@ 〈DoPayment〉@ 〈RecordTrnsctn〉
 ; X

The ePurse system in the specification in Figure A.8, having the modified main action
as above, is analysed using the mechanisation. The results of this analysis is discussed
next.
6.2.12.d.2 Results of analysing the ePurse system having CR17
Table 6.17 shows that the analysis of the system with respect to the three user roles in
the ePurse system results in the outcome “Simplified”. Recall from Section 3.2.6 that if
the predicate generated from back propagating a system specification can be simplified,
then according to BCF in Circus, there are no contradictions in the specification of the
system being analysed.
User role against which the system has
being analysed
Se
lle
r
Bu
ye
r
Te
rm
in
al
Time taken for back propagation 481 ms 394 ms 653 ms
Time taken for predicate simplification 1590 ms 1329 ms 1460 ms
Total time taken for evaluation 2071 ms 1723 ms 2113 ms
Result of the simplification by the
theorem prover
Simplified Simplified Simplified
Table 6.17: Results of the mechanised analysis of the ePurse system
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6.2.13 A comparison of results of the mechanised analysis
In order to compare the results of the mechanised analysis shown in Table 6.8, Table 6.11,
Table 6.14, Table 6.16 and Table 6.17 we must first have a way to identify the relative size
of each Circus specification that was analysed. The author does not know of any prior
work on comparing the relative size of two formal specifications in the Circus notation.
Further, the reader must also be informed that the implemented back propagation
process in the CFAT tool uses regular expressions and pattern matching for renaming
variables in the generated predicate. Alternatively, with the right programming skills,
one could have implemented the same mechanisation using a functional programming
language. In this scenario, regular expressions and pattern matching might not be
required.
BCF laws (see Table 2.4) used in the analysis in this chapter are:
• bw external choice
• bw sequence
• bw assignment
• bw guard
• bw input prefix
• bw output prefix
The bw sequence and bw external choice laws are for the composite operators, sequential
composition and external choice respectively. Apart from that, BCF back propagation
laws for the atomic actions in the Circus notation manipulate the incoming predicate
during the back propagation process. For example, bw guard, bw input prefix and bw
output prefix laws add additional text to the predicate being calculated. However, the
bw assignment law applies pattern matching through regular expressions to manipulate
the predicate being calculated. It is expected that as the predicate grows in size, more
computing time is required for pattern matching. Therefore, a correlation can be
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expected between the number of “assignment” actions in a given specification and the
average time taken for back propagating the same specification. Such a correlation is
reflected in Table 6.18 . However, this is less true for bw guard, bw input prefix and bw
output prefix laws where:
Application of the input and output laws depends on the channelset L upon which
the specification S is lifted. If there are output actions in S that uses a channel in L
additional text will be introduced to the back propagated predicate, increasing its
size. Likewise, base on whether an input action uses a channel in the channelset L
for communication, the resulting text introduced to the back propagated predicate
will be different. Therefore it will be difficult to derive a meaningful correlation
between the number of input actions in a Circus specification and the time it takes
for back propagating that specification.
The back propagation of the guarded action also introduce new text to the back
propagated predicate. However, this text depends on the size of the guard in a
guarded action. Therefore, existence of a guard will have little impact on the time
taken for back propagation.
It must be strongly noted that this is too little a dataset to make a strong conclusion
regarding the correlation. A much larger dataset from a range of systems must be
analysed if we are to make a more accurate conclusion regarding the relation between
the specification size and time taken for its mechanised analysis.
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Context Bank
information
system
Phone book
system
Secure
electronic
examination
system
ePurse
system
ePurse
system
Confidentiality
requirement
CR18 CR14 CR21 CR16 CR17
Confidentiality pattern CP1 CP2 CP3 CP4 CP5
Number of Circus actions
Guarded action 5 4 19 4 4
Input action 8 5 15 10 10
Output action 2 2 3 1 1
Assign action 6 5 34 7 7
The average
back propagation time
434 ms 252 ms 2792 ms 1477 ms 1587 ms
The average
simplification time
1271 ms 1656 ms 2095 ms 1095 ms 1219 ms
Table 6.18: A comparison of the average analysis times for different systems
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6.3 Summary
The main contribution of this chapter is the analysis carried out to evaluate the mech-
anisation of BCF in Circus, developed under this research. This fulfills the objective of
this chapter by demonstrating that the mechanisation of BCF in Circus is practically
applicable.
In this chapter:
• the mechanisation of BCF in Circus has been used to analyse systems with
confidentiality requirements that reflect five different types of confidentiality
requirement pattern identified in this research.
• the issue with a weak specification and how the weak specification maybe
strengthened has be demonstrated.
• the concept of negative testing has been discussed and the results of carrying out
a negative test has been discussed.
• the results obtained from executing different sizes and complexities of case studies
has been critiqued.
• a possible correlation between the number of “assignment” actions in a given spe-
cification and the average time taken for back propagating the same specification
has been identified. It must be noted that this maybe due to the programming
style used for mechanising BCF where pattern matching has been used text
replacement in a predicate.
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This chapter presents an overall evaluation of the research presented in this thesis.
7.1 Introduction
Recall from Chapter 1 that the hypothesis of this research states that:
a practically applicable approach exists that supports the process of analysing system
models using Banks’s Confidentiality Framework (BCF) (Banks, 2012) to verify if
those models respect the integrated confidentiality requirements pertaining to data
leakage through legitimate channels.
The author argues that the hypothesis has been fully satisfied through the proposed
mechanisation in this thesis. The argument for the practical applicability of the proposed
mechanisation approach has been justified by showing the time taken for analysing
specifications of different systems with varying sets of functions. A possible approach
for calculating the efficiency of the mechanisation has been discussed through a com-
parison between the time taken for a manual run of a BCF in Circus based analysis of a
system and a mechanised run of the same analysis.
The author is quick to acknowledge that the current mechanisation does not support
the analysis of recursion and parallel processes in systems. This is due to the current
limitations in BCF in Circus, as discussed in the next section. For this reason, the
mechanisation supports only sequential access systems.
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7.2 Factors that could have influenced the quality of the analysis
The following factors could have strengthened the overall value of the outcome of the
analysis carried out in this thesis.
Availability of real Circus specifications of Systems. If the case studies conducted in
this research were based on real Circus specifications of systems or on real
confidentiality requirements relating to data leakage then the justification of the
advantages brought by the proposed mechanisation could have been stronger.
Having to invent and hand-craft these specifications has been one of the limitations
of this research as detailed in Section 7.4.
Availability of descriptions of real-life systems. The research conducted in this thesis
required a catalogue of system descriptions of real-life systems, that could be
used as a benchmark for testing the mechanisation of BCF in Circus. However, the
author was not able to find a literature backed catalogue of formal specifications or
even system descriptions of real-life systems having a confidentiality requirement.
Therefore, such a catalogue has been compiled through a literature search, as
part of this research. Many limitations have shaped the catalogue that was
compiled eventually. However, if such a comprehensive catalogue was available,
results from analysing systems in that catalogue would have contributed towards
evaluating the value that the mechanisation can bring to the system engineering
discipline. The author believes that the catalogue provided in Chapter 5 can be a
starting point for such requirements for a benchmark.
Support for recursion in BCF in Circus. Banks (2012, p. 148) discussed a method for
deriving an invariant obligation that is required to back propagate a loop body in
a recursion. However, he stated that the method cannot be used in all scenarios
and therefore sometimes one must resort to intuition to identify the invariant
obligation.
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“We leave the problem of devising more sophisticated techniques for identifying
invariant obligations for future work.”
(Banks, 2012, p. 148)
In some scenarios, the user may identify an invariant obligation. However, Banks
does not provide a mechanisable law for these scenarios. Hence, the current
version of the CFAT tool is not designed to provide support for back propagating
recursion constructs. Section 3.4.3 discusses a scenario where a data leakage may
occur through recursion.
Support for parallel processes in BCF in Circus. BCF in Circus does not have a mechan-
izable back propagation law for parallel processes that can be used for automating
the back propagation of parallel constructs. This is a limitation of BCF in Circus as
discussed in Section 2.8. Concurrent access to systems is an important aspect of
information systems. A comprehensive analysis of confidentiality in a concurrent
access system must involve analysing the parallel process blocks in the system
specification.
7.3 Benefits derived from the mechanisation
The proposed mechanisation was intended to provide a number of benefits that would
enhance the value of BCF in Circus. The intended benefits have been discussed in
Section 3.1. The following is a discussion on the extent to which these intended benefits
have been realized.
Practicality. The evaluation of the proposed mechanisation has shown that the pro-
posed mechanisation is practically applicable. This has been demonstrated by
presenting the time taken for analysing a number of hand crafted systems that
are based on scenarios supported by literature. Based on the However, the per-
formance of the mechanisation can be improved on many fronts. For example,
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currently the LATEX model of the system and the HOL based back propagated pre-
dicate needs to be manually submitted to the CZT and the Isabelle theorem prover
respectively. This process could be automated to achieve a seamless process for
analysing systems using the proposed mechanisation of BCF in Circus.
Suitability. Apart from practicality, another intended purpose of the mechanisation
of BCF in Circus is to show whether systems with different types of confiden-
tiality requirements can be analysed. Two types of confidentiality properties
that are supported by BCF in Circus has been identified. The suitability of the
mechanisation to detect both types of confidentiality requirements supported by
BCF in Circus has been demonstrated through the use of negative testing (see
Section 6.2.11). It must be noted that the testing for suitability carried out in this
thesis is not strong as the proposed mechanisation does not support recursion
and parallel constructs, due to limitations with BCF in Circus. Therefore, in an
ideal world, these tests will fall short of reflecting real world scenarios of the
consistency of requirements in a system specification. Developing mechanizable
laws for recursion and parallel constructs of the Circus notation is a further work
required.
Efficiency. The comparison between the mechanised versus the manual analysis of a
trivial system in Section 3.5.1 has shown that the proposed mechanisation of BCF
in Circus in this thesis is multifold efficient than the manual approach. While
the relative efficiency has been shown for a trivial example, there is no way to
conclude whether the derived ratio of the Temporal Efficiency (see Section 3.5.1)
will be constant as the size and complexity of the specifications change. The
author believes that the discussion on relative efficiency between the manual
versus the mechanized analysis approach in Section 3.5 has demonstrated that an
efficient approach for analysing systems using BCF in Circus has been achieved
through the mechanisation.
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7.4 Contributions and Limitations
In this section, a discussion of the contributions and some of the limitations of those
contributions are presented.
Catalogue of case studies with a confidentiality requirement. The catalogue of case stud-
ies with a confidentiality requirement is an original contribution made in this
thesis as far as the author is aware of. As an initial catalogue, this provides a
good collection of case studies that has been derived through a systematic process.
Further, this collection can be used by other researchers to analyse other dimen-
sions in relation to a confidentiality requirement literature. For example, context
where security is most sought after. Researchers working on vertical areas of
research such as eliciting confidentiality requirements and various formalisms of
confidentiality requirement specifications can use scenarios from the case studies
in this catalogue to align their research with this existing literature discussing
different scenarios with a confidentiality requirement. This is because there is a
vacuum of such real-world case studies.
“there is a vacuum of real-world case studies and experience reports on how
confidentiality requirements are dealt with in practice”
(Gurses et al., 2005, p. 102).
The major limitation of the proposed catalogue in this thesis is its derivation
process. Because the scenarios were identified by focussing on pages in a paper
where a certain keyword was found, prospective descriptions of confidentiality
related requirements in other pages of the paper might have been missed, if such
a discussion did not contain the keyword ‘confidential’. Because of the limited set
of relevant papers that were identified, it was necessary to consider discussions
where confidentiality was mentioned in a very general way without giving much
details about the context except a reference for the system environment, such as
‘a banking system’, ‘an electronic voting system’, etc.
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Generalized patterns of confidentiality requirements. Generalized patterns of confiden-
tiality requirements is an original contribution as far as the author is aware of.
These patterns will greatly help the confidentiality engineering community as
the pattern catalogue can be used as a baseline benchmark to address confid-
entiality properties in the literature. However, while using the catalogue as a
benchmark, the user must also be aware that the catalogue could be improved on
many grounds. The pattern catalogue can also be useful for comparing different
formalisms that can be used to analyse systems with a confidentiality requirement.
Assumptions were made when standardizing some confidentiality requirements
described in some papers. Those assumptions were necessary because some of
the requirements were not clearly stated in terms of:
• the exact data that needed concealing.
• the user roles that were supposed to be unauthorised, with regards to a
particular piece of data in a given context.
Some patterns might be weak because the confidentiality requirements from which
those patterns were derived were partially hand-crafted. The author acknowledges
this weakness as a limitation. This limitation can only be overcome when systems
and their confidentiality requirements, considered as source material for such a
catalogue, are specified in a clear and unambiguous manner.
Further, because of the above mentioned limitation, the author anticipates fur-
ther patterns, should there be a more in-depth literature search exercise for
confidentiality properties in systems.
Confidentiality Framework Application Tool. The CFAT tool is an original contribution
of this research. A mechanised back propagation apparatus does not exists
to the author’s knowledge. Banks acknowledges this as an impediment to
BCFs deployment (Banks, 2012, p. 187). With the CFAT tool, this has been
addressed. The CFAT tool has been developed as part of this research. The
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biggest advantage of the CFAT tool is that it makes the task of back propagation
practically applicable.
The ability to generate a LATEX based Circus specification of a system being
analysed is an important feature of the CFAT tool. Engineers can type check and
syntax check the generated Circus specification to provide a degree of certainty
about the validity of specification.
The major limitation hindering the use of the CFAT tool is that the user must be
equipped with expertise in using the CFAT notation. One further improvement
required is the ability to automatically submit the generated LATEX based Circus
specification and the Isabelle theorem file to CZT and Isabelle theorem prover
respectively.
Further to the limitations in the contributions that has been made with this thesis, there
were other limitations that confined the landscape available for this research. Following
are such limitations.
Programming style not scalable. The use of an imperative programming approach to
code the back propagation logic used in the proposed mechanisation tool is not
scalable. This is one of the shortcomings of the tool proposed in this thesis. A
more appropriate approach would have been to use functional programming.
However, a functional programming approach was not pursued because the
author does not have the relevant background.
Having to hand-craft specifications. Since formal system specifications were not avail-
able for the systems modelled in the case studies in this thesis, specifications of
those systems had to be hand-crafted. The resulting specifications might not have
reflected the real life scenarios in those contexts.
Unable to analyse systems with parallel processes. If BCF in Circus supported parallel
processes then the mechanisation of BCF in Circus could have been extended and
used to analyse multi-user parallel processing environments. Such an analysis
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would have reflected a much closer view about the consistency of the requirements
in the system, as many systems designed for use by members of an organisation
allow parallel access.
Unable to analyse the recursion construct. BCF in Circus does no have a back propaga-
tion law for recursion. Because of this, the recursion construct had to be bypassed
during the back propagation stage of every analysis carried out in this research.
Banks (2012, p. 148) discussed how one may approach to back propagate the
recursion construct in Circus. However, this discussion is in its early stages
and needs further research to produce a mechanizable back propagation law for
recursion. As such, this endeavour is not within the scope of this thesis.
The global state promotion dilemma. The technique adopted by BCF for reasoning about
confidentiality in systems is to make specifiers define the level of separation
between the real and the twin system and use the result of the back propagation
application on the system specification to prove this separation. A separation
for a state variable can be defined if that variable exists in the global state space
of the system. This becomes an issue if the engineer wants to protect the value
of a particular function application such as f (x) where f is a function in the
global state space whereas x is a runtime variable whose value is provided by
the user during the execution of the program. Therefore, in order to define the
required separation, the value of x must be assigned to a global state variable y
and subsequently the formalisation of the confidentiality requirement must use f
and y rather than f and x.
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7.5 Mechanization vs. manual back propagation
Banks (2012) did not present any analysis on the feasibility of the manual application
of BCF. Rather, he did state that:
“The lack of any dedicated tool support for our platform is arguably the main
impediment to its deployment.” (Banks, 2012, p. 187)
The benefit of the mechanisation can be visible when the results of a manual back
propagation of a system and the mechanised back propagation of the same system
are compared side by side. The manual back propagation shown in Section 4.2 is for
a system formalized with a Circus specification that contains one input action, one
assignment action, one guarded action and one output action. Manual analysis of that
system using BCF in Circus takes roughly one hour while the mechanized analysis of
the same system takes 120 milliseconds as stated on Section 4.2.
A more promising set of results of a mechanised analysis that includes the time taken
for back propagating non-trivial system models is shown in Table 6.18 . For example,
the mechanized back propagation of the secure examination system with 71 atomic
actions takes an average of 2792 milliseconds or 2.79 seconds.
7.6 A critical analysis of the adopted mechanisation approach
Circus is not ideal as a formalism to adapt for instantiating BCF. The most important
issue is that there is no official BNF for the Circus notation. Some researchers do include
variations of what they say is the BNF of Circus such as in the papers by Woodcock and
Cavalcanti (2001b, P. 292), Woodcock and Cavalcanti (2002, P. 185), Sampaio et al. (2003,
P. 149), Freitas (2005, P. 13), Cavalcanti and Woodcock (2002, P. 149), Oliveira et al. (2006,
P. 3) and Oliveira et al. (2009, P. 5). However, unlike the ISO standardisation of the Z
notation (ISO/IEC, 2002) there is no single standardisation of the Circus notation nor
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there is a working group that identifies themselves as the caretaker of this formalism.
Another issue with the Circus notation is that there are no reliable and stable tool
support that can cater for type checking and model checking Circus specifications.
The only type checking tool available for type checking a Circus specification is CZT.
However, it does not contain useful error messages, syntax highlighting or navigation
capabilities for Circus specific constructs in the specification. Ye and Woodcock (2017)
has proposed an approach for model checking Circus specifications by linking Circus to
CSP||B1. Their approach involves transforming the state part of a Circus specification
to a B machine while converting the behavioural part to CSP and finally using ProB
(Leuschel and Butler, 2003) to model check the resulting CSP||B specification. The
problem here is that the limitations in CSP||B confine the type of Circus specifications
that are supported in this approach. Ye and Woodcock (2017, p. 94) discusses these
limitations. Tools such as CRefine (Oliveira et al., 2008) and JCircus (Barrocas and
Oliveira, 2012) have been developed in the past to cater for a specific need of a research
conducted in the past. However, to the author’s knowledge there is no evidence that
either these tools or any other Circus tools are actively being developed and maintained
in such a away that other researchers can build upon its code-base. Further, research
on the Circus notation has yet to be taken up by the broader research community rather
than being confined to a small cohort of collaborating academics from a limited set
universities, as is the case at present.
Isabelle theorem prover is not ideal for simplifying the predicate generated from back
propagating a formal specification based on Circus. One reason is that mechanical
theorem proving used in Isabelle theorem prover requires guidance by an expert. On
the contrary, finite-state verification techniques2 such as model checking can fully be
automated.
1 “CSP||B is a combination of CSP and B aiming to introduce behavioural specification into state-based B machines.
The B method characterises abstract state, operations with respect to their enabling conditions and their effect on
the abstract state, while CSP specifies overall system behaviour. But different from Circus, the CSP specification
and B machine in CSP||B are always orthogonal.They are individually complete specifications and can be checked
separately” (Ye and Woodcock, 2017, p. 76).
2 “Finite-state verification refers to a set of techniques for proving properties of finite-state models of computer
systems” (Dwyer et al., 1998, p. 7).
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“In contrast to mechanical theorem proving, which often requires guidance by
an expert, most finite-state verification techniques can be fully automated, thus
relieving the user of the need to understand the inner workings of the verification
process” (Dwyer et al., 1998, p. 7).
When compared to theorem proving, the advantages of model checking include full
automation and the ability to generate counter examples that help in debugging (Ye
and Woodcock, 2017, p. 73). However, a proof based approach excels in certain aspects
such as being able to handle very complex systems because it does not have to directly
check every state and also because its logics are typically more expressive (Amjad, 2004,
p. 16). The ideal scenario would be to use a platform that has an efficient combination
of model checking and theorem proving. Such combinations have been proposed in the
past researchers such as Arkoudas et al. (2004), Amjad (2004), Aagaard et al. (1999),
Bjørner et al. (1997), Dingel and Filkorn (1995), Shankar (1996), McMillan (1999) and
Rajan et al. (1995).
Generating and submitting the back propagated predicate in a format that is sup-
ported by such a combined platform will be a valuable further improvement for the
mechanisation approach proposed in this thesis.
The CZT platform was considered for building custom extensions on top of it, to support
the mechanisation of the calculations required by BCF in Circus and subsequently for
code genration. However, the architecture and inner workings of the CZT editor was
very complex that demand a steep learning curve before the CZT editor could be
extended. Kimber (2007) considered the CZT editor as an input interface which he
planned to extend for code generation to produce PerfectDeveloper (Crocker, 2003) code
from Object-Z specifications. However, after reviewing the CZT editor, Kimber (2007)
concluded that the DTDs and schemas of CZT projects were quite impenetrable.
HiVe Mathematical Tool-kit is not ideal for the purpose of the mechanisation proposed
in this thesis. This is because the theory package does not provide a set of tactics which
can be used in dispatching automatic proofs for theories.
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7.7 Critical factors that would have altered the direction of this
research
The following are some critical factors that would have altered the direction of this
research, if they were available at the beginning of this research.
Knowledge of Isabelle/Isar and Standard ML. If the author had been well versed with
Isabelle/Isar3 and standard ML (Wenzel, 2013, p. i) then the author could have
embedded Circus and the block structure (Banks, 2012, p. 102) of BCF in Circus
inside the Isabelle theorem prover, like HOL-Z (Brucker et al., 2003), Z and
HOL (Bowen and Gordon, 1994), CML (Woodcock and Miyazawa, 2012) or
Isabelle/Circus (Feliachi et al., 2012). Further, using ML, the author could have
mechanised the back propagation logic and subsequently simplify the predicate
within the Isabelle theorem prover.
Detailed developer guide for CZT. If there was a clear documentation regarding the
architecture of CZT and how one may extended it, the author could have extended
CZT to generate the theorem file from the standard LATEX format supported by
the CZT tool. In this scenario, the user could have specified the system using the
Circus notation rather than having to get expertise in using the CFAT notation
which is required in the current mechanisation proposed in this thesis. The author
attempted to extend CZT during the course of this research. However, similar to
Kimber (2007), the author found it impenetrable within the time frame of this
research.
“Indeed, the DTDs and schemas downloaded from existing projects such as
CZT were quite impenetrable.” (Kimber, 2007, p. 59)
3 Isabelle/Isar provides an interpreted language support for interactive theorem proving in the Isabelle theorem
prover whereas the host language of the Isabelle theorem prover is standard ML (Wenzel, 2013, p. i).
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7.8 Further work
The contributions made in this thesis has enabled many interesting directions of further
research that could be explored in future.
Comparative analysis of BCF in Circus. The proposed mechanisation in this thesis and
other similar mechanisations proposed in the literature, for analysing systems
with a confidentiality requirement, can be compared side by side on the basis
of analysis time and competence required. Such as exercise may reveal the
comparative strengths and weaknesses of the compared approaches. BCF in Circus
supports certain sub classes of confidentiality properties as stated in Section 5.3.
Therefore, it is important to confine this comparative analysis to systems with
properties that are supported by all compared approaches.
Extension of the mechanisation of BCF in Circus to support additional constructs.
If further research on BCF in Circus results in the introduction of support for data
leakage analysis of parallel processes, then such extensions can easily be adapted
in the mechanisation proposed in this thesis. Further, results of such an analysis
will more closely reflect the information flows in a real life execution of a system
with parallel processes rather than an exercise that cannot analyse a system with
parallel processes.
Embedding in Higher Order Logic (HOL). An on-going work (Zeyda et al., 2017) at the
University of York is concerned with embedding Circus in Isabelle/UTP. This
work further involves translating Circus notations into corresponding operators
within this embedding. The confidentiality framework can be mechanized as an
Isabelle/HOL theory by extending this embedding, so that Circus models with a
confidentiality requirement can be directly written in the Isabelle theorem prover
similar to HOL-Z and Isabelle/Circus. Tactics can be developed to facilitate the
simplification of these system models.
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Prototyping for black-box testing. Circus formal models may be translated to executable
OCAML programs for rapid prototyping. These prototypes may be used by
security experts to conduct data secrecy tests.
BCF and Event-B. BCF can be adopted for the Event-B notation provided that there is
a UTP semantics for the notation. The back propagation laws of BCF can then be
mechanized by extending the RODIN tool. The RODIN tool already has support
for modelling and refinement of Event-B specifications. This effort may result in
a more integrated tool that supports confidentiality verification.
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the mechanisation. The proposed mechan-
isation can be improved on many grounds so that engineers can save time when
using the mechanisation. Some potential areas of the mechanisation that can be
improved to achieve a better efficient and effective performance from the tool
include:
• Building support in the CFAT tool for a Controlled Natural Language (CNL)
as detailed in page 275-276. CNL can lower the barrier of entry for the CFAT
tool by allowing users to specify systems using a natural language rather
than having to use a structured notation.
• Automating the submission of the back propagated predicate to the Isabelle
theorem prover. This can be possible through the use of command line tools
of the Isabelle theorem prover.
• Automating the validation of the generated LATEX specification using CZT.
This can be possible through the use of command line tools of CZT.
• Develop tactics in the Isabelle theorem prover for improving the automation
of the simplification. Most probably, this will be an extension to the HiVe
mathematical toolkit.
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Techniques to improve the identification of data leakage risks. The process followed in
this thesis, for analysing systems with a confidentiality requirement, can be
strengthened by improving the confidentiality requirement elicitation stage of
the process. The current approach involves formalizing the given confidentiality
requirement and including it as part of the formal specification of the system.
However, if the system requirements could be analysed using techniques for
identifying security requirements from business goals, it can only help to improve
the set of security requirements of the system. The following are some useful
techniques in this domain that future researchers can utilize.
Abuse cases Abuse cases utilizes use case models to model complete
interactions between a systems and one or more actors
(McDermott and Fox, 1999). In comparison to normal
use cases, the result of the interaction in an abuse case is
harmful to one of the actors or stakeholders of the system.
“In a requirements phase, abuse case models can be used
to increase both user and customer understanding of
the security features of a proposed product.”
(McDermott and Fox, 1999, p. 63)
Misuse cases Sindre and Opdahl (2005) introduced misuse cases, which
are inverted use cases that describe functions that the sys-
tem should not allow. Use cases and misuse cases are in-
cluded in the same diagram of the system model, rather
than being on different diagrams like use cases and Abuse
cases. Misuse-case diagrams link regular use cases to both
threats and potential countermeasures which aids in priorit-
ization of requirements since the real cost of implementing
a use case includes the protection needed to mitigate all
serious threats to it (Sindre and Opdahl, 2005, p. 41).
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Deviational techniques A security analysis using deviational techniques such as
HAZOP (Kletz, 1999) on use cases may identify security
requirements which otherwise might have slip through un-
noticed. Srivatanakul (2005) demonstrated that deviational
techniques can be used on use cases in UML to identify
security requirements.
Anti-goals Another technique for identifying security requirements
is through the use of anti-models. An anti-model includes
anti-goals, which are attackers own goals that are inten-
tional obstacles to security goals, set up by the attackers
to threaten security goals (Elahi et al., 2010, p. 21). Lam-
sweerde (2004) extended KAOS, a goal-oriented security re-
quirements engineering methodology to capture anti-goals
and other obstacles that capture exceptional behaviour.
Tool-supported automation of translations. From the initial business goals to the formal
specification of confidentiality integrated systems, there are many stages where
there are requirements for syntactic translations of requirements between stages.
Figure 7.1 shows some of these stages with a T . Further work on automating
the translation at each stage is recommended to introduce a systematic process
for each translation. One such technique for enabling such translations is to use a
Controlled Natural Language (CNL) for describing systems. A small introduction
to CNL is given on page 275 - 276.
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Two important issues that one must address when writing a system require-
ment specification for an information system are that:
• the organisational structure and rules that are to be incorporated into
the information system must be described in a language that can be
understood by all stakeholders.
• the specification should be unambiguous so that traceability can be
established between the system requirement specification and its eventual
implementation.
Unambiguity is also required in a system requirement specification in order
to avoid inconsistencies between stakeholders as well as in order to formally
reason about system models. One way to ensure unambiguity in a system
requirement specification is to use a Controlled Natural Language (CNL)
(Schwitter, 2010).
A CNL is a subset of a natural language where the grammar and vocabulary
are restricted in a systematic way to reduce the ambiguity and complexity
found in a full natural language (Schwitter, 2010, p. 1113). Some CNLs include
INCOSE (Condamines and Warnier, 2014, p. 36), Attempto Controlled English
(ACE) (Fuchs et al., 2008) and Computer-Processable Language (CPL) (Clark et al.,
2005).
RuleCNL by Feuto Njonko et al. (2014) is a domain independent CNL that sys-
tematically embeds domain facts and terms in grammatically correct sentences.
In an organisational setting these domain fact and terms can be synonymous
with organisational rules and structure.
Controlled Natural Language (CNL)
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“An ontology models a part of the world. Such a model can be used by
humans and computers in order to establish a common ‘understanding’ of
relevant concepts and the relations between them.”
(Schumacher, 2001, p. 32)
A future area of work can be to work on a CNL that adopts the concept
of embedding organisational rules and structures similar to RuleCNL. This
CNL can be designed to provide a set of necessary patterns that can be used
to describe a simple system in such a way that the system description can
be systematically translated into a Circus specification. Table 7.1 shows the
mapping between some components of a system requirement specification
and a Circus specification. A set of rules can be proposed that can be used
to describe the organisational structure, rules and regulations using natural
language. Subsequently, a mapping for translating compliant sentences to the
Circus notation can be provided.
System requirement specification Structures of the Circus notation
Organisational structure data types, data objects,
global constants
Organisational rules and regulations state invariants
Operations performed in the organisation actions
Who can perform the functions channelsets
(representing user roles)
Which staff are included in each user role state invariants that define
elements of sets
Table 7.1: Mapping a system requirement specification to structures in
a Circus specification
Controlled Natural Language (CNL) (continued)
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A comprehensive set of sentence patterns are not required for using a CNL, but
rather a minimal set of patterns that can be used to derive unambiguous and
grammatically correct sentences to describe the structure, rules and regulations
of an organisation is enough as a start. Nonetheless, the grammar can be
extended later to support a richer set of patterns of sentences in order to
describe other identified components of a system requirement specification as
listed in Table 7.1.
Controlled Natural Language (CNL) (continued)
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Figure 7.1: Some possible stages and paths that can be taken when
moving from business goals to Circus specifications
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A.1 Modelling a system using the Circus notation
One way to model a system using the Circus notation, is to model the individual
components of the system and then combine them into a single system definition called
a Circus specification. The specifications of individual components are called Circus
paragraphs1. A Circus specification may contain zero, one or many Circus paragraphs.
This section describes how the Circus notation has been used to formally model the
range of systems discussed in this thesis.
The application of the Circus constructs, discussed in this section, are illustrated
using the specification of an Online expenditure tracker system (see Figure A.1). The
components of this specification are explained one-by-one, as we progress through the
following sub-sections. In summary, this system allows an on-line customer to purchase
items. Money spent on every purchase is tallied with his/her previous purchases. The
system also allows a customer to check his/her total expenditure.
A.1.1 Defining the data types and state variables
A.1.1.a Data types
In this thesis, systems are modelled as abstract formal specifications. Significant
examples of system scenarios are taken from the literature. The data structures of these
systems are modelled as abstract sets of elements or relations and functions.
1 A Circus paragraph is a syntactic structure of the Circus specification language (Sampaio et al., 2003).
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Basic types In the Circus notation, an abstract data type can be defined by providing
the name of the type enclosed in a pair of square brackets. Such type
definitions are called basic types (Spivey, 1989, p. 47). Similarly, multiple
types can be defined by providing a comma separated sequence of type
names.
e.g. [CUSTOMER, ITEM]
In the example, the basic types CUSTOMER and ITEM are defined using
the statement [CUSTOMER, ITEM]. The basic type CUSTOMER represents
the set of all the customer identifiers and the basic type ITEM represents
the set of all the item identifiers used in the system.
Free types A type with a finite number of elements can be defined in Circus using
the free type construct. A free type can be used to define a set of distinct
constants (Spivey, 1989, p. 82).
e.g. Status ::= InUse | NotInUse
The statement Status ::= InUse | NotInUse defines the free type (Spivey, 1989)
Status to be a set containing exactly two distinct elements that represent
two values. The free type definitions in this thesis use simple free types.
More complex free types can be defined as show in (Spivey, 1989, p. 82).
A.1.1.b State variables and invariants
State variables are variables that are declared in the global scope of the system. For
example, the data structures spent, price and currentCustomer need to be accessible
throughout the scope of the process Online expenditure tracker (see Figure A.1 ) and
so they are defined as state variables. The description of the state variables in the
specification are included in the Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Online expenditure tracker - Description of the state variables
State variable Description
spent A function that identifies the amount spent by a customer, if any.
price A function that identifies the price of an item, if any.
currentCustomer The user who is currently logged into the system.
The system enforces constraints encoded as state invariants on the values that can be
assumed by the state variables. These constraints encode the policies of the parent
organisation. The description of these state invariants are included in Table A.2.
Table A.2: Online expenditure tracker - Description of the state invariants
State invariants Description
currentCustomer ∈ (dom (spent))
The current user who is logged into the system must have a spent value
recorded in the system.
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[ CUSTOMER, ITEM ]
State
spent : CUSTOMER 7 7→N
currentCustomer : CUSTOMER
price : ITEM 7 7→N
currentCustomer ∈ (dom (spent))
channel mySpentAmountOut :N
channel buyItemIn : ITEM
channelset Customer == {| buyItemIn,mySpentAmountOut |}
process Online expenditure tracker =̂ begin
state State
RecordMyReciept =̂ var buyItem : ITEM •
buyItemIn?buyItem−→
((buyItem? ∈ dom (price))N
spent := spent⊕ {(currentCustomer 7→
(spent currentCustomer+ price buyItem?))})
GetMySpent =̂ mySpentAmountOut !(spent currentCustomer)−→ Skip
• µX •
((
RecordMyReciept@ GetMySpent
)
; X
)
end
Figure A.1: Specification of Online expenditure tracker - code block 1 of 1
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A.1.2 Establishing the communication channels
The system must have communication channels so that the customer can interact with
the system, by way of inputs and outputs.
Channels A channel can be declared by using the syntax channel x+ : T, where
channel is a keyword, x+ denotes a single or a comma separated sequence
of channel names and T denotes the type of data that can be communicated
through the channels. If a Circus channel is declared with this syntax, it can
be used by the system for communicating with the environment by way of
inputs and outputs. For example, the statement;
channel itin : ITEM
in the running example defines a channel called itin with the data type
ITEM to input item identifiers. It is important to note here that channels
are strongly typed in Circus, and hence a channel will restrict the data it
communicates based on its data type2.
In a system environment, confidentiality requirements may be enforced on all users
or various requirements may be enforced on various sub-groups of users. BCF (see
Section 2.3) provides constructs to enforce confidentiality requirements on a defined
sets of channels. In this regard, a confidentiality requirement may be enforced on a
user by enforcing the confidentiality requirement on the set of channels through which
the user communicates with the system.
Channel sets A set of channels with a given name is called a channelset. A channelset
is defined using the notation channelset ::= {| x+ |}, where channelset is
a keyword and x+ denotes a single or a comma separated sequence of
channel names. For example, the statement;
channelset Customer == {| buyItemIn, mySpentAmountOut |}
2 A channel can also be defined without a data type. Such channels are called synchronisation points and they do
not communicate any value (Freitas, 2005).
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in the running example defines a channelset called Customer that represents
the set of channels allowed to a customer of the system.
A.1.3 Defining the system operations
The term ‘action‘, in the Circus terminology refers to any operation of a system and
hence, from now on this term will be used to refer to system operations accordingly.
Here, we define the syntax of the common actions used in the Circus specifications
discussed in this thesis.
Primitive actions. The action Skip terminates immediately and does not make any
changes to the system state (Oliveira et al., 2009, p. 7).
Declaring a variable. A variable can be declared using the statement var v+ : T where
v+ denotes a single or a comma separated sequence of variable names and T
denotes the datatype of v that represents the values that v can assume.
The statement var n : N; c : CUSTOMER declares the variable n that can store
data of type N and the variable c that can store data of type CUSTOMER.
Input and output events. A prefixed action is defined to achieve input or output com-
munications whereby the communication event defined in the prefix takes place
before the action starts. A prefixed action is defined using the format Comm−→A
as found in the BNF in Figure A.2 where Comm is a communication event and A
is a Circus action.
Inputting a value
A prefixed action for input is written c?x−→A, whereby the system accepts a
value to the variable x through the channel c and then behaves like A and x is in
the scope of A (Oliveira, 2005).
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Outputting a value
A prefixed action for output is written c!y−→A whereby the system outputs the
value of the expression y through the channel c and then behaves like A.
Assigning a value to a variable. A value can be assigned to a variable using the action
statement a := E where a is a variable defined in the scope of the assignment
action and E is an expression that evaluates to a value of the same type as the
state variable a.
A.1.4 Defining the overall behaviour of the system
In the Circus notation, a system may be defined with one or more processes. Each
process may contain one or more actions and a main action. However, all the systems
analysed in this thesis are based on systems composed of multiple actions within a
single process. This is because our work uses BCF in Circus (Banks, 2012) where the
verification laws developed so far have been restricted to single processes.
A Circus specification supports multiple actions through action composition using the
CSP operators in the Circus BNF in Figure A.2. The following constructs are utilized in
this thesis for process composition.
Recursion. The recursion construct µX • A ; X recursively executes the action A where
X is a recursion label defined using the construct µX. We may define multiple
recursions in a single main action.
Sequential composition. The construct A ; B defines a sequential composition of two
actions whereby ‘; ’ is the sequential composition operator and the execution of
the action A is immediately followed by the execution of the action B.
In the example the statement (RecordMyReciept @GetMySpent) ; X defines a se-
quential composition where the composite action (RecordMyReciept@GetMySpent)
is immediately followed by X, a recursive invocation of the process starting at the
label X.
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Program ::= CircusPar*
CircusPar ::= ZParagraph | ChanDecl | CSetDecl | ProcDecl
ChanDecl ::= channel CDecl
SeqCDecl ::= CDecl | SeqCDecl ; CDecl
CDecl ::= N+ | N+ : ZExpr
CSDecl ::= channelset N== CSExpr
CSExpr ::= {| |} | {| N+ |} | N | CSExpr \ CSExpr
| CSExpr ∪ CSExpr | CSExpr ∩ CSExpr
PDecl ::= process N =̂ ProcDef
PDef ::= begin PPar* state Schema-Expr PPar* • Act end
PPar ::= Zparagraph | N =̂ Act | NameSetDecl
Act ::= Schema-Expr | CSPAct
CSPAct ::= Skip | Stop | Chaos | Comm→ Act | Cmd | ZPred N Act
| N | µN• Act | Act ; Act | Act u Act | Act @ Act
| Act |[ NSExpr | CSExpr | NSExpr ]| Act | Act \ CSExpr
| 9 ZDecl • Act
Cmd ::= var x : ZExpr • Act | N+ := ZExpr
Comm ::= N CParam*
CParam ::= ?N | ?N : ZPred | ! ZExpr | .ZExpr
NSDecl ::= nameset N== NSExpr
NSExpr ::= {} | { N+ } | N | NSExpr \ NSExpr
| NSExpr ∪ NSExpr | NSExpr ∩ NSExpr
Figure A.2: Circus BNF as published in Freitas (2005) doctoral thesis
NOTE : Pages 31 to 35 of the ISO standard for the Z notation (ISO/IEC, 2002) contains the
complete BNF of the Z notation.
External choice. The logged in user is allowed to either increment his expenditure
total by recording a new receipt in the system or view his/her total expenditure
recorded in the system.
RecordMyReciept@GetMySpent
These are multiple execution paths which the user can choose from. The external
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choice operator @ can be used to define a composite action with multiple execution
paths where the selected path depends on the external input.
Main action. The overall behaviour of a Circus process is defined by defining a nameless
action within the process scope. The overall behaviour of the system in the
running example is defined using the following Circus action.
• µX •
 RecordMyReciept@ GetMySpent
 ; X

An implementation of the system specification in Figure A.1 will behave as follows. In
the beginning state of the system, it is assumed that the state variables price and spent
have already been populated with the necessary data. While in this state, the Circus
action RecordMyReciept or GetMySpent can be chosen by the environment. At the end of
the run, the recursive label X locates the program counter to the state at the beginning
of the program where the label X is defined.
A.1.5 Recursion
The recursion construct in the Circus notation is of the form µX • F(X). To left justify
the lifted body 〈F(X)〉 with respect to the confidentiality annotation θ, we have to
identify an invariant obligation θi where θ v θi (Banks, 2012, p. 148). Consider the
original confidentiality annotation θ as θ0. The following calculation is used to identify
a θn such that θn = θn+1.
θi+1 = θi ∧ bw(〈F(X)〉, θi)
Banks’s argues that this method is not guaranteed to identify a finite n such that
θn = θn+1 (Banks, 2012, p. 148) in the general case. He further states that, in this case
one may resort to intuition by analysing patterns of obligations to derive an invariant
obligation.
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The calculation of the invariant obligation needs further research to derive any useful
laws that can be used for back propagation calculations and as such this endeavour
is not within the scope of this thesis. For this reason, we do not calculate invariant
obligations when back propagating the systems in the case studies in this thesis. I note
that omitting the calculation of the invariant obligation is a limitation of the case study
analysis done in this thesis.
A.2 A comparison of the tools that provide any form of support for
specifying systems in the Circus notation
Tool support for the Circus notation is limited. To the author’s knowledge, the only
tools that provide any form of support for specifying systems in the Circus notation are
Symphony IDE supporting COMPASS Modelling Language (CML), CZT and CRefine.
The following describes the extent to which each tool supports specifying systems in
the Circus notation and the effort required to modify the tool to support an extension
to the Circus notation.
Symphony IDE supporting COMPASS Modelling Language (CML). Symphony IDE sup-
ports the domain specific language CML that is designed for modelling and analysing
systems of systems (Woodcock and Miyazawa, 2012). CML is based on VDM (Gulati
and Singh, 2012), CSP (Hoare, 1980) and Circus (Oliveira et al., 2006). Symphony IDE
(Coleman et al., 2014) is a tool that utilizes CML models to generate Isabelle theorem
files to reason about certain properties of those models. Hence, CML, Symphony IDE
and the Isabelle theorem prover provide a clear path from formal models based on
Circus to Isabelle theorem prover, where we can reason about various properties of
those models. However, the generated theorem files are based on the Isabelle/UTP
framework (Woodcock et al., 2015). The foundation of the Isabelle/UTP framework is
based on a custom definition for the UTP variable and a value model that complements
the typing requirements for those variables. In order to extend the Isabelle/UTP to
support the extended twin semantics of BCF we need to code a new definition for every
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UTP notation and function of the theory of designs in the Isabelle/UTP. Therefore,
CML is not a viable alternative for the purpose of extending it to support BCF.
Symphony IDE generates Isabelle theorem files based on CML system models to reason
about certain properties of these models. The theorem files are based on a theory
package that needs extensive extension from the ground up if twin semantics was to be
supported.
Community Z Tools (CZT). CZT (Malik and Utting, 2005) supports the parsing of Circus
specifications. However, the architecture and inner workings of the CZT editor is
very complex that demand a steep learning curve before the CZT editor could be
extended to support reasoning about confidentiality requirements in a given Circus
specification. Kimber (2007) considered the CZT editor as an input interface which he
planned to extend for code generation to produce PerfectDeveloper (Crocker, 2003) code
from Object-Z specifications. However, after reviewing the CZT editor, Kimber (2007)
concluded that the DTDs and schemas of CZT projects were quite impenetrable.
CRefine. CRefine (Oliveira et al., 2008) is a tool that supports the use of Circus refine-
ment calculus (Sampaio et al., 2003). It has an inbuilt proof obligation manager, that
automatically dispatch proofs for some of its refinement steps (Oliveira et al., 2008).
However, since CRefine extends CZT (Gurgel et al., 2008), it suffers from the same
architectural complexities.
A.3 Decisions regarding the development of a custom tool for BCF
application
For design decisions regarding the development of a BCF application and code gen-
eration tool, it is best to learn how the past researchers have approached it. CRefine,
Symphony IDE and Perfect Developer (Crocker, 2003) are some of the tools that have
been developed in the past for the formal specification and verification of systems.
Perfect Developer (Crocker, 2003) is a tool that allows a user to define and later refine a
formal specification to object oriented code. In addition, it generates “proof obligations”
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from pre-conditions, invariants, etc to verify the correctness of the system model being
defined (Kimber, 2007). These three tools allow the formal specification systems and
dispatch proofs about certain properties of those systems. CRefine and Symphony IDE
both support Circus or a close variant of it. Our requirements for a formal tool for
reasoning about confidentiality, also share these characteristics.
Even-though CRefine accepts a LATEX document, it has support for a unicode (on-screen
pretty printing) display format because the author’s of the CRefine tool believe that
its target audience is mostly not familiar with LATEX and also that “pretty printing is a
success among researchers, since it unconditionally makes the presentation of the development
more user friendly” (Oliveira et al., 2008). Perfect developer adopts a non-LATEX notation
similar to any object oriented language, to make it more “accessible for software developers
with limited mathematical knowledge”. CML is also a non-LATEX notation.
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A.4 Translating CFAT notation to HOL
The following subsections describe how the some CFAT structures that represent Z data
structures are translated into equivalent HOL data structures in the Isabelle theorem
prover. The following presents a discussion of how the the data structures of CFAT
notation is translated to similar HOL data structures.
Variable definition. Z is a strongly typed language and hence a variable declaration in Z
implies that the universal set that contains all elements for that type (Kolyang
et al., 1996) restricts the possible values of that variable. This implication is
the type invariant for that type. For, e.g., The Z statement user : EMPLOYEE;
• defines a state variable “user" with an arbitrary type EMPLOYEE (type
definition), but it also
• implies that “user" belongs to an arbitrary set EMPLOYEE of the same
type (type invariant).
However, in HOL notation, the type definition and the type invariant must be
stated separately. To standardize the translation from Z to HOL and also for
ease of readability, the convention we have adopted is that we write;
• the lowercase of the given Z type name EMPLOYEE, as the equivalent
arbitrary type name in HOL (type EMPLOYEE in Z written as type
employee in HOL)
• the given type EMPLOYEE (also the assumed arbitrary set) in Z as name
of the universal set representing the given type in HOL (arbitrary set
EMPLOYEE is Z written as arbitrary set EMPLOYEE in HOL)
For example, Equation (A.1) defines a variable in the Z notation where the
variable name is user and its type is EMPLOYEE.
user : EMPLOYEE (A.1)
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The variable definition in Equation (A.1) can be written in equivalent HOL
term as in Equation (A.2).
∀ (user::employee) . user ∈ EMPLOYEE (A.2)
where employee is an arbitrary type, user is universally quantified and EMPLOYEE
is a set of the same type employee.
Each basic type defined in the Z notation is considered to be synonymous
with a universal set of labels that represent that type. Hence, we translate
every basic type defined in the Z notation as the Isabelle theorem prover
type string, that represent a set of strings. In the Isabelle theorem prover, we
defined this type synonym with the statement;
type synonym employee = string
Subsequently, we define the arbitrary sets of basic types as sets of strings as
shown below.
definition EMPLOYEE :: "string set "
where "EMPLOYEE == v. ∃ (s::string) . v = s"
Relations and functions. A relation is a set of cartesian products of some given types.
Throughout this thesis, we restrict ourself to binary relations which are
relations between two given types. In Z notation, a relation is enforced
between two types via the use of the infix operator ↔. Given two types
DOCTOR and PATIENT , Equation (A.3) defines a relation between the two.
GP : DOCTOR↔ PATIENT (A.3)
Equation (A.3) can be read as: the relation GP relates doctors to patients . The
HOL notation equivalent for the Equation (A.3) is shown as Equation (A.4).
∀ (GP::doctor <=> patient) . GP ∈ (DOCTOR <> PATIENT) (A.4)
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Here, doctor and patient are two type variables representing types of the
elements in the two universal sets DOCTOR and PATIENT defined by the
two given types and <=> is the type constructor for the “relation type" in
the Mathematical tool-kit. The invariant GP ∈ (DOCTOR <> PATIENT )
defines the valid elements that belong to the set of the cartesian products of
the relation GP. The set of elements DOCTOR and PATIENT of the arbitrary
types doctor and patient are defined as follows.
definition DOCTOR :: "string set " (A.5)
where "DOCTOR == v. ∃ (s::string) . v = s" (A.6)
Set definition for basic type DOCTOR
definition PATIENT :: "string set " (A.7)
where "PATIENT == v. ∃ (s::string) . v = s" (A.8)
Set definition for basic type PATIENT
Functions are special types of relations. The toolkit by Bowen and Gordon
(1994) defines functions that restrict the subset of relations that are healthy
with respect to various function definitions. Appendix A.4 presents operators
in the toolkit that are defined for functions over relations and components of
those relations.
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Function type Z infix notation HiVe notation
Binary relation ↔ <>
Partial function 7→ -|->
Total function → >
Function application %
Cartesian product × ><
Maplet 7→ |->
Table A.3: Operators in HiVe for the Z mathematical constructs
Following are the function definitions for partial and total functions.
X 7→ Y == {f . f : (S↔ R) ∧ (∀ x y1 y2. (x, y1) : f ∧ (x, y2) : f ⇒ (y1 = y2))}
X→ Y == {s.s : S 7→ R ∧ dom s = S}
In a system where only some doctors are assigned patients, a partial relation
exists between the doctors and the patients. In such a case, the relation GP
can be defined as;
GP : DOCTOR 7→ PATIENT
whereas the HOL equivalent definition is,
∀ (GP::doctor <=> patient) . GP ∈ (DOCTOR -|-> PATIENT)
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A.5 Description and formal specification of systems
A.5.1 Case study - Phone book system
A hand-crafted documentation with a formal specification of the Phone book system of
a secret government agency is presented. A Circus action is defined for each use case in
the use case diagram of the Phone book system shown in Figure A.3. The operations
performed by these actions are described in Table A.5. It is important to note that
the action Init in Table A.5 is not in Figure A.3. This is because Init initializes system
variables and is not executed through external action. The following table of contents
may be useful for easy navigation within this case study.
Contents of the case study Page
Documentation of the Phone book system case study
- Operations 295
- Data types of system entities 297
- State variables 297
- Formal specification of the system in the Circus notation 300
A.5.1.a Operations
The operations of the system are formalized as Circus actions and described in Table A.5.
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Figure A.3: Use case diagram for the Phone book system
Table A.5: Phone book system - Description of the Circus actions
Action Operation performed by the action
AddPhoneNumber Adds a phone number to the phone book.
SetSecretPhoneNumber Adds an official into the list of high ranking officials whose
phone numbers should never be revealed.
GetPhoneNumberNoSecret Outputs the phone number of a given official, as long he is
not included in the list of high ranking officials.
GetPhoneNumberAny Outputs the phone number of a given offical.
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A.5.1.b Data types of system entities
The entities of the system are employees and their phone numbers. These are represen-
ted using basic types. These basic types are described in Table A.6.
Table A.6: Phone book system - Description of the basic types
Basic type Description
EMPLOYEE set of all possible identifiers for employees
TELEPHONE set of all possible telephone numbers
A.5.1.c State variables
The state of the system is recorded by the schema State. The state variables that record
and maintain various information about the system state are described in Table A.7.
Table A.7: Phone book system - Description of the state variables
State variable Description
phoneNumbers A relation that identifes the telephone number allocated to each
unique employee.
secretList The set of unique identifiers that represents the set of employees
whose phone numbers are considered secret.
loggedIn The set of identifiers of the users who are logged into the system.
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loginUser The identifier that represents the user who is currently logged into
the system.
reqOfficial The identifier of the official whose phone number is being reques-
ted from the system.
officials The set of identifiers that represents all the officials whose phone
numbers have been recorded in the system.
secretaries The set of unique identifiers that represents the secretaries of the
organisation.
engineers The set of identifiers that represents all the engineers whose phone
numbers have been recorded in the system.
manager The identifier that represents the manager of the organisation.
A.5.1.d State invariants
Further, the system is designed to respect the following constraints.
Table A.8: Phone book system - Description of the state invariants
State invariants Description
dom (phoneNumbers) ⊆ officials
The set of people whose phone numbers are recorded in the system must
be from the set of officials recorded in the system.
secretList ⊆ dom (phoneNumbers)
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The set of officials whose numbers are considered confidential must be
from the set of officials whose phone numbers have been recorded in the
system.
reqOfficial ∈ dom (phoneNumbers)
The official whose phone number is being requested from the system
must have his/her phone number recorded in the system.
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
The current user must be from the set of users logged into the system.
loggedIn ⊆ officials
The set of users who are logged into the system must be from the set of
officials in the agency.
officials ⊆ (secretaries ∪ engineers ∪ {manager})
The set of officials of the agency mustbe from the group of secretaries,
the group of engineers or the manager.
(engineers ∩ {manager}) = {}
The same person cannot be an engineer and the manager at the same
time.
({manager} ∩ secretaries) = {}
The same person cannot be the manager and a secretary at the same time.
(engineers ∩ secretaries) = {}
The same person cannot be an engineer and a secretary at the same time.
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[ TELEPHONE,EMPLOYEE ]
State
phoneNumbers : EMPLOYEE 7 7→ TELEPHONE
manager, reqOfficial, loginUser : EMPLOYEE
engineers, secretaries, officials, loggedIn, secretList : FEMPLOYEE
(engineers ∩ secretaries) = {}
({manager} ∩ secretaries) = {}
(engineers ∩ {manager}) = {}
officials ⊆ (secretaries ∪ engineers ∪ {manager})
loggedIn ⊆ officials
loginUser ∈ loggedIn
reqOfficial ∈ dom (phoneNumbers)
secretList ⊆ dom (phoneNumbers)
dom (phoneNumbers) ⊆ officials
HideSecretNumber
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
reqOfficial ∈ secretList ∧
reqOfficial 6= loginUser ∧
loginUser 6= manager⇒
reqOfficial ∈ dom (phoneNumbers)⇒
reqOfficial9 6∈ dom (phoneNumbers9)
channel addPhoneNumberIn, anyPhoneOut,noSecPhoneOut : TELEPHONE
channel noSecOfficialIn, setSecretOfficialIn, addPhoneOfficialIn : EMPLOYEE
channel anyOfficialIn : EMPLOYEE
channelset Engineers == {| noSecPhoneOut,noSecOfficialIn |}
channelset Manager == {| setSecretOfficialIn, anyPhoneOut, anyOfficialIn |}
channelset Secretaries == {| addPhoneOfficialIn,noSecPhoneOut,noSecOfficialIn,
addPhoneNumberIn |}
process Phone book system =̂ begin
state State
Init =̂ reqOfficial := loginUser
AddPhoneNumber =̂ var addPhoneNumber : TELEPHONE;
addPhoneOfficial : officials •
addPhoneNumberIn?addPhoneNumber−→
addPhoneOfficialIn?addPhoneOfficial−→
((loginUser ∈ secretaries)N
phoneNumbers := phoneNumbers⊕
{(addPhoneOfficial? 7→ addPhoneNumber?)})
SetSecretPhoneNumber =̂ var setSecretOfficial : dom (phoneNumbers) •
setSecretOfficialIn?setSecretOfficial−→
((loginUser = manager)N
secretList := secretList ∪ {setSecretOfficial?})
Figure A.4: Specification of Phone book system - code block 1 of 2
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GetPhoneNumberNoSecret =̂ var noSecOfficial : dom (phoneNumbers) •
noSecOfficialIn?noSecOfficial−→
reqOfficial := noSecOfficial?;
((noSecOfficial? 6∈ secretList ∨
loginUser = manager)N
noSecPhoneOut !(phoneNumbers noSecOfficial?)−→ Skip)
GetPhoneNumberAny =̂ var anyOfficial : dom (phoneNumbers) •
anyOfficialIn?anyOfficial−→
reqOfficial := anyOfficial?;
((loginUser = manager)N
anyPhoneOut !(phoneNumbers anyOfficial?)−→ Skip)
HideSecretNumber =̂ HideSecretNumber
Options =̂

AddPhoneNumber@ SetSecretPhoneNumber@ GetPhoneNumberNoSecret@ GetPhoneNumberAny
 ; HideSecretNumber
• 〈Init〉 ; µY • 〈Options ; Y〉
end
Figure A.4 (cont.) : Specification of Phone book system - code block 2 of 2
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A.5.2 Case study - Secure electronic examination system
A hand-crafted documentation with a formal specification of the Secure electronic
examination system is presented. A Circus action is defined for each use case in the use
case diagram of the Secure electronic examination system shown in Figure A.5. The
operations performed by these actions are described in Table A.14. It is important to
note that the action Init in Table A.14 is not in Figure A.5. This is because Init initializes
system variables and is not executed through external action. The following table of
contents may be useful for easy navigation within this case study.
Contents of the case study Page
Documentation of the Secure electronic examination system case study
- Operations 310
- Data types of system entities 302
- State variables 305
- Formal specification of the system in the Circus notation 312
A.5.2.a Data types of system entities
The entities of the system including the actors Chair, Student, Setter, Checker and
Grader as well as the components Paper, Question, Answer and Candidate are repres-
ented using basic types. These basic types are described in Table A.10.
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Figure A.5: Use case diagram for a Secure electronic examination system
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Table A.10: Secure electronic examination system - Description of the basic types
Basic type Description
EXAMINER The set of all possible identifiers for examiners
USER The set of all users who are allowed access to the system
SUBJECT The set of all identifiers for subjects
PAPER The set of all identifiers for all subject examination papers an-
nounced and managed in the system
QUESTION The set of all identifiers for questions in all the subject examination
papers.
ANSWER The set of all identifiers for answers recorded by students against
the subject examination papers
CANDIDATE The set of all identifiers representing candidates who are students
who have registered in the system to sit on examinations.
The login status of users and the status of the examination papers are attributes that
define values for certain properties of some entities in the system. These attributes are
declared as free types in the system and are described in Table A.11.
Table A.11: Secure electronic examination system - Description of the free types
Free type Item Meaning
PAPERSTATUS announced The paper has been announced.
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setting The paper is currently being set.
checked The paper has been checked.
released The paper has been released for candidates to take
the paper.
paperclosed The examination has ended and answers will not
be accepted from candidates for that paper.
grading The paper is currently being graded.
gradepublished The results have been published.
A.5.2.b State variables
The state of the system is recorded by the schema State. The state variables that record
and maintain various information about the system state are described in Table A.12.
Table A.12: Secure electronic examination system - Description of the state variables
State variable Description
chair A function that identifies the lecturer appointed as the chair for a
subject, if any.
exams A relation between subjects and examination papers initiated for
those subjects.
setter A function that identifies the lectuer appointed as the setter for a
paper, if any.
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checker A function that identifies the lectuer appointed as the cheker for a
paper, if any.
grader A function that identifies the lectuer appointed as the marker for a
paper, if any.
pStatus A function that identifies the status of a paper, if any.
regStudent A function that identifies the student for a given candidate, if any.
regPaper A function that identifies the paper registered by a candidate, if
any.
questions A relation between papers and questions that belong to those
papers.
ansPaper A relation between papers and answers recorded on those papers.
ansStudent A relation between candidate and answers they have recorded.
result A function that represents the grade obatained by a candidate, if
any.
students The set of identifiers of the students.
lecturers The set of identifiers of the lecturers.
users The set of identifiers of the users who are allowed acces to the
system.
loginUser The user who is currently logged into the system.
theCandidate The candidate whose grade or answer is being requested from the
system.
306
A.5 Description and formal specification of systems
A.5.2.c State invariants
Further, the system is designed to respect the following constraints.
Table A.13: Secure electronic examination system - Description of the state invari-
ants
State invariants Description
((ran chair) ∪ (ran setter) ∪ (ran checker) ∪ (ran grader)) ⊆ lecturers
The set of lecturers who are appointed as chairs of subjects a subset of
the set of chairs recorded in the system.
((ran chair) ∩ (ran setter)) = {}
A lecturer cannot be a subject chair and a setter at the same time.
((ran chair) ∩ (ran checker)) = {}
A person cannot be both a chair and a checker in the system.
((ran chair) ∩ (ran grader)) = {}
A person cannot be both a chair and a grader in the system.
((ran setter) ∩ (ran checker)) = {}
A person cannot be both a setter and a checker in the system.
((ran setter) ∩ (ran grader)) = {}
A person cannot be both a setter and a grader in the system.
((ran checker) ∩ (ran grader)) = {}
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A person cannot be both a checker and a grader in the system.
users ⊆ (lecturers ∪ students)
The set of users allowed access to the system is a subset of the set of
lectuers and students.
(lecturers ∩ students) = {}
A person cannot be a lecturer and a student at the same time.
loginUser ∈ users
The user currently using the system must be from the set of users allowed
access to the system.
dom (pStatus) ⊆ dom (exams)
A paper for which a paper status has been recorded must belong to a
particular subject.
dom (setter) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
A paper for which a setter has been assigned must have a paper status.
dom (checker) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
A paper for which a checker has been assigned must have a paper status.
dom (grader) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
A paper for which a grader has been assigned must have a paper status.
dom (questions) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
Every paper on which a question is recorded must have a paper status.
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dom (ansPaper) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
Every paper on which an answer is recorded must have a paper status.
ran regPaper ⊆ dom (pStatus)
Every paper registered for, must have a paper status.
dom (regPaper) ⊆ dom (regStudent)
Every student registered for a paper must be a registered candidate.
ran regStudent ⊆ students
A student registered as a candidate must be a student recorded in the
system.
dom (result) ⊆ dom (regPaper)
Every result recorded in the system must be for a registered paper.
dom (ansStudent) ⊆ dom (regPaper)
Every answer recorded by a student must be for a registered paper.
dom (questions) ⊆ dom (setter)
Every paper for which questions are recorded, must have a setter assigned
to it.
dom (questions) ⊆ ran regPaper
Every question recorded in the system must be for a registered paper.
dom (ansPaper) ⊆ ran regPaper
Every answer recorded in the system must be for a registered paper.
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A.5.2.d Operations
The operations of the system are formalized as Circus actions and described in
Table A.14.
Table A.14: Secure electronic examination system - Description of the Circus actions
Action Operation performed by the action
AnnouncePaper Allows a subject chair to announce a subject examination.
AppointSetter Allows a subject chair to appoint a subject lecturer to set the
exam paper.
ResignSetter Allows an appointed setter to resign himself or herself from
the post.
AppointChecker Allows a subject chair to appoint a subject lecturer to check
the exam paper.
ResignChecker Allows an appointed checker to resign himself or herself
from the post.
AppointMarker Allows a subject chair to appoint a subject lecturer to set the
exam paper.
ResignMarker Allows an appointed grader to resign himself or herself from
the post.
CloseExam Allows a setter to close the paper to conclude the end of the
examination.
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CheckPaper Allows a checker to check the paper and record his approval
by changing the paper status to checked.
GradePaper Allows a grader to record the grade awarded to a particular
cnadidate for a particular paper.
PublishGrades Allows a grader to publish the grades obained by all candid-
ates who set for a paper.
TakePaper Allows a student to record answers for a particular paper
during the examination.
GetMyAnswers Allows a user to view the answers he/she has recorded in
the system.
RegisterforExam Allows a student to register for a particular paper using
his/her candidate number.
CancelRegistration Allows a student to cancel his/her registration for a particu-
lar paper.
GetOwnResult Allows a student to view his/her grade for a particular paper
he/she took.
GetAnyResult Allows a lecturer to view the grade of any candidate for any
paper he/she has sat.
SetPaper Allows a setter to set a paper by recording questions for that
paper.
ReleasePaper Allows a setter to release the paper for candidates to take
the examination.
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[ ANSWER,QUESTION,PAPER,SUBJECT,USER,EXAMINER ]
[ CANDIDATE ]
PAPERSTATUS ::= paperclosed | released | checked | setting | announced
| gradepublished | grading
State
loginUser : USER
regStudent : CANDIDATE 7 7→USER
ansPaper : PAPER↔ANSWER
ansStudent : CANDIDATE↔ANSWER
grader, checker, setter : PAPER 7 7→USER
pStatus : PAPER 7 7→ PAPERSTATUS
exams : PAPER 7 7→ SUBJECT
chair : SUBJECT 7 7→USER
regPaper : CANDIDATE 7 7→ PAPER
users, lecturers, students : FUSER
theCandidate : CANDIDATE
questions : PAPER↔QUESTION
result : CANDIDATE 7 7→N
dom (ansPaper) ⊆ ran regPaper
dom (questions) ⊆ ran regPaper
dom (questions) ⊆ dom (setter)
dom (ansStudent) ⊆ dom (regPaper)
dom (result) ⊆ dom (regPaper)
ran regStudent ⊆ students
dom (regPaper) ⊆ dom (regStudent)
ran regPaper ⊆ dom (pStatus)
dom (ansPaper) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
dom (questions) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
dom (grader) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
dom (checker) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
dom (setter) ⊆ dom (pStatus)
dom (pStatus) ⊆ dom (exams)
loginUser ∈ users
(lecturers ∩ students) = {}
users ⊆ (lecturers ∪ students)
((ran checker) ∩ (ran grader)) = {}
((ran setter) ∩ (ran grader)) = {}
((ran setter) ∩ (ran checker)) = {}
((ran chair) ∩ (ran grader)) = {}
((ran chair) ∩ (ran checker)) = {}
((ran chair) ∩ (ran setter)) = {}
((ran chair) ∪ (ran setter) ∪ (ran checker) ∪ (ran grader)) ⊆ lecturers
HideOthersAnswers
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser 6= theCandidate ∧
pStatus (regPaper theCandidate) = released⇒
(ran({theCandidate} −C ansStudent) ∩
ran({theCandidate9} −C ansStudent9)) = {}
Figure A.6: Specification of Secure electronic examination system - code block 1 of 6
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channel gradeAwardedIn, anyResultOut, ownResultOut :N
channel takePaperAnswerIn : ANSWER
channel appCheckerSubjectIn, appointPsubjectIn, paperSubjectIn : SUBJECT
channel appMarkerSubjectIn : SUBJECT
channel resignPsetterIn, appointPSetterIn,newPaperIn : PAPER
channel appMarkerPaperIn, resCheckerPaperIn, appCheckerPaperIn : PAPER
channel gradePaperIn, chkPaperIn, closePaperIn, resMarkerPaperIn : PAPER
channel regExamPaperIn, takePaperIn, pubGradePaperIn : PAPER
channel anyResultPaperIn, ownResultPaperIn, cancelRegPaperIn : PAPER
channel releasePaperIn, setPaperIn : PAPER
channel ownAnswerCandidateIn, takePaperCandidateIn, gradeCandidateIn : CANDIDATE
channel ownResultCandidateIn, cancelRegCandidateIn, regExamCandidateIn : CANDIDATE
channel anyResultCandidateIn : CANDIDATE
channel appMarkerLecturerIn, appCheckerLecturerIn, appointPlecturerIn : USER
channel ownAnswerOut : FANSWER
channel setQuestionPaperIn : QUESTION
channelset Chair == {| appMarkerSubjectIn, appMarkerLecturerIn, resMarkerPaperIn,
appCheckerLecturerIn, resCheckerPaperIn, appMarkerPaperIn,
resignPsetterIn, appCheckerSubjectIn, appCheckerPaperIn,
appointPSetterIn, appointPsubjectIn, appointPlecturerIn |}
channelset Checker == {| resCheckerPaperIn, chkPaperIn |}
channelset Marker == {| gradeCandidateIn, gradeAwardedIn, pubGradePaperIn,
gradePaperIn |}
channelset Setter == {| resignPsetterIn, releasePaperIn, closePaperIn,
setPaperIn, setQuestionPaperIn |}
channelset Student == {| takePaperCandidateIn, ownAnswerCandidateIn, ownAnswerOut,
ownResultOut, takePaperIn, takePaperAnswerIn,
cancelRegCandidateIn, ownResultPaperIn, ownResultCandidateIn,
regExamPaperIn, regExamCandidateIn, cancelRegPaperIn |}
process Secure electronic examination system =̂ begin
state State
Init =̂ theCandidate := ((regStudent) ∼) loginUser
AnnouncePaper =̂ var paperSubject : dom (chair);
newPaper : PAPER •
paperSubjectIn?paperSubject−→
newPaperIn?newPaper−→
((chair paperSubject? = loginUser)N
exams := exams⊕ {(newPaper? 7→ paperSubject?)};
pStatus := pStatus⊕ {(newPaper? 7→ announced)})
AppointSetter =̂ var appointPlecturer : lecturers;
appointPsubject : dom (chair);
appointPSetter : dom (pStatus) •
appointPlecturerIn?appointPlecturer−→
appointPsubjectIn?appointPsubject−→
appointPSetterIn?appointPSetter−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧ (appointPsubject?, loginUser) ∈ chair)N
setter := setter⊕ {(appointPSetter? 7→ appointPlecturer?)})
Figure A.6 (cont.) : Specification of Secure electronic examination system - code block 2 of 6
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ResignSetter =̂ var resignPsetter : dom (setter) •
resignPsetterIn?resignPsetter−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧ (resignPsetter?, loginUser) ∈ setter)N
setter := setter \ {(resignPsetter? 7→ loginUser)})
AppointChecker =̂ var appCheckerLecturer : lecturers;
appCheckerSubject : dom (chair);
appCheckerPaper : dom (pStatus) •
appCheckerLecturerIn?appCheckerLecturer−→
appCheckerSubjectIn?appCheckerSubject−→
appCheckerPaperIn?appCheckerPaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(appCheckerSubject?, loginUser) ∈ chair)N
checker := checker⊕
{(appCheckerPaper? 7→ appCheckerLecturer?)})
ResignChecker =̂ var resCheckerPaper : dom (checker) •
resCheckerPaperIn?resCheckerPaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(resCheckerPaper?, loginUser) ∈ checker)N
checker := checker \ {(resCheckerPaper? 7→ loginUser)})
AppointMarker =̂ var appMarkerLecturer : lecturers;
appMarkerSubject : dom (chair);
appMarkerPaper : dom (pStatus) •
appMarkerLecturerIn?appMarkerLecturer−→
appMarkerSubjectIn?appMarkerSubject−→
appMarkerPaperIn?appMarkerPaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(appMarkerSubject?, loginUser) ∈ chair)N
grader := grader⊕
{(appMarkerPaper? 7→ appMarkerLecturer?)})
ResignMarker =̂ var resMarkerPaper : dom (grader) •
resMarkerPaperIn?resMarkerPaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧ (resMarkerPaper?, loginUser) ∈ grader)N
grader := grader \ {(resMarkerPaper? 7→ loginUser)})
CloseExam =̂ var closePaper : dom (setter) ∩ dom (pStatus) •
closePaperIn?closePaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(closePaper?, loginUser) ∈ setter ∧
(closePaper?, released) ∈ pStatus)N
pStatus := pStatus⊕ {(closePaper? 7→ paperclosed)})
CheckPaper =̂ var chkPaper : dom (checker) ∩ dom (pStatus) •
chkPaperIn?chkPaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(chkPaper?, loginUser) ∈ checker ∧
(chkPaper?, setting) ∈ pStatus)N
pStatus := pStatus⊕ {(chkPaper? 7→ checked)})
Figure A.6 (cont.) : Specification of Secure electronic examination system - code block 3 of 6
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GradePaper =̂ var gradeAwarded :N;
gradePaper : dom (grader) ∩ dom (pStatus);
gradeCandidate : dom (regPaper) •
gradeAwardedIn?gradeAwarded−→
gradePaperIn?gradePaper−→
gradeCandidateIn?gradeCandidate−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(gradeCandidate?, gradePaper?) ∈ regPaper ∧
(gradePaper?, paperclosed) ∈ pStatus ∧
(gradePaper?, loginUser) ∈ grader)N
result := result⊕ {(gradeCandidate? 7→ gradeAwarded?)})
PublishGrades =̂ var pubGradePaper : dom (grader) ∩ dom (pStatus) •
pubGradePaperIn?pubGradePaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(pubGradePaper?, paperclosed) ∈ pStatus ∧
(pubGradePaper?, loginUser) ∈ grader)N
pStatus := pStatus⊕ {(pubGradePaper? 7→ gradepublished)})
TakePaper =̂ var takePaperAnswer : ANSWER;
takePaperCandidate : dom (regPaper);
takePaper : ran(regPaper) •
takePaperAnswerIn?takePaperAnswer−→
takePaperCandidateIn?takePaperCandidate−→
takePaperIn?takePaper−→
theCandidate := takePaperCandidate?;
((loginUser ∈ students ∧
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser = takePaperCandidate? ∧
(takePaper?, released) ∈ pStatus ∧
(takePaperCandidate?, takePaper?) ∈ regPaper)N
ansPaper := ansPaper⊕ {(takePaper? 7→ takePaperAnswer?)})
GetMyAnswers =̂ var ownAnswerCandidate : dom (ansStudent) •
ownAnswerCandidateIn?ownAnswerCandidate−→
theCandidate := ownAnswerCandidate?;
((loginUser ∈ students ∧
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser = ownAnswerCandidate?)N
ownAnswerOut !
(ansStudent L {ownAnswerCandidate?} M)−→ Skip)
RegisterforExam =̂ var regExamCandidate : dom (regStudent);
regExamPaper : dom (pStatus) •
regExamCandidateIn?regExamCandidate−→
regExamPaperIn?regExamPaper−→
theCandidate := regExamCandidate?;
((loginUser ∈ students ∧
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser = regExamCandidate?)N
regPaper := regPaper⊕
{(regExamCandidate? 7→ regExamPaper?)})
Figure A.6 (cont.) : Specification of Secure electronic examination system - code block 4 of 6
315
A Appendix
CancelRegistration =̂ var cancelRegCandidate : dom (regStudent);
cancelRegPaper : ran(regPaper) •
cancelRegCandidateIn?cancelRegCandidate−→
cancelRegPaperIn?cancelRegPaper−→
theCandidate := cancelRegCandidate?;
((loginUser ∈ students ∧
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser = cancelRegCandidate? ∧
(cancelRegCandidate?, cancelRegPaper?) ∈ regPaper)N
regPaper := regPaper \
{(cancelRegCandidate? 7→ cancelRegPaper?)})
GetOwnResult =̂ var ownResultPaper : ran(regPaper);
ownResultCandidate : dom (result) •
ownResultPaperIn?ownResultPaper−→
ownResultCandidateIn?ownResultCandidate−→
theCandidate := ownResultCandidate?;
((loginUser ∈ students ∧
((regStudent) ∼) loginUser = ownResultCandidate? ∧
(ownResultCandidate?, ownResultPaper?) ∈ regPaper ∧
(ownResultPaper?, gradepublished) ∈ pStatus)N
ownResultOut !(result ownResultCandidate?)−→ Skip)
GetAnyResult =̂ var anyResultCandidate : dom (result);
anyResultPaper : ran(regPaper) •
anyResultCandidateIn?anyResultCandidate−→
anyResultPaperIn?anyResultPaper−→
theCandidate := anyResultCandidate?;
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(anyResultCandidate?, anyResultPaper?) ∈ regPaper)N
anyResultOut !(result anyResultCandidate?)−→ Skip)
SetPaper =̂ var setQuestionPaper : QUESTION;
setPaper : dom (setter) ∩ dom (pStatus) •
setQuestionPaperIn?setQuestionPaper−→
setPaperIn?setPaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(setPaper?, loginUser) ∈ setter ∧
(setPaper?, checked) ∈ pStatus)N
questions := questions⊕
{(setPaper? 7→ setQuestionPaper?)};
pStatus := pStatus⊕ {(setPaper? 7→ setting)})
ReleasePaper =̂ var releasePaper : dom (setter) ∩ dom (pStatus) •
releasePaperIn?releasePaper−→
((loginUser ∈ lecturers ∧
(releasePaper?, loginUser) ∈ setter ∧
(releasePaper?, checked) ∈ pStatus)N
pStatus := pStatus⊕ {(releasePaper? 7→ released)})
HideOthersAnswers =̂ HideOthersAnswers
StudentOptions =̂

RegisterforExam@ CancelRegistration@ TakePaper@ GetOwnResult@ GetMyAnswers

Figure A.6 (cont.) : Specification of Secure electronic examination system - code block 5 of 6
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LecturerOptions =̂

AppointSetter@ ResignSetter@ AppointChecker@ ResignChecker@ CloseExam@ CheckPaper@ AppointMarker@ ResignMarker@ SetPaper@ ReleasePaper@ GradePaper@ PublishGrades@ GetAnyResult

Options =̂
(
LecturerOptions@ StudentOptions
)
; HideOthersAnswers
• 〈Init〉 ; µX • 〈Options ; X〉
end
Figure A.6 (cont.) : Specification of Secure electronic examination system - code block 6 of 6
317
A Appendix
A.5.3 Case study - ePurse system
A hand-crafted documentation with a formal specification of the ePurse system is
presented. A Circus action is defined for each use case in the use case diagram of the
ePurse system is shown in Figure A.7. The operations performed by these actions are
described in Table A.16. It is important to note that the action Init in Table A.16 is not in
Figure A.7. This is because Init initializes system variables and is not executed through
external action. The following table of contents may be useful for easy navigation
within this case study.
Contents of the case study Page
Documentation of the ePurse system case study
- Operations 319
- Data types of system entities 319
- State variables 320
- Formal specification of the system in the Circus notation 324
e-Purse system
Buyer
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e-Purse 
 
Record 
transaction 
 
Approve 
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Process 
payment 
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Information flow violates 
confidentiality policy
Information flow 
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Figure A.7: Use case diagram for the ePurse system
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A.5.3.a Operations
The operations of the system are formalized as Circus actions and listed in Table A.16.
Table A.16: ePurse system - Description of the Circus actions
Action Operation performed by the action
SelectAgent Allows the user to select the current agent who is using the
system.
RecordTrnsctn Allows the seller to record the value of a transaction in the
system.
ApproveTrnsctn Allows the ePurse holder to approve charging the value of the
transaction from his/her ePurse.
ShowBalSec Allows only the ePurse owner to check the balance of the ePurse.
DoPayment Allows the terminal to process the transaction by adjusting value
of the transaction from the ePurse.
A.5.3.b Data types of system entities
These basic types declared in the system are described in Table A.17.
Table A.17: ePurse system - Description of the basic types
Basic type Description
TRANSACTION set of all possible transaction identifiers
EPURSE set of all possible epurse identifiers
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The free types declared in the system are described in Table A.18.
Table A.18: ePurse system - Description of the free types
Free type Item Meaning
AGENT buyer The current agent is the buyer.
seller The current agent is the seller.
terminal The current agent is the terminal.
VALIDATED yes The transaction has been validated.
no The transaction has not been validated.
A.5.3.c State variables
A state variable has been declared to represent each organisational component within
the system specification. The description of these state variables are included in
Table A.19.
Table A.19: ePurse system - Description of the state variables
State variable Description
owns A function that identifies the ePurse owned by a buyer, if any.
balance A function that identifies the balance in an ePurse, if any.
320
A.5 Description and formal specification of systems
transPurse A function that identifies the ePurse to which a transaction is
charged, if any.
transTerminal A function that identifies the terminal on which a transaction is
recorded, if any.
transAmount A function that identifies the value of a transaction, if any.
transValid A function that identifies the validation status of a transaction, if
any.
currAgent The current agent who is using the system.
reqPurse The ePurse of which a balance is being requested.
A.5.3.d State invariants
We assume certain system constraints that must be respected throughout the life of
the system. These constraints reflect the relevant organisational rules that we believe
are typical in a phone book system. These constraints are defined as state invariants
(Woodcock and Davies, 1996, p. 168) in the system specification.
Table A.20: ePurse system - Description of the state invariants
State invariants Description
dom (balance) ⊆ ran owns
Every ePurse which has a balance must also have an owner.
ran transPurse ⊆ dom (balance)
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Every ePurse on to which a transaction is recorded must also have a
balance recorded.
dom (transValid) ⊆ dom (transAmount)
Every transaction that has a validation status must also have a transation
value associated with it.
dom (transPurse) ⊆ dom (transAmount)
Every transacation of an ePurse must also have a transation value associ-
ated with it.
dom (transTerminal) ⊆ dom (transAmount)
Every transacation recorded in a terminal must also have a transation
value associated with it.
reqPurse ∈ ran owns
The ePurse of which a balance is being requested must be owned by
someone.
reqPurse ∈ dom (balance)
The ePurse of which a balance is being requested must have a balance
recorded.
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[ EPURSE,TRANSACTION ]
AGENT ::= terminal | seller | buyer
VALIDATED ::= no | yes
bmin :N
State
transPurse : TRANSACTION 7 7→ EPURSE
transTerminal : TRANSACTION 7 7→AGENT
currAgent : AGENT
transValid : TRANSACTION 7 7→VALIDATED
balance : EPURSE 7 7→N
transAmount : TRANSACTION 7 7→N
owns : AGENT 7 7→ EPURSE
reqPurse : EPURSE
reqPurse ∈ dom (balance)
reqPurse ∈ ran owns
dom (transTerminal) ⊆ dom (transAmount)
dom (transPurse) ⊆ dom (transAmount)
dom (transValid) ⊆ dom (transAmount)
ran transPurse ⊆ dom (balance)
dom (balance) ⊆ ran owns
HideExactBalance
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
(currAgent 7→ reqPurse) 6∈ owns ∧
currAgent 6= terminal ∧
reqPurse ∈ dom (balance)⇒
(balance reqPurse) 6= (balance9 reqPurse9)
HideMinBalance
ΞState
∃ State 9 •
(currAgent 7→ reqPurse) 6∈ owns ∧
currAgent 6= terminal ∧
reqPurse ∈ dom (balance) ∧
balance reqPurse ∈ {r :N | r < bmin} ⇒
balance9 reqPurse9 6∈ {r :N | r < bmin}
channel recordTransAmountIn, showBalEpurseOut, bsout :N
channel epurseOwnerIn, bybIn, approveTransAgentIn, changeAgentIn : AGENT
channel payTransEpurseIn, showEpurseIn, epbIn, approveTransEpurseIn : EPURSE
channel payTransIn, approveTransIn, recordTransactionIn : TRANSACTION
channelset Buyer == {| approveTransIn, approveTransAgentIn, approveTransEpurseIn |}
channelset Seller == {| recordTransAmountIn, recordTransactionIn |}
channelset Terminal == {| showBalEpurseOut, showEpurseIn, epurseOwnerIn,
payTransIn, payTransEpurseIn |}
Figure A.8: Specification of ePurse system - code block 1 of 2
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process ePurse system =̂ begin
state State
SelectAgent =̂ var changeAgent : AGENT •
changeAgentIn?changeAgent−→ currAgent := changeAgent?
RecordTrnsctn =̂ var recordTransaction : TRANSACTION;
recordTransAmount :N •
recordTransactionIn?recordTransaction−→
recordTransAmountIn?recordTransAmount−→
((currAgent = seller)N
transAmount := transAmount⊕
{(recordTransaction? 7→ recordTransAmount?)})
ApproveTrnsctn =̂ var approveTransEpurse : EPURSE;
approveTransAgent : AGENT;
approveTrans : TRANSACTION •
approveTransEpurseIn?approveTransEpurse−→
approveTransAgentIn?approveTransAgent−→
approveTransIn?approveTrans−→
((currAgent = buyer ∧ approveTrans? ∈ dom (transAmount))N
transPurse := transPurse⊕
{(approveTrans? 7→ approveTransEpurse?)};
transValid := transValid⊕ {(approveTrans? 7→ yes)};
transTerminal := transTerminal⊕
{(approveTrans? 7→ approveTransAgent?)})
ShowBalSec =̂ var epurseOwner : dom (owns);
showEpurse : dom (balance) ∩ ran owns •
epurseOwnerIn?epurseOwner−→
showEpurseIn?showEpurse−→
reqPurse := showEpurse?;
((currAgent = buyer ∧ currAgent = epurseOwner? ∧
(epurseOwner? 7→ showEpurse?) ∈ owns)N
showBalEpurseOut !(balance showEpurse?)−→ Skip)
DoPayment =̂ var payTransEpurse : EPURSE;
payTrans : TRANSACTION •
payTransEpurseIn?payTransEpurse−→
payTransIn?payTrans−→
((currAgent = terminal ∧ payTrans? ∈ dom (transPurse))N
balance := balance⊕
{(payTransEpurse? 7→
(balance payTransEpurse?− transAmount payTrans?))})
HideExactBalancê= HideExactBalance
HideMinBalance =̂ HideMinBalance
• µX •
〈SelectAgent〉 ;

〈ApproveTrnsctn〉@ (〈ShowBalSec〉 ; 〈HideExactBalance〉)@ 〈DoPayment〉@ 〈RecordTrnsctn〉
 ; X

end
Figure A.8 (cont.) : Specification of ePurse system - code block 2 of 2
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Abbreviations
ANTLR ANother Tool for Language Recognition
ATP Automatic Theorem Prover
BCF Banks’s Confidentiality Framework
BNF Backus-Naur Form
CA Confidentiality Annotation
CML COMPASS Modelling Language
CNL Controlled Natural Language
CONCHITA CONfidentiality CHecker for Incremental Threat Analysis
CSCW Computer Supported Cooperative Work
CSP Communicating Sequential Processes
CZT Community Z Tools
DLP Data Leak Prevention
DTD Document Type Definition
E.U. European Union
FDR Failures-Divergence Refinement
FTC Federal Trade Commission
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Abbreviations
GUI Graphical user interface
HAZOP HAZard and OPerability
HiVE Hierarchical Verification Environment
HOL Higher-Order Logic
IBAC Identity-Based Access Control
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
KAOS Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification
LCF Logic for Computable Functions
LTL Linear Temporal Logic
ML Meta Language
OCAML Object Categorical Abstract Machine Language
OCL Object Constraint Language
OOPSLA Object-Oriented Programming Systems Languages & Applications
PII Personally Identifiable Information
RBAC Role-Based Access Control
RHODIN Rigorous Open Development Environment for Complex Systems
SMT Satisfiability Modulo Theories
SPIN Simple Promela INterpreter
UML Unified Modelling Language
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Abbreviations
UML-RT Unified Modelling Language - Realtime
UTP Unifying Theories of Programming
ZF Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
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